基于时间投入——专注度双维核心模型的高中生学业勤奋度研究

为避免单维评估存在高估或者低估学生学业勤奋表现的不足,以学业勤奋度研究的"时间(行为)投入"和"专注度"两种取向为基础,提出了高中生学业勤奋度的时间(行为)投入—专注度双维核心模型,并考察386名高中生在该模型上的分布特点,进而检验其应用效果。结果表明:(1)以学业勤奋度的双维核心模型为基础,将学生分为四组,并且这四组学生在时间投入和专注度上的差异表现为:在时间投入上,高时间投入的两个组学生的时间投入水平较高,低时间投入两个组学生的时间投入水平较低;在专注度上的分布也是如此。这说明本研究的分组是有效的。(2)模型能够有效将高中生分组,其中高时间投入—低专注度组所占比例最大(30.4%),其次为低时间投入—低专注度组(28.6%),再次是低时间投入—高专注度组(23.6%),高时间投入—高专注度组所占比例最小(17.4%)。(3)模型在不同总体学业成绩和语文、数学、英语等单科成绩上的分组效应均显著,同时拥有高学习时间(行为)投入和高专注度的高中生具有最佳的总体和单科学业成绩。因此,学业勤奋度的学习时间(行为)投入—专注度模型具有良好的应用效果。     

‘It seems at the moment my career is dependent on factors outside of my control’: reflections on graduates’ experiences of employment and career enactment in an era of economic uncertainty and austerity

ABSTRACT

This paper explores contested notions of the purpose of education and careers work. The research for the paper examines public sector employee reactions to notion of a psychological contract breach, when cuts in funding put their jobs and careers at risk. It argues that, in this environment, the search for career fulfilment can be marked by feelings of cruel optimism, wicked problems and broken expectations. The findings are then used to present the case for further research, firstly, to address the notion of possible selves, as individuals explore alternative identity affirming career opportunities; and secondly, the impact of changes in public policy on the processes of psychological contracting between students and staff in further and higher education.     

Neuroscience and the possibility of locally determined choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias

In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their conclusion, despite being sympathetic to a lot of what they say in support of it.     

Strawson’s modest transcendental argument

Although Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was published over fifty years ago and has been widely discussed, its main argument is still notoriously difficult to pin down. The most common – but in my view, mistaken – interpretation of Strawson’s argument takes him to be providing a ‘relentlessly’ naturalistic framework for our responsibility practices. To rectify this mistake, I offer an alternative interpretation of Strawson’s argument. As I see it, rather than offering a relentlessly naturalistic framework for moral responsibility, Strawson actually develops a transcendental argument, which grounds our moral responsibility practices in the practical perspective of social agents. However, the aims of this essay are not purely interpretative. Strawson’s essay continues to have important implications for a number of issues that arise in the contemporary debates that concern free will and moral responsibility. In particular, it puts significant pressure on moral responsibility sceptics like Derk Pereboom [Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001] who think that the truth of moral responsibility scepticism has no worrisome implications for our lives with others.     

Locke’s arguments against the freedom to will

In sections 2.21.23–25 of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke considers and rejects two ways in which we might be ‘free to will’, which correspond to the Thomistic distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. In this paper, I examine Locke’s arguments in detail. In the first part, I argue for a non-developmental reading of Locke’s argument against freedom of exercise. Locke’s view throughout all five editions of the Essay is that we do not possess freedom of exercise (at least in most cases). In the second part, I argue that, when Locke asks whether we possess freedom of specification, his question is intentionally ambiguous between two readings, a first-order reading and a higher-order reading. Locke’s view is that, on either reading, we do not possess freedom of specification (at least in any interesting sense).     

Decomposability of the Finitely Generated Free Hoop Residuation Algebra

In this paper we prove that, for n > 1, the n-generated free algebra in any locally finite subvariety of HoRA can be written in a unique nontrivial way as Ł₂ × A′, where A′ is a directly indecomposable algebra in . More precisely, we prove that the unique nontrivial pair of factor congruences of is given by the filters and , where the element is recursively defined from the term introduced by W. H. Cornish. As an additional result we obtain a characterization of minimal irreducible filters of in terms of its coatoms. Presented by Daniele Mundici     

自由意志与决定论的关系：基于心理学视角

西方心理学的各种理论流派在对人格、自我和行为动因等基本问题作出解答时,始终存在自由意志与决定论的分歧与对峙。该文在对这些分歧和对峙作出评述和分析的基础上,厘清了人类行为的决定因素和目的性动因,主张目的性是自由意志存在的基础,而人类意识行为选择的多样性以及自我对不同选择的断言则使自由意志成为必然。自由意志与决定性是一个问题的两个方面,二者是一种辩证统一的关系。     

MARKETS AND MORALITY

For most of human history, economic systems were personal in nature—people normally interacted with people they knew personally and knew well. Today's modern market economies are impersonal—people normally interact with people they do not know personally. The historical movement from personal to impersonal systems was necessary for societies to develop the specialization of labor needed for modern production technologies. That is, the high standards of living in the developed world are due to these impersonal systems. However, the ethical systems theologians apply to modern market systems were developed for personal societies and are often inappropriate for impersonal societies. In this article, we develop the differences between personal and impersonal systems, examine the writings of a number of theologians who are very critical of market economies, and attempt to show how a different ethical approach is needed.