On a neglected feature of moral agency

Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.     

The Case of Guest Workers: Exploitation,Citizenship and Economic Rights

Working from a ``capitalist' theory of exploitation, based on a neo-classical account of economic value, I argue that guest workers are exploited. It may be objected, however, that since they are not citizens, any inequality that stems from their status as non-citizens is morally unobjectionable. Although host countries are under no moral obligation to admit guest workers as citizens, thereare independent reasons that call for the extension of economicrights – the freedom of occupation in particular – to guestworkers. Since the cause of unequal exchange rests in the factthat guest workers are deprived of these rights, rather than in their exclusion from citizenship per se, I concludethat they are exploited even if their exclusion from citizenshipmay be justified.     

Researching a Local Heroin Market as a Complex Adaptive System

This project applies agent-based modeling (ABM) techniques to better understand the operation, organization, and structure of a local heroin market. The simulation detailed was developed using data from an 18-month ethnographic case study. The original research, collected in Denver, CO during the 1990s, represents the historic account of users and dealers who operated in the Larimer area heroin market. Working together, the authors studied the behaviors of customers, private dealers, street-sellers, brokers, and the police, reflecting the core elements pertaining to how the market operated. After evaluating the logical consistency between the data and agent behaviors, simulations scaled-up interactions to observe their aggregated outcomes. While the concept and findings from this study remain experimental, these methods represent a novel way in which to understand illicit drug markets and the dynamic adaptations and outcomes they generate. Extensions of this research perspective, as well as its strengths and limitations, are discussed.     

Countries with fewer males have more violent crime: marriage markets and mating aggression

Violent crimes (murders, rapes, and assaults) are substantially higher in countries with a relative scarcity of men according to research using INTERPOL data [Barber, 2000a]. This is a paradox given that males are more criminally violent and likely reflects increased direct mating competition. The present research sought to confirm and extend Barber's [2000a] finding, using murder data from the United Nations and homicides from World Health Organization that are of higher quality than the INTERPOL data, and using more rigorous controls. In addition to level of economic development, control variables included, income inequality, urbanization, population density, the number of police, and whether the country was a major center of illegal drug trafficking. Regression analyses with all controls found that killings in both data sets increased with declines in the male proportion of the population. The findings are discussed in terms of direct reproductive competition and alternative explanations are considered.     

Complexity as a guide to understanding decision bias: A contribution to the favorite‐longshot bias debate

This paper investigates the origins of a widespread decision bias in betting markets, the favorite‐longshot bias (FLB); in particular, whether it is caused by cognitive errors on the part of bettors or by the pricing policies of bookmakers. The methodology is based on previous literature, which has suggested that: (i) races, as decision tasks for bettors, can be distinguished by their degree of complexity and their attractiveness to those with access to privileged information (insiders), (ii) cognitive errors increase as complexity increases, and (iii) bookmakers set odds in a manner to protect themselves from insiders. The degree of FLB was examined in races of varying complexity and attractiveness to insiders using a dataset of 8545 races drawn from the parallel bookmaker and pari‐mutuel markets operating in the UK in 2004. The results, interpreted in the light of the cognitive error and complexity literature, suggest that neither bettors' nor bookmakers' cognitive errors are the main cause of the bias. Rather, bettors' preferences for risk and the deliberate pricing policies of bookmakers play key roles in influencing the bias in markets where bookmakers and pari‐mutuel operators coexist. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neuroscience and the possibility of locally determined choices: Reply to Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias

In a previous paper, I argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will by providing support for a subset of what I called “statements of local determination.” I also argued that Libet-style experiments have not so far supported statements of that sort. In a commentary to the paper, Adina Roskies and Eddy Nahmias accept the claim about Libet-style experiments, but reject the claim about the possibilities of neuroscience. Here, I explain why I still disagree with their conclusion, despite being sympathetic to a lot of what they say in support of it.     

Strawson’s modest transcendental argument

Although Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was published over fifty years ago and has been widely discussed, its main argument is still notoriously difficult to pin down. The most common – but in my view, mistaken – interpretation of Strawson’s argument takes him to be providing a ‘relentlessly’ naturalistic framework for our responsibility practices. To rectify this mistake, I offer an alternative interpretation of Strawson’s argument. As I see it, rather than offering a relentlessly naturalistic framework for moral responsibility, Strawson actually develops a transcendental argument, which grounds our moral responsibility practices in the practical perspective of social agents. However, the aims of this essay are not purely interpretative. Strawson’s essay continues to have important implications for a number of issues that arise in the contemporary debates that concern free will and moral responsibility. In particular, it puts significant pressure on moral responsibility sceptics like Derk Pereboom [Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001] who think that the truth of moral responsibility scepticism has no worrisome implications for our lives with others.     

Locke’s arguments against the freedom to will

In sections 2.21.23–25 of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke considers and rejects two ways in which we might be ‘free to will’, which correspond to the Thomistic distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. In this paper, I examine Locke’s arguments in detail. In the first part, I argue for a non-developmental reading of Locke’s argument against freedom of exercise. Locke’s view throughout all five editions of the Essay is that we do not possess freedom of exercise (at least in most cases). In the second part, I argue that, when Locke asks whether we possess freedom of specification, his question is intentionally ambiguous between two readings, a first-order reading and a higher-order reading. Locke’s view is that, on either reading, we do not possess freedom of specification (at least in any interesting sense).     

‘It seems at the moment my career is dependent on factors outside of my control’: reflections on graduates’ experiences of employment and career enactment in an era of economic uncertainty and austerity

ABSTRACT

This paper explores contested notions of the purpose of education and careers work. The research for the paper examines public sector employee reactions to notion of a psychological contract breach, when cuts in funding put their jobs and careers at risk. It argues that, in this environment, the search for career fulfilment can be marked by feelings of cruel optimism, wicked problems and broken expectations. The findings are then used to present the case for further research, firstly, to address the notion of possible selves, as individuals explore alternative identity affirming career opportunities; and secondly, the impact of changes in public policy on the processes of psychological contracting between students and staff in further and higher education.