A Cerebral Hyperventilation Index for Electroencephalography

This study was an attempt to determine the effect of drive on probability learning. Each of two groups of Ss was divided into high- and low-drive groups on the basis of MAS scores. Each S was given 200 trials on a probability learning task, with 70 per cent reinforcement on one side and 30 per cent reinforcement on the other. At the .05 level, there was no difference between groups in probability choices, and neither group differed from the objective probability scores. The results are discussed in terms of the number of trials involved, the introduction of emotional arousal, and Hullian theory. On the basis of a comparison with the results of previous studies, it was suggested that investigators be cautious in generalizing probability learning results from one species to another.     

Energy,Complexity, and Strategies of Evolution: As Illustrated by Maya Indians of Guatemala

Using free energy rate density (Φ_m) I differentiate two evolutionary strategies common to cosmic, biological, and cultural systems: the horizontal when energy increases proportional to mass, with no increase in complexity; and the vertical when it increases disproportionately to the mass and complexity increases. The vertical process is a continuing increase in complexity such that the system becomes vulnerable to collapse when energy sources fail. This is illustrated by a comparison of four Mayan Indian groups in Guatemala.     

Introduction: The Role of Process Metaphysics in Our World of Science

This article applies the analytic rigor of philosophy to the vexed topic of business strategy, and uses the objective, public evidence of business strategy as an existence proof for the possibility of free will and purpose in the private realm of subjective intentionality. The first part distinguishes three types of intentionality in philosophy—purposive intentionality, referential intentionality, and the problematic intentionality of a godlike, miraculous “inner intender.” After rejecting this third type of intentionality, and noting that its rejection saves the first two types of intentionality from guilt by association, the second part draws parallels with three types of strategy in business: purposive, referential, and godlike. The first defines the goals and objectives of a company; the second picks out and targets consumers in market driven strategy; and the third, with the help of philosophical reflections, demands a rethinking of the function of leadership without reliance on a single, godlike leader. In the third part of this article, the existence proof from the public world of business is used to shed light on the possibility of intentionality in the private world of subjective intentionality. Finally, the article draws conclusions for its three audiences: for the philosophers, with credit to Nietzsche who saw it all, a greater clarity about intentionality and free will; for business people, greater clarity about the importance of purposiveness and strategic intent; and for business philosophers, a demonstration showing how—through strategy and intentionality—we can both create value and give meaning to the lives of our employees, ourselves, and our customers.     

Quantification of dislocation structures at high resolution by atomic force microscopy of dislocation etch pits

Atomic force microscopy of dislocation etch pit structures is a convenient means of characterising the dislocation structure in etchable materials at high resolution for dislocation spacing extending down to 25 nm . This is demonstrated for single crystals of CaF₂. The local deformation zone generated around nanoindents at ambient temperature and the low-angle boundaries generated in the bulk during uniaxial compression at elevated temperatures are presented as examples.     

Theology of Desire

Abstract

A white-hair asks, as a man, when I meet a woman, what do I sense? This is answered as a single young man, a married father, a divorced man, and as an elder. From a pre-Sixties youth where sex was religiously defined in terms of marriage and women as mothers-to-be, through the Free Sex movement as a young adult, to experiences of prison sex as a religious radical, into married, divorced and finally elder sexuality, the search is to understand the play of sexuality and intimacy. "Slap the bitch!" prison sex makes clear the source functionality of the mythic Adam's Rib account in determining the currently dominant global view of sexuality and intimacy in the digital age. A vision of coupled presence is presented wherein ritual practices are referenced that enable men and women to embody the fullness of their sexuality and intimacy.     

Delusion,Dissociation and Identity

Abstract

Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.     

At one with our actions,but at two with our bodies

Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as ‘doing’ the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of ‘agent causation’. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are ‘tryings’ that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so would be to endorse the so–called ‘standard causal story’. But Hornsby misses a possibility here, for we can insist on this identity claim without endorsing the standard story if we embrace an account which parallels the disjunctive account in the philosophy of perception. This will leave us with a picture of physical action that saves the insights of Hornsby's account without succumbing to its distortions.     

When Subjectivism Matters

Abstract: In this article I consider when the question of whether entities exist subjectively (only in the minds of subjects) or objectively (in themselves, independently of the minds of subjects) is important, both theoretically and practically. I argue that when it comes to the metaphysics underlying three types of moral questions, broadly conceived, the subjectivity question does not matter practically, although it is widely thought to matter. Subjectivism does not matter in these moral questions in the same way(s) it matters in some nonmoral metaphysical issues. The moral questions I consider are the meaning of life, normative ethics, and the free‐will problem. The nonmoral issues I address are the existence of God, the traditional mind/body problem, and personal identity. I explain the difference by noting that certain metaphysical issues on the fact side of the fact/value distinction impinge on persons' lives more prominently than do the metaphysics behind the three moral questions.     

Spinoza on the Conditions that Nominally Define the Human Condition

ABSTRACT

In ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Harry Frankfurt argues that a successful analysis of the concept ‘human’ must reveal something that distinguishes humans from non-humans, as well as indicate something informative about ‘those attributes [of ourselves] which are the subject of our most humane concern.’ In this paper, I present an analysis of Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ as it is employed within his Ethics. I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ satisfies Frankfurt’s desiderata because I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ is, at core, a version of Frankfurt’s own. I argue that Spinoza’s account of human bondage and human freedom indicate that Spinoza sees humans as beings that possess higher-order volitions, and that comments Spinoza makes throughout his corpus shows that he views beings that lack higher order desires to be, in an important sense, non-human. The analysis here sheds light upon the community of entities that Spinoza’s Ethics is written for, as well as upon issues concerning the nature of Spinoza’s Free Man.