The efficacy of free‐recall,cognitive load,and closed‐ended questions when children are asked to falsely testify about a crime

The current study evaluated the benefits of free‐recall, cognitive load, and closed‐ended questions on children's (ages 6 to 11; N = 147) true and false eyewitness disclosures. Children witnessed an experimenter find a stranger's wallet and were then asked to make a false denial, false accusation, true denial, or true accusation regarding an alleged theft. Overall, the free‐recall question resulted in longer, more forthcoming and more detailed disclosures from older children and those who made a truthful accusation; however, children under the age of 9 and lie‐tellers mostly relied on the closed‐ended questions to discuss the theft. Although the cognitive load questions resulted in newly recalled information, there were no significant narrative differences between true and false statements on these questions. These findings suggest that forensic professionals should consider a child's developmental level, statement veracity, and disclosure‐type (denial vs. accusation) when examining the efficacy of these commonly used questioning strategies.     

Mind,Consciousness, and Free Will

This commentary discusses how philosophy and science can collaborate to understand the human mind, considering dialogues involving three philosophers and three cognitive scientists. Their topics include the relation of philosophy and science, the nature of mind, the problem of consciousness, and the existence of free will. I argue that philosophy is more general and normative than science, but they are interdependent. Philosophy can build on the cognitive sciences to develop a theory of mind I call “multilevel materialism,” which integrates molecular, neural, mental, and social mechanisms. Consciousness is increasingly being understood as resulting from neural mechanisms. Scientific advances make the traditional concept of free will implausible, but “freeish” will is consistent with new theories of decision making and action resulting from brain processes. Philosophers should work closely with scientists to address profound problems about knowledge, reality, and values.     

Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Sanity and Weakness of Will

This essay evaluates John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza'smature semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility, focusingon their new theory of moderate reasons-responsiveness as a model of``moral sanity.' This theory, presented in Responsibility andControl, solves many of the problems with Fischer's earlier weakreasons-responsiveness model, such as its unwanted implication thatagents who are only erratically responsive to bizarre reasons can beresponsible for their acts. But I argue that the new model still facesseveral problems. It does not allow sufficiently for non-psychoticagents (who are largely reasons-responsive) with localized beliefsand desires incompatible with full responsibility. Nor does it take intoaccount that practical ``fragmentation of the self' over time may alsoreduce competence, since moral sanity requires some minimum level ofnarrative unity in our plans and projects. Finally, I argue that actual-sequenceaccounts cannot adequately explain sane but weak-willed agency. This isbecause without libertarian freedom, such accounts have no way to modelthe perverse agent's determination to be irrational or weak.     

《齐物论》与竹林玄学

《庄子》作为“三玄”之一,在魏晋玄学中大行其道。阮籍和嵇康是两位在任自然的旗帜下发挥庄子思想的名士。分析发现,阮籍对庄子的理解,大致来自《齐物论》。然《齐物论》对他的意义是双重的：既排遣其对现实的不满,又给因对现实的无能为力而游戏人生的生活态度提供掩饰。嵇康学理上的表现在于,其“声无哀乐”的见解,以乐论的形式,对《齐物论》中齐是非的观点作独特的补充,同时,却又在讨论人格的公（诚）私（伪）之分时,把它同是非问题联系起来,从而显露自己无法掩饰的价值立场。阮、嵇无论是言还是行的矛盾,都与庄子齐是非的悖论有关。     

Jung's analysis of Sabina Spielrein and his use of Freud's free association method

This paper examines Jung's use of Freud's free association method and his own association experiments in his analysis of Sabina Spielrein in 1904-1905. Jung's gradual rejection of the Freudian free association method is noted. By the time of their split in 1913, Jung came to view Freud's method of using associations to analyse personal complexes as reductive, limiting and backward-looking. He also felt that the Freudian method threatened the analysand by creating confusion and a regressive dependency on the analyst. Jung's early approach inclined away from personal pain in favour of analysing autonomous, impersonal and collective phenomena. The historical question is raised whether Jung's rejection of the use of the free associations of the individual analysand might be as fundamental as their well-known disagreement about Freud's belief in the central role of sexuality in neurosis.     

Centrality ratings,forensic relevance,and production frequency: Which one best identifies central and peripheral items?

Production frequency has often been used to identify central and peripheral information, under the assumption that high frequency implies that the item is central. However, no research to date has tested the relationship between centrality and frequency. Participants watched a video of a bank robbery and completed a free recall test, from which frequency for recalled items was computed. Two groups then watched the same video and rated centrality and forensic relevance for each item. Results showed that most, but not all, items with high frequency were rated as central and forensically relevant but that low frequency items were not diagnostic of either item centrality or forensic relevance. Forensic relevance was a better indicator of item centrality than frequency. We concluded that frequency measures should be avoided to determine centrality. Also, if centrality ratings cannot be collected, forensic relevance ratings may be more appropriate for this purpose.     

Human action and virtue in Descartes and Spinoza

In this paper, I argue that despite undeniable fundamental differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s accounts of human action, there are some striking similarities between their views on right action, moral motivation, and virtue that are usually overlooked. I will argue, first, that both thinkers define virtue in terms of activity or freedom, mutatis mutandis, and thus in terms of actual power of acting. Second, I will claim that both Descartes and Spinoza hold a non-consequentialist approach to virtue, by which human actions are evaluated as virtuous or good on the basis of their motivational forces rather than their consequences. I will show further that both philosophers identify virtue qua free action with the highest good (summum bonum), and thus with that which is to be sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything preferable to it.     

Twenty‐First‐Century Counseling Theory Development in Relation to Definitions of Free Will and Determinism

This article is a continuation of Wilks's ( 2003 ) review of the development of counseling theory in relation to definitions of free will and determinism. The original review showed that theoretical synthesis was in part achieved when causal events inherent in absolute determinism were incorporated into a soft self‐determinist process. This review traces three 21st‐century challenges to self‐determinism and provides evidence supporting the inclusion of both self‐determinism and indeterminate free will in a single but asymmetrical causal model.     

Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic.