聋生汉字加工的自由回忆与词序位置记忆实验研究

本研究采用韵母相同、声母相同、音异形似和音同形似四类汉字字组,对使用手语聋生、使用口语聋生和听力正常大学生进行了自由回忆和词序位置记忆两个实验。结果表明,聋生不论在汉字字组的自由回忆中还是在汉字次序信息的记忆中,对汉字的记忆效果不仅都与字组类型有关,而且都受到了语音干扰,存在语音混淆现象。这就证明,聋生在汉字加工过程中使用了语音编码,语音编码在聋生汉字加工过程中确实起到了非常重要的作用。     

Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology

Libertarians about free will sometimes argue for their position on the grounds that our phenomenology of action is such that determinism would need to be false for it to be veridical. Many, however, have thought that it would be impossible for us to have an experience that is in contradiction with determinism, since this would require us to have perceptual experience of metaphysical facts. In this paper I show how the libertarian claim is possible. In particular, if experience depicts the world such that there is more than one physically possible future, then determinism would need to be false for that experience to be veridical. I show that we have experiences, or perceptual episodes, of this kind on the basis of recent work in the study of perception. Theorists in this area have argued that we have vision-for-action, and that what we visually perceive are not just objects but also possibilities for action. If we experience that it is possible that we ?, then we also experience that it is possible that we not ?. Furthermore, we probably experience more than one possibility for action at any one moment. I argue that these are physical possibilities, and therefore that we experience the world such that there is more than one physically possible future. So the libertarian claim about the semantics of agential phenomenology is highly plausible, even if this does not entail libertarianism.     

Consciousness,Free Will,and the Sciences of the Mind

In his review of the trio of philosopher-scientist dialogues on the nature and capacities of the human mind, Paul Thagard (2018) advocates clearly and forcefully for a fairly extreme position, which he advances as preferable to an equally extreme alternative. I will suggest a middle path that becomes attractive when one attends not just to the range of data now pouring forth from the sciences of mind but also to our own experience as minded individuals.     

Ability,Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence

Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of the Past with a principle that does not generate this difficulty. I develop such an account and defend it from objections. I also explore some of the account's implications, including whether the account is consistent with presentism.     

Implicit attitudes and the social capacity for free will

In this paper I ask what implicit attitudes tell us about our freedom. I analyze the relation between the literature on implicit attitudes and an important subcategory of theories of free will—self-disclosure accounts. If one is committed to such a theory, I suggest one may have to move to a more social conceptualization of the capacity for freedom. I will work out this argument in five sections. In the first section, I discuss the specific theories of free will that are central to this paper. In the second section, I will show that implicit-bias research raises questions about people’s capacities to exercise (these specific understandings of) free will. In the third section, I will consider how an individual may overcome these failures and argue that the individual ability for self-regulation is significantly limited. One could stop here and conclude that free will is a limited capacity. But I argue that this conclusion would be too hastily drawn. I will instead continue to ask what would be required for free will. By discussing how failures of free will are due to social structures and may be therefore repaired by changing social structures in section 4, I will arrive at an alternative conclusion about the capacity for free will in section 5.     

‘Retouch free’: The effect of labelling media images as not digitally altered on women's body dissatisfaction

This study aimed to investigate the effect of ‘retouch free’ labels on thin ideal fashion images on women's body dissatisfaction. This represents an experimental analogue to current practice by some fashion magazines. Participants were 224 female undergraduates who viewed a set of fashion shoots with either no label, or a label indicating that the image had not been digitally altered. Results indicated that, although body dissatisfaction increased after exposure to the thin ideal images, there was no significant effect of label type on mood or body dissatisfaction. It was concluded that labelling images as digitally unaltered appears neither helpful nor harmful in terms of body dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, more extensive research is required to guide the most effective use of labels.     

“词语自由联想”视域下医护人员形象调查——公众与医护人员的认知态度比较

言语行为可以反映认知态度,利用心理学的“自由联想法”对公众与医护人员进行针对医护人员形象的调查,以获得他们心目中描述医护人员形象的词语.按照他们头脑中出现的顺序进行加权统计;计算积极、中性和消极词语的比例.调查发现,公众对医护人员形象的认知态度存在矛盾;同时医护人员对自身职业评价较低;二者通过联想获得贬义词分值较高,原因是医护人员普遍被认为劳动强度大、职业安全感小等.运用社会认知心理学的平衡理论进行分析以期获得提升认知态度,改善医患关系的新途径.     

Ten Principles for Interpreting Neuroscientific Pronouncements Regarding Human Nature

As the field of brain research continues to advance, much is being discovered about the various aspects of the brain that are associated with certain feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. However, certain studies, or popularized accounts thereof, overreach in their pronouncements, drawing unwarranted conclusions regarding human nature. There are ten principles that will assist the non‐specialist in critically assessing both now and future discoveries reported from the neurosciences, with a focus on helping theologians using neuroscientific data in multidisciplinary work regarding human nature.     

Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency

Is it possible to reconcile the concept of conscious agency with the view that humans are biological creatures subject to material causality? The problem of conscious agency is complicated by the tendency to attribute autonomous powers of control to conscious processes. In this paper, we offer an embodied process model of conscious agency. We begin with the concept of embodied emergence – the idea that psychological processes are higher-order biological processes, albeit ones that exhibit emergent properties. Although consciousness, experience, and representation are emergent properties of higher-order biological organisms, the capacity for hierarchical regulation is a property of all living systems. Thus, while the capacity for consciousness transforms the process of hierarchical regulation, consciousness is not an autonomous center of control. Instead, consciousness functions as a system for coordinating novel representations of the most pressing demands placed on the organism at any given time. While it does not regulate action directly, consciousness orients and activates preconscious control systems that mediate the construction of genuinely novel action. Far from being an epiphenomenon, consciousness plays a central albeit non-autonomous role in psychological functioning.