FREE YOUR MIND: BUDDHISM,CAUSALITY, AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility?     

Confucian Order at the Edge of Chaos: The Science of Complexity and Ancient Wisdom

Many academics extol chaos theory and the science of complexity as significant scientific advances with application in such diverse fields as biology, anthropology, economics, and history. In this paper we focus our attention on structure-within-chaos and the dynamic self-organization of complex systems in the context of social philosophy. Although the modern formulation of the science of complexity has developed out of late-twentieth-century physics and computational mathematics, its roots may extend much deeper into classical thinking. We argue here that the essential ideas and predictions of the science of complexity are found within the social ordering principle of li (the rites) in Confucius's Analects .     

Group choice: competition, travel, and the ideal free distribution

If a group of foragers distributes among resource patches according to the ideal free distribution, the relative number of foragers in each patch should match the relative amount of resource obtained there, unless deviations arise from factors such as incomplete information or interforager interference. In analogy to individual choice, such effects may produce undermatching—group distribution falling short of resource distribution—or overmatching—group distribution overshooting resource distribution. In the present experiments, a flock of about 30 pigeons distributed between two patches with continuous inputs of green peas. Competition was varied by changing the size or extent of the patches. When the patches were areas or troughs, some undermatching occurred. When the patches were small bowls, strong undermatching occurred. When travel was required to switch patches, undermatching decreased slightly. A visual barrier that prevented pigeons from seeing one patch from the other had no effect. Overall rate of food delivery, varied over a wide range, had no effect. It appeared that the mechanism of flock distribution depended on comparisons between patches that were successive rather than simultaneous. Although most pigeons participated in the experiments, and different pigeons participated to different extents, individual pigeons tended to be consistent in the extent of participation from session to session, suggesting the possibility that participation might reflect competitive ability. Examination of the preferences and switching of individual pigeons revealed no consistency within or across individuals. It appeared that the flock's distribution was a truly emergent phenomenon, in the sense that results at the level of the flock in no way paralleled behavior at the level of the individual.     

遗忘症患者外显与内隐记忆分离的实验研究：自由回忆与再认任务

采用WMS－CR和MMSE筛选了9名遗忘症患者,采用自由回忆和再认两项任务观察了他们及正常对照组的外显记忆。结果发现：遗忘症患者两项外显记忆任务操作呈分离现象,自由回忆任务操作明显受损,再认任务的操作尽管较对照组低,但与对照组差异未达显著性水平。推论;①外显记忆受患者损伤的颞叶或间脑结构调节。②再认任务至少包含两种性质不同的潜在加工过程,一种为意识性重组加工,另一种为无意识自动加工,两者相互独立地贡献再认任务的操作。正常人意识性重组加工的贡献占优势,掩盖了无意识的作用。遗忘症患者意识性重组加工损伤,无意识自动加工部分代偿作用。③先前研究未对遗忘症患者进行认知功能的筛选,患者对再认障碍可能源于其他认知功能障碍,而非记忆障碍之故。     

Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?

“Frankfurt-style cases” (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because (i) our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners (CIs) are inconsistent (we accept that the mere presence of CIs is enough to make us gain but not lose responsibility-underwriting capacities), and (ii) this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the location of mental states and capacities. In response to this challenge, we argue that (i) there is no inconsistency in our intuitions about cases involving CIs, as soon as we draw the comparison properly, and that (ii) intuitions about such cases do not rest on an internalist prejudice, but on a more basic distinction between two kinds of dispositions. Additionally, we discuss some methodological issues that arise when comparing intuitions about thought experiments and end with a discussion of the implications of our argument for the reliability of intuitions about FSCs.     

Vision and abstraction: an empirical refutation of Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitivism

This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This contradicts Orlandi’s version of the non-cognitivist hypothesis, but does so while vindicating her methodological position.     

Libet-style experiments,neuroscience, and libertarian free will

People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not (but possibly could) support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle undermine libertarian free will, but that Libet-style experiments have not done that so far.     

Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck

I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane's libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane's recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane's theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Jones's A-ing butJones*'s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Jones's A-ing and Jones*'sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility.     

心理应激对大白鼠自由基损伤的影响

本研究将动物分为实验模型５天、１０天、２０天组及对照组,并检测各组动物上述组中的ＬＰＯ、ＳＯＤ、ＣＡＤ水平进行了分析;研究因噪音诱发的心理应激反应时大白鼠脑、肝、肺、心、肾组织自由基损伤情况及防御酶的活性变化;结果发现：在心理应激反应条件下,动物各组织的因自由基反应而使ＬＰＯ含量升高、防御酶ＳＯＤ、ＣＡＤ活性下降,表明：１．心理应激可以诱发动物体内产生大量的自由基,并对脑、肝、肺、心、肾组织产生影     

生物自然主义:塞尔对自由意志的解释

在对自由意志问题的解答中,传统的相容论和心理决定论都存在一定的缺陷,未能令人满意地回答这一问题。塞尔试图把自由意志的心理状态说明与神经生物学解释结合起来,认为在自由意志行为中存在间隔。在解释我们的自由意志行为时我们有必要先设一个不可约减的非休谟式的自我。这种阐释虽然符合我们的日常经验和科学说明,但却引发了一个新难题:我们的神经元系统的决定性是如何与意志自由行动中的间隔相一致的?