Continuous visual cues trigger automatic spatial target updating in dynamic scenes

Dynamic tasks often require fast adaptations to new viewpoints. It has been shown that automatic spatial updating is triggered by proprioceptive motion cues. Here, we demonstrate that purely visual cues are sufficient to trigger automatic updating. In five experiments, we examined spatial updating in a dynamic attention task in which participants had to track three objects across scene rotations that occurred while the objects were temporarily invisible. The objects moved on a floor plane acting as a reference frame and unpredictably either were relocated when reference frame rotations occurred or remained in place. Although participants were aware of this dissociation they were unable to ignore continuous visual cues about scene rotations (Experiments 1a and 1b). This even held when common rotations of floor plane and objects were less likely than a dissociated rotation (Experiments 2a and 2b). However, identifying only the spatial reference direction was not sufficient to trigger updating (Experiment 3). Thus we conclude that automatic spatial target updating occurs with pure visual information.     

传统美德认同和责任情境对大学生责任行为倾向的影响

责任行为是个体在特定责任情境下履行责任和承担后果的行为。本研究采用问卷调查方法着重探讨大学生的传统美德认同和责任情境因素对责任行为倾向的影响。结果表明,传统美德认同,以及责任情境中的责任性质和责任对象都对大学生的责任行为倾向有显著影响,且三者的交互作用显著：（1）传统美德认同高的大学生在履行责任情境中,其责任行为倾向显著强于美德认同低的大学生;（2）履行责任时的责任行为倾向显著强于承担后果时的责任行为倾向,但低美德认同者的两种行为倾向在他人责任情境中无差异;（3）在履行责任情境中,大学生对自我的责任行为倾向显著强于对他人的责任行为倾向;但美德认同低的大学生在承担后果情境中则相反。     

Malchish‐Kibalchish: cultural factors in a clinical case

In this paper, a Jungian understanding of cultural factors influencing individual analysis is illustrated with the case of a patient suffering from panic attacks. The analysis revealed that, in addition to the patient's personal background, the collectivistic attitudes of the Soviet culture, which had a moulding effect on the patient in his childhood and obstructed his individuation, should be taken into account. The concepts of the totalitarian object and the Russian cultural complex encompassing a grandiosity pole and an inferiority pole are used to explore the patient's condition, and the crucial role of creating mutual language with the patient is outlined.     

The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness)

Measures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this ‘elimination experiment’ counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.     

Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.     

Fallacies

Fallacies are things people commit, and when they commit them they do something wrong. What kind of activities are people engaged in when they commit fallacies, and in what way are they doing something wrong? Many different things are called fallacies. The diversity of the use of the concept of a fallacy suggests that we are dealing with a family of cases not related by a common essence. However, we suggest a simple account of the nature of fallacies which encompasses them all, viz., the term “fallacy” is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs, relative to that method of fixing beliefs. Very different sorts of things called fallacies are examined in the light of this account, e.g., denying the antecedent, circular arguments, so-called informal fallacies, and propositions said to be fallacies. We do not provide a theory of fallacies. Still, on our account pretty much all of those things that have been called fallacies are fallacies, and they have been called fallacies for pretty much the same reasons.     

客体的视觉工作记忆研究进展

近年来,客体信息的视觉工作记忆问题引发了大量研究,并获得不少成果。本文对视觉工作记忆的研究范式,客体在视觉工作记忆中的存储方式、容量及保持时间等相关研究进行了概述,重点介绍关于视觉工作记忆存储单元和容量问题的"强客体"假设、"弱客体"假设和双重存储机制假设,并提出进一步的研究思路。     

Infants’ recognition of objects using canonical color

We explored infants’ ability to recognize the canonical colors of daily objects, including two color-specific objects (human face and fruit) and a non-color-specific object (flower), by using a preferential looking technique. A total of 58 infants between 5 and 8 months of age were tested with a stimulus composed of two color pictures of an object placed side by side: a correctly colored picture (e.g., red strawberry) and an inappropriately colored picture (e.g., green-blue strawberry). The results showed that, overall, the 6- to 8-month-olds showed preference for the correctly colored pictures for color-specific objects, whereas they did not show preference for the correctly colored pictures for the non-color-specific object. The 5-month-olds showed no significant preference for the correctly colored pictures for all object conditions. These findings imply that the recognition of canonical color for objects emerges at 6 months of age.