平等的正义性及其形式原则考论

正义在逻辑上是比平等更底层、更基础的概念,可以为平等理论提供逻辑基础,平等的论证是一种正义性论证。支撑平等的正义的形式原则相同的人相同对待,不同的人不同对待,恰恰是从平等的描述性概念即人们的相同性到平等的规范性概念即平等要求的逻辑过渡。     

Procedural fairness in ultimatum bargaining: Effects of interactional fairness and formal procedure on respondents’ reactions to unequal offers1

Abstract: Ninety‐nine Japanese students received one of three offers in an ultimatum bargaining scenario: unfavorable and unequal; equal; or favorable but unequal. These offers were determined by either the other participant or by a computerized lottery. We also manipulated the arbitrariness of the role assignment procedure. Participants perceived the intentional small offer as more unfair in the interactional sense than the unintentional small offer, while they perceived the same offers as unfair in the distributive sense, regardless of intentionality. The intentional small offer was more likely to be rejected than the unintentional small offer. Participants perceived the arbitrary procedure of the role assignment as highly unfair, whereas the difference of arbitrariness in role assignment procedures had no significant impact on their reactions to the offer. Acceptance of the offer was strongly determined by interactional fairness, as well as by distributive fairness, and these types of fairness were influenced by different situational characteristics, such as intentionality, the size of the offer, and the equality of the offer.     

Johnson on the Metaphysics of Argument

This paper responds to two aspects of Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). The first is his critique of deductivism. The second is his failure to make room for some species of argument (e.g., visual and kisceral arguments) proposed by recent commentators. In the first case, Johnson holds that argumentation theorists have adopted a notion of argument which is too narrow. In the second, that they have adopted one which is too broad. I discuss the case Johnson makes for both claims, and possible objections to his analysis.     

The Straw Thing of Fallacy Theory: The Standard Definition of 'Fallacy'

Hamblin held that the conception of 'fallacy' as an argument that seems valid but is not really so was the dominant conception of fallacy in the history of fallacy studies. The present paper explores the extent of support that there is for this view. After presenting a brief analysis of 'the standard definition of fallacy,' a number of the definitions of 'fallacy' in texts from the middle of this century – from the standard treatment – are considered. This is followed by a review of the definitions of 'fallacy' in the earlier history of logic books, including those of Aristotle, Whately, Mill and De Morgan. The essay concludes that there is scarcely any support for Hamblin's view that this particular definition of 'fallacy' was widely held.     

The role of informal social support in needs assessment: proposal and application of a model to assess immigrants' needs in the south of Spain

Needs assessment models have been generally focused on the identification and prioritization of needs, analysing formal resources available in the community as possible solutions for existing problems. These kinds of models have assumed that formal services are the primary source of support for individuals in need. However, a great deal of the investigations in the field of Social Psychology have shown that the main source of help and support when facing a problem is not formal organizations, but people's own informal networks. In this article, we therefore propose a needs assessment model that emphasizes the importance of analysing both formal and informal social resources. The application of this model to assess Moroccan immigrants' needs in the south of Spain shows the anticipated low level of utilization of formal services and programmes, one that contrasts with the high use of informal networks as an essential source of social support for this group of immigrants. These results reveal the limitations of traditional needs assessment models, and the importance of incorporating the analysis of informal social support as a key resource for need satisfaction, particularly in the case of immigrant populations. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of emotions

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory of emotions.     

Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority

It is commonly said that some standards, such as morality, are ‘normatively authoritative’ in a way that other standards, such as etiquette, are not; standards like etiquette are said to be ‘not really normative’. Skeptics deny the very possibility of normative authority, and take claims like ‘etiquette is not really normative’ to be either empty or confused. I offer a different route to defeat skeptics about authority: instead of focusing on what makes standards like morality special, we should focus on what makes standards like etiquette ‘not really normative’. I defend a fictionalist theory on which etiquette is ‘not really normative’ in roughly the same way that Sherlock is ‘not really a detective’, and show that fictionalism about some normative standards helps us explain the possibility of normative authority.     

How Causal is Downward Causation?

Summary  The purpose of this paper is to lay bare the major problems underlying the concept of downward causation as discussed within the perspective of the present interest for phenomena that are characterized by self-organization.In our discussion of the literature, we have focussed on two questions: (1) What sorts of things are said to be, respectively, causing and caused within the context of downward causation? And (2) What is the meaning of ‘causing’ in downward causation? We have concluded that the concept of ‘downward causation’ is muddled with regard to the meaning of causation and fuzzy with regard to the nature of the causes and the effects. Moreover, we have concluded that ‘causation’ in respect of ‘downward causation’ is usually understood in terms of explanation and determination rather than in terms of causation in the sense of ‘bringing about’. Thus, the term ‘downward causation’ is badly chosen.