Philosophical Methodology and Conceptions of Evil Action

There is considerable philosophical dispute about what it takes for an action to be evil. The methodological assumption underlying this dispute is that there is a single, shared folk conception of evil action deployed amongst culturally similar people. Employing empirical research the authors undertook, this article suggests that this assumption is false. There exist, amongst the folk, numerous conceptions of evil action. Hence, the authors argue, philosophical research is most profitably spent in two endeavours. First, in determining which (if any) conception of evil action we have prudential or moral (or both) reason to deploy and, second, in determining whether we could feasibly come to adopt that conception as the single shared conception given our psychological make‐up and the content of the conceptions currently deployed.     

PANENTHEISM AND THE UNDOING OF DISENCHANTMENT

In this article, I draw on historical and conceptual arguments to show, first, that disenchantment and the influential view of the relationship between science and religion to which disenchantment gives rise are rooted in the metaphysics of theism. I then introduce the alternative metaphysical position of panentheism and identify Jungian psychology as an important, if implicit, mid‐twentieth‐century instance of panentheistic thought. Using the example of Jungian psychology, I demonstrate how the viewpoint of panentheism undoes the implications of disenchantment for the relationship between science and religion, promoting greater opportunities for dialogue and reconciliation between science and religion. I note, however, that these closer relations may depend on understanding science and religion differently from how they are understood under disenchantment. While the original tension between science and religion is eased, another tension—between panentheistic and disenchanted understandings of science and religion—is exposed. I conclude by reflecting on some implications of this discussion for sociology.     

BIBLICAL AND THEISTIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT AGAINST NATURALISM

Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism states that evolution cannot produce warranted beliefs. In contrast, according to Plantinga, Christian theism provides (I) properly functioning cognitive faculties in (II) an appropriate cognitive environment, in accordance with (III) a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs. But does theism fulfill criteria I–III? Judging from the Bible, God employs deceit in his relations with humanity, rendering our cognitive functions unreliable (I). Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that God's purpose would be to produce true beliefs in humans (III). Finally, from the theistic/religious perspective, it is impossible to tell whether observations have natural or supernatural causes, which undermines an appropriate cognitive environment (II). Reliable identification of deceit or miracles could alleviate these problems, but the theistic community has failed to resolve this issue. Dismissal of parts of the Bible, or attempts to find alternative interpretations, would collapse into skepticism or deism. Thus, Plantinga's problem of epistemic warrant backfires on theism.     

Interpreting delusions

This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced 'defamiliarisation' or even 'derealisation' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of delusional experience can serve to make explicit the manner in which we ordinarily experience the world under a taken-for-granted aspect of affective familiarity. This implicit feeling is, I argue, partly constitutive of our sense of reality. However, so-called 'folk psychology,' which is generally adopted by philosophers as an initial interpretive backdrop for delusional beliefs and for beliefs more generally, fails to accommodate it. As a consequence, some pervasive philosophical assumptions concerning the manner in which we experience and understand the world, ourselves, and each other are called into question.     

THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURAL LAWS IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN: NATURALISM,THEISM, AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE

Abstract. A historical perspective allows for a different view on the compatibility of theistic views with a crucial foundation of modern scientific practice: the uniformity of nature, which states that the laws of nature are unbroken through time and space. Uniformity is generally understood to be part of a worldview called “scientific naturalism,” in which there is no room for divine forces or a spiritual realm. This association comes from the Victorian era, but a historical examination of scientists from that period shows that uniformity was an important part of both theistic and naturalistic worldviews. Victorian efforts to maintain the viability of miracles and divine action within a universe ruled by natural laws receives special attention. The methodological practices of theistic and naturalistic scientists in the nineteenth century were effectively indistinguishable despite each group's argument that uniformity was closely dependent on their worldview. This similarity is used to reexamine both the reasons for the decline of the role of religion within the scientific community and claims made by the intelligent design movement about the relationship of science and religion.     

"THEISTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY": A THEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE

I take the APA publication A Spiritual Strategy for Counseling and Psychotherapy (Richards and Bergin 2005), along with a devoted issue of Journal of Psychology and Theology (Nelson and Slife 2006), as a paradigmatic example of a trend. Other instances include the uncritical use of "Eastern" philosophy in Humanistic and Transpersonal Psychology, almost normative appeal to the "Sacred" within the psychology of spirituality, talk of "God in the brain" within neurological research, the neologism entheogen referring to psychedelic drugs, and calls for new specializations such as neurotheology and theobiology. In response to the legitimate ethical requirements of respect and openness regarding clients' religious worldviews, the trend is to make God an essential component in psychological theory. The argument is that God is active in the universe and especially in human affairs to such an extent that any accurate account of strictly psychological matters, not just a comprehensive, interdisciplinary purview that could include a distinct theological dimension, must include God as an explanatory factor. Less nuanced than standard theological thought about divine intervention—including a range of opinions from supernaturalism, to occasionalism, to providential and deistic naturalism—this trend would blur the epistemological differences between religion and science by appeal to claimed knowledge sources such as inspiration and revelation and thus undermine the achievements of evidence-based science and establish particularistic religious beliefs as standard explanatory accounts. The concern to include a spiritual, in contrast to a religious or theist, dimension in psychological theory is welcome; but elaborated approaches, such as my own and those of Roberto Assagioli, Viktor Frankl, and Ken Wilber, open to varied theological applications, already exist.     

徽州古民居:《周易》美学思想的体现

徽州古民居乃中国古代建筑艺术之宝库,传统文化之精髓,而《周易》又是中国传统文化之源头活水,其"天人合一"、"保合太和"、"唯变所适"的美学思想对徽州古民居产生了深远影响并在徽州古民居中有着明显的体现。研究徽州古民居所体现的《周易》美学思想,有助于体认其所蕴含的深厚的中国传统文化,这将有助于更好的保护和宣扬徽州古民居,从而让更多的人来感受它的美。     

不幸福感的概念和模型

心理学家对幸福感的研究已有丰富的成果, 但是对不幸福感的研究还比较缺乏。对不幸福感的研究是从另一个角度来探究幸福感。本文对不幸福感的概念、不幸福感与幸福感关系以及不幸福感的模型进行介绍。Uchida和Kitayama提出了不幸福感的文化民俗模型, 认为不幸福感包括两个维度：即时享乐体验/应对行为, 认知评价/情感或动机的卷入。他们发现这两个维度具有跨文化的一致性。     

EMERGENCE EVERYWHERE?! REFLECTIONS ON PHILIP CLAYTON'S MIND AND EMERGENCE

Abstract. Emergence is a powerful concept marked by great emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual appeal. It makes inroads into the understanding of the most diverse phenomena. Emergence appears to have the potential of explaining anything from the behavior of atoms, ant colonies, and traffic jams to insurance risks, human consciousness, and divine action. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence (2004) offers much‐needed clarification of the philosophical grounding of emergence theory. To a large extent, emergence hinges on the concept of levels and hierarchies in nature. The preferred metaphor is that of a ladder. Given the tendency of concepts like emergence to build ideology, a careful analysis of language and metaphor is called for, however. I argue that the preference for the ladder metaphor does not do justice to the differentiated relationality that is a distinct mark of emergence. This oversight may have detrimental consequences when emergence theory is transferred from natural to social and cultural processes. A hermeneutical analysis suggests that better metaphors and visualizations need to be found. As an invitation to consider alternatives, some examples of complex regular poly topes are offered.     

人类大脑、认知与行为进化的整合模型

物种进化的历史进程中,大脑、认知与行为系统的进化机能利于有机体控制社会、生物与自然资源,而有机体所控制的各种资源又会影响自身的生存与繁衍。社会、生物与自然资源可以相对稳定,也可以变化不定。资源的稳定变化所传递的信息会引起大脑、认知以及行为系统做出模块化的自主反应。资源的稳定变化利于人类整合朴素心理学、朴素生物学与朴素物理学,而资源的变化不定所传达出的信息会引起认知与行为系统有意识地进行自上而下的外显行为反应。人类外显行为反应系统的进化导致人类出现自我意识,并具有探索性解决问题的能力。朴素心理能力、意识与问题解决能力可以整合为动机－控制理论