Filtering Theories of Truth: Compositionality as a Criterion

The traditional way to filter out the implausible candidate solutions to the semantic paradoxes is to appeal to the so-called “cost/benefit analyses.” Yet it is often tedious and controversial to carry out such analyses in detail. Facing this, it would be helpful for us to rely upon some principles to filter out at least something, if not everything, from them. The proposal in this paper is thereby rather simple: We may use principles of compositionality as a “filter” for this purpose. The paper has four sections. In Section 2, the author uses the filter to examine Kripke’s fixed-point theory and to thereby show how it works. In Section 3, the author gives more examples from the classical theories of truth to demonstrate the power of the filter. In Section 4, the author addresses the skepticism concerning whether there is any consistent or non-trivial theory of truth that can survive this filtering procedure. A “nearly sufficient” condition for a theory of truth to survive this test is discussed in order to show that at least some consistent or non-trivial theories of truth do indeed survive the filtering procedure.     

EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS CAPACITY IN THE GENUS HOMO: ORIGINS AND BUILDING BLOCKS

The large, ancient ape population of the Miocene reached across Eurasia and down into Africa. From this genetically diverse group, the chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and humans evolved from populations of successively reduced size. Using the findings of genomics, population genetics, cognitive science, neuroscience, and archaeology, the authors construct a theoretical framework of evolutionary innovations without which religious capacity could not have emerged as it did. They begin with primate sociality and strength from a basic ape model, and then explore how the human line came to be the most adaptive and flexible of all, while coming from populations with reduced genetic variability. Their analysis then delves into the importance of neurological plasticity and a lengthening developmental trajectory, and points to their following article and the last building block: the expansion of the parietal areas, which allowed visuospatial reckoning, and imagined spaces and beings essential to human theologies. Approximate times for the major cognitive building blocks of religious capacity are given.     

The Causal Structure of Evolutionary Theory

One contentious debate in the philosophy of biology is that between the statisticalists and causalists. The former understand core evolutionary concepts like fitness and selection to be mere statistical summaries of underlying causal processes. In this view, evolutionary changes cannot be causally explained by selection or fitness. The causalist side, on the other hand, holds that populations can change in response to selection—one can cite fitness differences or driftability in causal explanations of evolutionary change. But, on the causalist side, it is often not clear how, precisely, one should understand these causes. Thus, much more could be said about what sort of causes fitness and driftability are. In this paper, I borrow Dretske's distinction between structuring and triggering causes and I suggest that fitness and driftability are structuring causes of evolution.     

Modal Frame Correspondences and Fixed-Points

Taking Löb's Axiom in modal provability logic as a running thread, we discuss some general methods for extending modal frame correspondences, mainly by adding fixed-point operators to modal languages as well as their correspondence languages. Our suggestions are backed up by some new results – while we also refer to relevant work by earlier authors. But our main aim is advertizing the perspective, showing how modal languages with fixed-point operators are a natural medium to work with.     

Attitudes and cognitive distances: On the non-unitary and flexible nature of cognitive maps

Spatial relations of our environment are represented in cognitive maps. These cognitive maps are prone to various distortions (e.g., alignment and hierarchical effects) caused by basic cognitive factors (such as perceptual and conceptual reorganization) but also by affectively loaded and attitudinal influences. Here we show that even differences in attitude towards a single person representing a foreign country (here Barack Obama and the USA) can be related to drastic differences in the cognitive representation of distances concerning that country. Europeans who had a positive attitude towards Obama’s first presidential program estimated distances between US and European cities as being much smaller than did people who were skeptical or negative towards Obama’s ideas. On the basis of this result and existing literature, arguments on the non-unitary and flexible nature of cognitive maps are discussed.     

Combating Foster Care Drift: An Ecosystemic Treatment Model For Neglect Cases

The neglect of children may take many forms, but always represents the diminished capacity of the entire system of which the children are a living part. Child, parent, family, neighborhood, and community variables mutually influence one another. Once children are removed from a home, these same individual, relational, and contextual factors may result in foster placements of indefinite term and goals. Families are not reunited nor are the children legally freed to be placed in permanent homes. Because of the multiplicity of transacting influences there needs to be a stage-wise, systemic approach to remediation. This begins with crisis intervention and life stabilization. Later it includes more traditional family therapy work. However, the marital and family therapist contributes substantially at each stage.     

The heterogeneous processes of cheating: Attention evidence from two eye tracking experiments

Dishonesty erodes society. Although much is known about dishonesty, the process leading up to the decision of whether to be honest or dishonest is often assumed to be homogenous and is not well understood. In this paper, we take a more nuanced approach and explore more closely the process of deciding whether to cheat or be honest when an opportunity to cheat arises. We do this in two laboratory eye tracking experiments. In our first experiment (n = 193), we identify heterogeneity in the decision to cheat. Some decisions on whether to cheat or be honest exhibit relatively little variation and appear to be oriented towards cheating (or honesty) with apparently little consideration of the alternative, whereas other decisions seem to be characterized by a higher degree of consideration for both decision alternatives. Our second experiment (n = 299) demonstrates that a gaze dependent intervention in the choices process is able to affect the behavioral outcomes.     

Evidence-based treatment and therapist drift

Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) has a wide-ranging empirical base, supporting its place as the evidence-based treatment of choice for the majority of psychological disorders. However, many clinicians feel that it is not appropriate for their patients, and that it is not effective in real life-settings (despite evidence to the contrary). This paper addresses the contribution that we as clinicians make to CBT going wrong. It considers the evidence that we are poor at implementing the full range of tasks that are necessary for CBT to be effective - particularly behavioural change. Therapist drift is a common phenomenon, and usually involves a shift from ‘doing therapies’ to ‘talking therapies’. It is argued that the reason for this drift away from key tasks centres on our cognitive distortions, emotional reactions, and use of safety behaviours. A series of cases is outlined in order to identify common errors in clinical practice that impede CBT (and that can make the patient worse, rather than better). The principles behind each case are considered, along with potential solutions that can get us re-focused on the key tasks of CBT.     

Modelling the History of Ideas

We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately developed and implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical texts, and provide historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to Skinner's objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and cognitive psychology.