On the Value of Coming into Existence

In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) aperson. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence canbe better (or worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claimsare highly controversial, I consider and reject a number of objectionswhich threaten them. These objections raise various semantic, logical,metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that there is animportant sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to comeinto existence. Again, I consider and reject some objections. Finally, Ibriefly consider what the conclusions reached in this paper imply for ourmoral obligations to possible future people.     

Can We Really Have It All? The Attainment of Work and Family Values

We discuss the role values and value attainment play in the complex and dynamic process of balancing work and family demands. We contend that an individual experiences conflict between work and family demands because of value incongruence between that individual and a pivotal family member (i.e., lack of value similarity) or because of the incongruent values between that individual and the organization (i.e., lack of value congruence). We further argue that work-family conflict leads to job and life dissatisfaction for individuals because this conflict frustrates the attainment of important work and family values. We develop and propose a conceptual model, capturing both work and family values as they relate to work-family conflict, value attainment, and outcomes.     

大学毕业生的职业期望及其影响因素研究

本研究对当代大学生职业期望所包括的关键因素以及各因素之间的结构模式进行了深入分析,从职业动机、自我意识、环境意识以及个人的职业发展计划等多种不同角度对影响职业期望的因素进行了有益的探索,并在此基础上建立了"当代大学生职业期望的初步模型".     

Stimulus control depends on the subjective value of the outcome

Stimuli that provide information about likely future reinforcers tend to shift behavior, provided a reliable relation between the stimulus and the reinforcer can be discriminated. Stimuli that are apparently more reliable exert greater control over behavior. We asked how the subjective value (measured in terms of preference) of reinforcers associated with stimuli influences stimulus control. Five pigeons worked on a concurrent chains procedure in which half of all trials ended in a smaller reinforcer sooner, and the other half in a larger reinforcer later. In Signaled trials, the color and flash duration on the keys in the initial link signaled the outcome of the trial. In Conflicting probe trials, the color and the flash duration signaled conflicting information about the outcome of the trial. Choice in Signaled trials shifted toward the signaled outcome, but was never exclusive. In Conflicting probe trials, control was divided idiosyncratically between the 2 stimulus dimensions, but still favored the outcome with the higher subjective value. Thus, stimulus control depends not only on the perceived reliability of stimuli, but also on the subjective value of the outcome.     

Diminishing marginal value as delay discounting.

The fundamental law underlying economic demand and exchange is the tendency for value of marginal units to diminish with increasing amounts of a commodity. The present paper demonstrates that this law follows from three still-more-basic psychological assumptions: (a) limited consumption rate, (b) delay discounting, and (c) choice of highest valued alternative. Cases of diminishing marginal value apparently due to pure intensity of reward may plausibly be attributed to the above three factors. The further assumption that maximum consumption rate may vary within and across individuals implies that some substances may be unusually addictive and that some individual animals may be unusually susceptible to addiction.     

INTERRELATING NATURE, HUMANITY, AND THE WORK OF GOD: SOME ISSUES FOR FUTURE REFLECTION

Abstract. This essay suggests some future items for an agenda about human viability, defined as survivability with meaning and purpose, by exploring interrelations between nature, humanity, and the work of God. It argues for intrinsic and creative value in nature, so there is a value kinship, as well as a factual kinship, between humans, nature, and God-working. It considers humans as "webs of culture, life, and cosmos" and suggests some implications of this notion of human nature for viability. And it asks what human fulfillment can be in light of the awesome creative-destroying-recreative activity that seems to be the ground of an evolving universe.     

Diagnosticity,confidence, and the need for information

Recent research has suggested that people prefer to use the most diagnostic available information as the basis for their choices and decisions, and are most confident in those decisions when information is highly diagnostic. However, the effect of information diagnosticity on the need for additional information has yet to be investigated; that is, in an optional stopping task, will the amount of information requested depend upon information diagnosticity? Three models of the role of diagnosticity in information use were examined; expected value, a confidence criterion, and information cost. Subjects attempted to categorize stimuli with the aid of information of varying costs and diagnosticity levels. They requested more information when it was obtained at a low cost. More importantly, across cost conditions, subjects consistently requested greater amounts of information when that information was of a low diagnosticity. These data seem most consistent with use of a confidence criterion that is adjusted for information costs.     

See the devil and tame him

Born in 1921, professor of philosophy at the University of Warsaw and art theory in the Polish Academy of Sciences; has published twelve books and more than three hundred articles (bibliography in volume 14 of A. Mercier (ed.).Philosophers on Their Own Work. Bern: 1990) ranging over the history of aesthetics, Marxist and Soviet aesthetics, and issues related to the status of the arts in contemporary Western culture.     

Confirmation of linear system theory prediction: Rate of change of Herrnstein's kappa as a function of response-force requirement

Four human subjects worked on all combinations of five variable-interval schedules and five reinforcer magnitudes (¢/reinforcer) in each of two phases of the experiment. In one phase the force requirement on the operandum was low (1 or 11 N) and in the other it was high (25 or 146 N). Estimates of Herrnstein's κ were obtained at each reinforcer magnitude. The results were: (1) response rate was more sensitive to changes in reinforcement rate at the high than at the low force requirement, (2) κ increased from the beginning to the end of the magnitude range for all subjects at both force requirements, (3) the reciprocal of κ was a linear function of the reciprocal of reinforcer magnitude for seven of the eight data sets, and (4) the rate of change of κ was greater at the high than at the low force requirement by an order of magnitude or more. The second and third findings confirm predictions made by linear system theory, and replicate the results of an earlier experiment (McDowell & Wood, 1984). The fourth finding confirms a further prediction of the theory and supports the theory's interpretation of conflicting data on the constancy of Herrnstein's κ.     

GOD IN THE CAVE

When Finite and Infinite Goods was published in 1999, it took its place as one of the few major statements of a broadly Augustinian ethical philosophy of the past century. By “broadly Augustinian” I refer to the disposition to combine a Platonic emphasis on a transcendent source of value with a traditionally theistic emphasis on the value‐creating capacities of absolute will. In the form that this disposition takes with Robert Merrihew Adams, it is the resemblance between divine and a finite excellence that makes the finite excellence objectively of value, and it is the correspondence of an obligation to a divine command that makes the obligation objectively obligatory. I look closely at the complexity of this ethical division of labor—between the good and the right—mainly as it appears in the context of Finite and Infinite Goods, but also with attention to the broader corpus of Adams's writings, particularly his work on Leibniz and the essays of his that have been gathered together in The Virtue of Faith. I argue that there is a creative tension in his work between his desire to secure an objective basis for ethics and his affirmation of the value of grace, a love that is not proportioned to the excellence of its object. This tension, I further argue, ought to be resolved in the direction of grace.