Scientific Realism and the Meanings of Theoretical Terms

In contemporary philosophy of science, there are many interesting arguments for and against scientific realism with regard to the meaningfulness and truthfulness of theoretical statements. Some anti-realists hold that since many important concepts in scientific theories have no specific referents, the relevant theoretical statements are therefore either false or meaningless. In this essay, I join the debates concerning the plausibility of scientific realism by focusing on two intertwined issues： first, that of how we can we explicate the meaningfulness of theoretical statements, especially statements pertaining to unobservable objects, and second, that of the meaningfulness of theoretical statements for our acceptance of scientific realism.     

Self‐absorption paradox is not a paradox: Illuminating the dark side of self‐reflection

Although considered an important component of a healthy personality, self‐reflection has not so far been shown to have any specific benefits for mental health. This research addresses this issue by taking into consideration two important suppressor variables, self‐rumination and the need for absolute truth. The latter is an innovative variable, defined and presented in this research. The first two studies aimed to validate a new measure that acts as an operational definition of the need for absolute truth. The first study was conducted with two group of participants; the first group consisted of 129 females and 67 males, mean age = 20 years, and the second 182 females and 104 males, mean age = 27. In the second study, participants were 22 females and 18 males, mean age = 20.5. In the final study, conducted with 296 female, 163 male participants (mean age = 37), suppressor effects were tested using structural equation modeling. The results showed that by taking account of these two suppressor variables, particularly the need for absolute truth, the expected relationship between self‐reflection and mental health was revealed. The need for absolute truth was shown to be crucial for understanding the effects of self‐reflection on mental health, therefore it should be considered in all processes of psychotherapy.     

Paradoxes and Failures of Cut

This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical approach to truth and semantic paradox. It begins from an inferentialist, and particularly bilateralist, theory of meaning—one which takes meaning to be constituted by assertibility and deniability conditions—and shows how the usual multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic can be given an inferentialist motivation, leaving classical model theory as of only derivative importance. The paper then uses this theory of meaning to present and motivate a logical system—ST—that conservatively extends classical logic with a fully transparent truth predicate. This system is shown to allow for classical reasoning over the full (truth-involving) vocabulary, but to be non-transitive. Some special cases where transitivity does hold are outlined. ST is also shown to give rise to a familiar sort of model for non-classical logics: Kripke fixed points on the Strong Kleene valuation scheme. Finally, to give a theory of paradoxical sentences, a distinction is drawn between two varieties of assertion and two varieties of denial. On one variety, paradoxical sentences cannot be either asserted or denied; on the other, they must be both asserted and denied. The target theory is compared favourably to more familiar related systems, and some objections are considered and responded to.     

Frege,Boolos, and Logical Objects

In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of logical objects (extensions, numbers, truth-values) and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the eta relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the eta relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses unrestricted Comprehension for Logical Objects and banishes encoding (eta) formulas from Comprehension for Properties. The relative mathematical and philosophical strengths of the two theories are discussed. Along the way, new results in the theory of abstract objects are described, involving: (a) the theory of extensions, (b) the theory of directions and shapes, and (c) the theory of truth values.     

Under Carnap’s Lamp: Flat Pre-semantics

“Flat pre-semantics” lets each parameter of truth (etc.) be considered sepa-rately and equally, and without worrying about grammatical complications. This allows one to become a little clearer on a variety of philosophical-logical points, such as the use fulness of Carnapian tolerance and the deep relativity of truth. A more definite result of thinking in terms of flat pre-semantics lies in the articulation of some instructive ways of categorizing operations on meanings in purely logical terms in relation to various parame- ters of truth (etc.); namely, closing vs. leaving open, local vs. translocal, and anchored vs. unanchored. Basic relations among these categories are established.     

FROM BELIEF TO UNBELIEF AND BACK TO BELIEF: A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL RUSE

Abstract. Michael Ruse's rejection of religious belief is questioned at two levels. First, on the metaethical level of analysis, evolutionary ethics cannot account for moral behavior that is based on a "strong version" of the Love Command. Second, agnosticism is discussed as a form of belief. Insights from religious forms of life that are inclusive, pluralistic, and expansive are contrasted with exclusivistic, closed, and fundamentalist forms of religion in order to develop criteria for "genuine religion." Theistic agnosticism is presented as a prolegomena to belief.     

The value of philosophy: A Canguilhemian perspective

This paper represents a philosophical reflection on the nature and value of philosophy itself. Georges Canguilhem somewhat scandalously argued that the fundamental value of philosophy does not lie in truth. He suggests that truth is a typical value of science because truth is what science says and what is said scientifically. Why would a philosopher depreciate his own discipline? And does he really do so? Or is there a different motivation: to help philosophy to become a much more self-confident voice? And if truth is no longer a value of philosophy, what value fits it better? The article follows Canguilhem in his conception of truth, science, and philosophy. It is against the background of these considerations that the specific revised anthropology of the scientist or philosopher is formed. The main question is what this means for current philosophy and why it could be inspiring for philosophers today.     

认识检验之旅——中国古代认识真理性检验标准思想探析

中国古代关于认识真理性检验标准的思想可以大致归纳为四种主要观点。先秦及汉代的唯物主义思想家已经有了把感觉经验和行为效果作为检验认识真理性标准的思想;古代唯心主义思想家则坚持无客观标准论,他们要么直接坚持主观标准论,要么认为根本无是非标准可言;宋、明、清时期的一些唯物主义哲学家提出并坚持以客观事物或事实作为检验认识真理性的标准;与此不同,王廷相、王夫之、颜元等人则提出“行”标准说,这种颇具光辉的哲学思想,使中国古代关于认识真理性检验标准思想的探讨大大前进了一步。     

Meaning, Truth, and Phenomenology

This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology.