Lying and intersubjective truth: A communication based approach to understanding lying

This project was undertaken as a response to a perceived deficiency regarding the role of communication in a large block of the phenomenological discourse on lying. The arguments presented here attempt to make the communication process an explicit, rather than an implicit component of this discussion. First, a lie is explained as a communicative act that is identified by making a simple comparison between two contradictory realities, the reality presented by the lie, and some sort of true reality. Existing discussions of lying are examined and judged to be deficient because they limit their explanations of this true reality to subjective and objective standards of truth. Intersubjectivity is presented as an alternative truth standard, and it is argued that lies can only be discovered and understood through a process of interpretation or negotiation (dialogue) by human interactants.     

Reasoning to what is true in fiction

The paper discusses the principle by which we reason to what is true in fiction. The focus is David Lewis's article Truth in Fiction (1978) which proposes an analysis in terms of counterfactuals and possible worlds. It is argued thatLewis's account is inadequate in detail and also in principle in that it conflicts radically with basic and familiar tenets of literary criticism. Literary critical reasoning about fiction concerns not the discovery of facts in possible worlds but the recovery of meanings in interpretative frameworks. The model theoretic approach fails to account for common literary or rhetorical devices like unreliable narration, connotation and point of view. And in explaining indeterminacy of content in terms of truth-value gaps it gives too simplistic an account of critical reasoning about character motivation and thematic development. A more adequate account of content-indeterminacy can be provided through a comparison of the interpretation of fiction with the interpretation of human action. A broader motif in the paper is the underlying tension between what is required for the logic of fiction and what is required for the aesthetics of fiction.     

Correspondence in children's self-report: Tacting and manding aspects

Four boys and 4 girls (3 to 5 years old) played with as many as three toys chosen from a set of six, and were then asked whether they played with each of the toys. After a baseline in which all children showed high levels of correspondence between reported and actual behavior, reports of play were differentially reinforced, first in an individual and then in a social context. Two children in the individual condition began to report play with all six toys, even though no more than three toys had been played with. When reports of play were reinforced in a group context, 5 children reported play with all six toys. When correspondence was subsequently reinforced, virtually complete correspondence returned and was maintained in a third noncontingent reinforcement condition. Correspondence and lack of correspondence were discussed in terms of self-tacting and distorted tacting or manding.     

Show Me the Argument: Empirically Testing the Armchair Philosophy Picture

Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is what we would expect from the vantage point of the armchair philosophy picture. The results also show, however, that the percentages of articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. This trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in philosophy.     

Linking Trust to Trustworthiness

Abstract

Trust is valuable when placed in trustworthy agents and activities, but damaging or costly when (mis)placed in untrustworthy agents and activities. So it is puzzling that much contemporary work on trust – such as that based on polling evidence – studies generic attitudes of trust in types of agent, institution or activity in complete abstraction from any account of trustworthiness. Information about others’ generic attitudes of trust or mistrust that take no account of evidence whether those attitudes are well or ill placed can offer little or no help for those who aim to place or refuse trust well. Information about attitudes is evidently useful to those who aim to influence those who hold them, which explains why polls about attitudes are popular with political parties, advertisers and other campaigning organisations. But where we aim not to influence others, but to place and refuse trust intelligently we must link trust to trustworthiness, and must focus on evidence of honesty, competence and reliability.     

求真与致善——荀子正名理论新探

荀子的正名理论不仅接续孔子的正名传统,也有对诸子之学的扬弃,在正名理论中荀子借鉴了名家、墨家的理论,丽他们也是萄子批评最多的。荀子的正名理论主要体现在《正名》篇中。其中他讨论了名的分类、名的作用、制名的原则等,并对“三惑”等不正之名进行了批判。他认为名的主要作用在于“明贵贱”与“辨同异”,“贵贱”关乎价值,“同异”关乎事实,萄子就通过名联接了事实与价值。“辨同异”在乎求“真”,“明贵贱”在乎求“善”,而荀子又认为“明贵贱”高于“辨同异”,从而把名学引向伦理、政治之域。     

Frege,Boolos, and Logical Objects

In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of logical objects (extensions, numbers, truth-values) and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the eta relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the eta relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses unrestricted Comprehension for Logical Objects and banishes encoding (eta) formulas from Comprehension for Properties. The relative mathematical and philosophical strengths of the two theories are discussed. Along the way, new results in the theory of abstract objects are described, involving: (a) the theory of extensions, (b) the theory of directions and shapes, and (c) the theory of truth values.     

Under Carnap’s Lamp: Flat Pre-semantics

“Flat pre-semantics” lets each parameter of truth (etc.) be considered sepa-rately and equally, and without worrying about grammatical complications. This allows one to become a little clearer on a variety of philosophical-logical points, such as the use fulness of Carnapian tolerance and the deep relativity of truth. A more definite result of thinking in terms of flat pre-semantics lies in the articulation of some instructive ways of categorizing operations on meanings in purely logical terms in relation to various parame- ters of truth (etc.); namely, closing vs. leaving open, local vs. translocal, and anchored vs. unanchored. Basic relations among these categories are established.     

FROM BELIEF TO UNBELIEF AND BACK TO BELIEF: A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL RUSE

Abstract. Michael Ruse's rejection of religious belief is questioned at two levels. First, on the metaethical level of analysis, evolutionary ethics cannot account for moral behavior that is based on a "strong version" of the Love Command. Second, agnosticism is discussed as a form of belief. Insights from religious forms of life that are inclusive, pluralistic, and expansive are contrasted with exclusivistic, closed, and fundamentalist forms of religion in order to develop criteria for "genuine religion." Theistic agnosticism is presented as a prolegomena to belief.