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31.
Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.  相似文献   
32.
    
Group discussion significantly improves performance on intellective problems. However, most experiments have been conducted in Western cultures. Cross‐cultural psychology suggests that members of Eastern cultures might be less likely to benefit from group discussion. One experiment in Japan suggested that this was not the case, but this experiment suffered from some limitations. To address these limitations, Japanese participants were asked to solve an intellective task four times: individually (pre‐test), in small discussion groups (test), individually again (transfer task, post‐test), and individually after a delay (delayed post‐test). The results revealed a robust improvement during group discussion. Groups in which at least one member had found the correct answer individually agreed on it during the discussion. Moreover, and in contrast with results obtained in Western cultures, most groups with no such member also found the correct answer. The gains obtained during discussion were maintained in the transfer tasks. This result provides further evidence that the improvement of reasoning performance in group discussion is a universal phenomenon, and provides support for the practice of collaborative learning in Japan.  相似文献   
33.
    
《Theoria》2018,84(3):229-241
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34.
    
This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ‘paradigms’, is almost ubiquitous.

These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport – faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science – must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport.  相似文献   
35.
    
In a recent article, I criticized Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss's so‐called “no guidance argument” against the truth norm for belief, for conflating the conditions under which that norm recommends belief with the psychological state one must be in to apply the norm. In response, Glüer and Wikforss have offered a new formulation of the no guidance argument, which makes it apparent that no such conflation is made. However, their new formulation of the argument presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour, and betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm. Once this is taken into account, it becomes clear that the no guidance argument fails.  相似文献   
36.
In recent years the controversy over Drive versus Relational models of the psyche has become entangled in a philosophical controversy over epistemology. Some have argued that the Drive model was a relic of an age of positivistic science, while Relational models are a product of a postmodern condition. This paper argues that the controversy need not be a philosophical one, and that Relational views are not, in fact, a product of postmodernism, nor are they necessarily dependent on a postmodern epistemology. Separating the epistemological from the psychological more carefully may help return the debate to its proper, psychoanalytic domain, and perhaps contribute to a more fruitful dialogue across what, at times, seems like an abyss between Relational views and Drive theory.  相似文献   
37.
    
The author discusses some striking convergences which appear in the thought of two unsettling and powerfully stimulating personalities of the 20th century: John Cage in music and art, and W.R. Bion in psychoanalysis. Both foster openness to the unknown and the need to tolerate 'uncertainties, mysteries, doubts', arguing for an attitude requiring negative valence and receptive emptiness. In their search for fresh personal awareness of reality aimed at allowing mental transformation and growth, both strive to disturb intellectual comfort and do not hesitate to use pro(e)vocative and even shocking means. They both propose an attitude towards tradition which demands the freedom to use and recreate inherited knowledge in a personal and innovative way. Finally, both Cage and Bion maintained a highly auto-reflective attitude, carefully considering the artist's/psychoanalyst's contribution to the process of art and psychoanalysis. These convergences probably represent important and wider contemporary cultural trends which permeate in their different realizations.  相似文献   
38.
    
Paul Teller 《Metaphilosophy》2012,43(3):257-274
Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby showing how philosophical method must take into account the idealized nature of our familiar conception of truth.  相似文献   
39.
    
This article considers three recent attempts by David Armstrong, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer to provide truthmakers for negative existential truths. It is argued that none of the proposed truthmakers are up to the task of making any negative existential truth true and, it will turn out, for the same reason.  相似文献   
40.
    
Psychoanalysis emphasizes that in discovering psychic truth what is needed is not abstract or distant knowledge of this truth but rather an immediate encounter with it. In this paper the author examines the meaning of this immediacy through the study of Betty Joseph's notion of 'here and now,' which in recent years has been most directly associated with it. The author shows how Joseph's notion of 'here and now' continues a legacy beginning in Freud and taken up by Klein regarding the immediacy of unconscious truth that differs from other available analytic formulations of the term. To highlight the uniqueness of Joseph's contribution the author goes on to examine what distinguishes it within the kleinian framework. She does this in part through comparison with the clinical approach of Hanna Segal, whose focus on unconscious phantasy adheres to the same foundational legacy. The author points to the differences between Joseph and Segal and their significance, which have not been sufficiently elaborated in the analytic literature. She argues that viewing these differences within the context of a shared perspective on the role of unconscious truth in the analytic process and task enriches our understanding of the complexity of kleinian thinking and the meaning of truth in psychoanalysis. This understanding is also furthered by the recognition that many uses of the term 'here and now' in the analytic literature refer to something very different from what Joseph refers to and are based on a perspective that is fundamentally opposed to hers.  相似文献   
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