Criteria Based Content Analysis: The Less Scientific Road to Truth

Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA) is a forensic tool that aims atdistinguishing true from false statements made by crime victims. As such,CBCA and similar techniques are regularly employed by psychologicalexpert-witnesses in court. However, it could be argued that the diagnosticaccuracy of CBCA is moderate, and too low for application in the forensiccontext. The current article discusses problems that arise if conclusionsabout credibility of testimonies based on CBCA are presented in court. Afundamental, yet so far hardly addressed flaw is that CBCA suffers from aninherent truth bias. That is, the underlying notion that credibility isexamined by means of searching for signs supporting truthfulness isscientifically less valid than the approach in which credibility isestablished by focusing on alternative explanations and signs of deceit.     

Beyond transference,countertransference, the silences and the opinion1

The author examines several works of an intersubjectivist trend, as well as writings by Hanly, Cavell and Bion, defending many of the named psychoanalysts' viewpoints. These viewpoints are expressed in the search and the struggle for truth, recognizing, like Popper, that truth exists but that we cannot know with certainty whether and when we touch upon it, only that this endless effort merits a lifetime's work because it is the attempt at an encounter with ourselves‐the true encounter. The author explains the criticisms by Green of Jacobs, and defends the maintenance of ‘a certain possible neutrality’ (Eizirik). He poses some questions with regard to Ogden's ‘third subject’, considering it, among other aspects, from the supervisory point of view, which may demonstrate the existence of ‘a certain possible objectivity’ of the emotional confl ict. He develops some criticisms concerning silence as an interpretative action by Ogden, and summarizes two case histories. Both were unconsciously attempting to manipulate the analyst intensely‐one of them to get the analyst to intervene in his love life, and the other to interrupt acting out.     

QUESTIONING SCIENTIFIC FAITH IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The late nineteenth century was not only a time in which religious faith was questioned in light of increasing claims of natural science. It is more accurate to see the familiar Victorian crisis of faith as but one aspect of a larger historical phenomenon, one in which the methods of both religion and science came under scrutiny. Among several examinations of the status of scientific knowledge in the waning decades of the century, the treatment of the subject by the German theologian Wilhelm Herrmann and philosopher Hans Vaihinger rejected its objective nature and denied that either scientists or theologians had access to the truth of nature. Although this stance regarding the nature of science, religion, and their relationship was limited to intellectuals in German society at the time, it foreshadowed developments in our own day in which the traditional search for truth has been problematized.     

On Vagueness,Truth Values and Fuzzy Logics

Some aspects of vagueness as presented in Shapiro’s book Vagueness in Context [23] are analyzed from the point of fuzzy logic. Presented are some generalizations of Shapiro’s formal apparatus. Presented by Daniele Mundici     

On authenticity: the question of truth in construction and autobiography

Freud was occupied with the question of truth and its verification throughout his work. He looked to archaeology for an evidence model to support his ideas on reconstruction. He also referred to literature regarding truth in reconstruction, where he saw shifts between historical fact and invention, and detected such swings in his own case histories. In his late work Freud pondered over the impossibility of truth in reconstruction by juxtaposing truth with ‘probability’. Developments on the role of fantasy and myth in reconstruction and contemporary debates over objectivity have increasingly highlighted the question of ‘truth’ in psychoanalysis. I will argue that ‘authenticity’ is a helpful concept in furthering the discussion over truth in reconstruction. Authenticity denotes that which is genuine, trustworthy and emotionally accurate in a reconstruction, as observed within the immediacy of the analyst/patient interaction. As authenticity signifies genuineness in a contemporary context its origins are verifiable through the analyst’s own observations of the analytic process itself. Therefore, authenticity is about the likelihood and approximation of historical truth rather than its certainty. In that respect it links with Freud’s musings over ‘probability’. Developments on writing ‘truths’ in autobiography mirror those in reconstruction, and lend corroborative support from another source.     

Why the Liar Does not Matter

This paper develops a classical model for our ordinary use of the truth predicate (1) that is able to address the liar's paradox and (2) that satisfies a very strong version of deflationism. Since the model is a classical in the sense that it has no truth value gaps, the model is able to address Tarski's indictment of our ordinary use of the predicate as inconsistent. Moreover, since it is able to address the liar's paradox, it responds to arguments against deflationism based upon that paradox alone. The model is based upon a notion of the complexity of propositions that a fixed set of speakers might express. A context-sensitive definition of the truth predicate is then provided based upon a class of possible worlds defined in terms of these speakers. Reasonable constraints on the memories and lifetimes of ordinary speakers are used to limit the set of propositions that they might express so that deflationist requirements are satisfied.     

Lutheran Secularism as a Challenge for Constructive Theology: A Swedish Perspective,a Foucauldian Proposal

In this article the Swedish Lutheran heritage is discussed in relation to its historical connections with secularism. The question is raised whether and how constructive and liberating Lutheran theology can be developed under such conditions. In order to deal with this problem, Michel Foucault's late philosophy of truth and subjectivity is discussed. A proposition is made for a constructive theology that does not retreat from secularism but is critically involved in the secular through an emphasized confidence in God.     

A Review of “Trauma and Human Existence: Autobiographical,Psychoanalytic and Philosophical Reflections”

Abstract

The author sets out to locate Bion's model of the mind within the developmental history of psychoanalysis, from Freud to Klein to Bion, using biographical material and clinical case examples, to illustrate Bion's concepts of container/contained, his understanding and use of projective identification, his extension of the use of the countertransference, and his differentiation between the psychotic and non-psychotic aspects of the mind. Links, and attacks against linking are discussed, as well as Bion's thoughts about learning versus knowing, being versus becoming and his emphasis on the essential importance of the development of the capacity to think.     

When Fluency Signals Truth: Prior Successful Reliance on Fluency Moderates the Impact of Fluency on Truth Judgments

Repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true. One position relates this so‐called “truth effect” to metacognitive experiences of fluency, suggesting that repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true because they are processed more fluently. Although most prior research focused on why repetition influences truth judgments, considerably less is known about when fluency is used as information. The present research addresses this question and investigates whether reliance on fluency is moderated by learning experiences. Specifically, we focus on changes in the reliance on fluency over the course of time. A series of experiments reveals that fluency is more likely to be used in truth judgments when previous reliance on fluency has resulted in valid judgments, compared with when previous reliance on fluency was misleading. These findings suggest that reliance on fluency in judgments is a finely tuned process that takes prior experiences with fluency‐based judgments into account. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

"诚"与"真"——论儒家之"诚"对当代真理论研究的启示

在儒家学说中,“诚”并不仅指人与人之间的真诚,“诚”也是一个本体论范畴。儒学认为人可以同天,“可以赞天地之化育”,这也是对人的主体性的强调。人能通过倾听自然的言说而得到一点局部真理,但永远不可能把握绝对真理,即大自然的全部奥秘。只有作为绝对主体的大自然才掌握着绝对真理。这种绝对真理是人类的信仰对象,而不是人类的认知对象。现代性的一个愚蠢错误是把这种绝对真理当作人类的认知对象。如果我们认为真理是存在或存在者的本真显现,则真并不仅是命题的属性,也是事物的属性,真理(truth)与真实性(reality)、真(true)与真实(real)密不可分。诚正体现着二者的统一。现代人将道德与自然知识截然分开,失去了诚,扭曲了德。真理论须有个伦理维度才能避免极端怀疑主义。