Experience-grounded semantics: a theory for intelligent systems

An experience-grounded semantics is introduced for an intelligent reasoning system, which is adaptive, and works with insufficient knowledge and resources. According to this semantics, truth and meaning are defined with respect to the experience of the system – the truth value of a statement indicates the amount of available evidence, and the meaning of a term indicates its experienced relations with other terms. The major difference between experience-grounded semantics and model-theoretic semantics is that the former does not assume the sufficiency of knowledge and resources. This approach provides new ideas to the solution of some important problems in cognitive science.     

Preserving integrity against colonization

Genuine reconciliation between first- and third-person methodologies and knowledge requires respect for both phenomenological and scientific epistemologies. Recent pragmatic, theoretical, and verbal attempts at reconciliation by cognitive scientists compromise phenomenological method and knowledge. The basic question is thus: how do we begin reconciling first- and third-person epistemologies? Because life is the unifying concept across phenomenological and cognitive disciplines, a concept consistently if differentially exemplified in and by the phenomenon of movement, conceptual complementarities anchored in the animate properly provide the foundation for reconciliation. Research by people in neuroscience and in dynamic systems theory substantiate this thesis, providing fundamental examples of conceptual complementarity between phenomenology and science.     

声符和义符在形声字语音、语义提取中的作用

采用眼动技术记录汉语阅读者在形声字的语音、语义提取中对声符和义符的注意规律, 考察形声字部件的位置、功能和正字法意识对汉字认知的影响。结果表明：(1)在汉字的视觉加工中, 阅读者对部件空间位置的注意加工优势受到声旁位置的调节。对左形右声结构的汉字, 被试更多地注意字的右边, 对右形左声结构的汉字, 被试更多地注意字的左边; (2)在汉语阅读者的正字法规则中, 存在着“左侧释义、右侧释音”的部件的位置-功能联结。(3)在通达形声字的语音、语义的过程中, 与义符相比, 声符具有注意资源的优势, 这种优势在语音提取任务中更加明显：声符无需依赖义符的信息便可以相对独立地激活整字的语音, 但声符需要义符的配合才能够提取整字的语义。     

Proper Semantics for Substructural Logics,from a Stalker Theoretic Point of View

We study filters in residuated structures that are associated with congruence relations (which we call -filters), and develop a semantical theory for general substructural logics based on the notion of primeness for those filters. We first generalize Stone’s sheaf representation theorem to general substructural logics and then define the primeness of -filters as being “points” (or stalkers) of the space, the spectrum, on which the representing sheaf is defined. Prime FL-filters will turn out to coincide with truth sets under various well known semantics for certain substructural logics. We also investigate which structural rules are needed to interpret each connective in terms of prime -filters in the same way as in Kripke or Routley-Meyer semantics. We may consider that the set of the structural rules that each connective needs in this sense reflects the difficulty of giving the meaning of the connective. A surprising discovery is that connectives , ⅋ of linear logic are linearly ordered in terms of the difficulty in this sense. Presented by Wojciech Buszkowski     

多值逻辑与语义赋值博弈

文章在扩展博弈上,给出了多值逻辑的语义赋值博弈的一般框架,避免了博弈者在多值逻辑的语义博弈中声明无穷对象的问题;然后通过Eloise赢的策略定义博弈的语义概念——赋值,证明了多值逻辑的博弈语义与Tarski语义是等价的;最后,根据语义赋值博弈框架对经典逻辑进行了博弈化。     

The Basic Constructive Logic for a Weak Sense of Consistency defined with a Propositional Falsity Constant

The logic B_Kc1 is the basic constructive logic in the ternaryrelational semantics (without a set of designated points) adequateto consistency understood as the absence of the negation ofany theorem. Negation is introduced in B_Kc1 with a negationconnective. The aim of this paper is to define the logic B_Kc1F.In this logic negation is introduced via a propositional falsityconstant. We prove that B_Kc1 and B_Kc1F are definitionally equivalent.     

Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy

Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.

Autonomous construction of ecologically and socially relevant semantics

This article presents a synthetic modeling approach to the problem of grounded construction of concepts. In many computational models of grounded language acquisition and evolution, meanings are created in the process of discrimination between a chosen object and other objects present on the scene of communication. We argue that categories constructed for the purpose of identification rather than discrimination are more suitable for the detached language use (talking about things not present here and now). We describe a semantics based on so-called identification criteria constructed by extracting cross-situational similarities among instances of a category, and present several computational models. In the model of individual category construction, the instances are grouped to categories by common motor programs (affordances), while in the model of social learning, focused on the influence of naming on category formation, entities are considered members of the same category, if they are labeled with the same word by an external teacher. By these two mechanisms, the learner can construct interactionally grounded representation of objects, properties, relations, changes, complex situations and events. We also report and analyze simulation results of an experiment focused on the dynamics of meanings in iterated intergenerational transmission.