Semantic Coherence and Inconsistency in Estimating Conditional Probabilities

Two studies examined semantic coherence and internal inconsistency fallacies in conditional probability estimation. Problems reflected five distinct relationships between two sets: identical sets, mutually exclusive sets, subsets, overlapping sets, and independent sets (a special case of overlapping sets). Participants estimated P(A), P(B), P(A|B), and P(B|A). Inconsistency occurs when this constellation of estimates does not conform to Bayes' theorem. Semantic coherence occurs when this constellation of estimates is consistent with the depicted relationship among sets. Fuzzy‐trace theory predicts that people have difficulty with overlapping sets and subsets because they require class‐inclusion reasoning. On these problems, people are vulnerable to denominator neglect, the tendency to ignore relevant denominators, making the gist more difficult to discern. Independent sets are simplified by the gist understanding that P(A) provides no information about P(B), and thus, P(A|B) = P(A). The gist for identical sets is that P(A|B) = 1.0, and the gist of mutually exclusive sets is that P(A|B) = 0. In Study 1, identical, mutually exclusive, and independent sets yielded superior performance (in internal inconsistency and semantic coherence) than subsets and overlapping sets. For subsets and overlapping sets, interventions clarifying appropriate denominators generally improved semantic coherence and inconsistency, including teaching people to use Euler diagrams, 2 × 2 tables, or relative frequencies. In Study 2, with problems about breast cancer and BRCA mutations, there was a strong correlation between inconsistency in conditional probability estimation and conjunction fallacies of joint probability estimation, suggesting that similar fallacious reasoning processes produce these errors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EDGAR MORIN'S PARADIGM OF COMPLEXITY AND GÖDEL'S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM

This article shows that in two respects, Gödel's incompleteness theorem strongly supports the arguments of Edgar Morin's complexity paradigm. First, from the viewpoint of the content of Gödel's theorem, the latter justifies the basic view of complexity paradigm according to which knowledge is a dynamic, unfinished process, and develops by way of self-criticism and self-transcendence. Second, from the viewpoint of the proof procedure of Gödel's theorem, the latter confirms the complexity paradigm's circular line of inference through which is formed the all-round knowledge of a concrete object.     

Rule Separation and Embedding Theorems for Logics Without Weakening

A full separation theorem for the derivable rules of intuitionistic linear logic without bounds, 0 and exponentials is proved. Several structural consequences of this theorem for subreducts of (commutative) residuated lattices are obtained. The theorem is then extended to the logic LR ⁺ and its proof is extended to obtain the finite embeddability property for the class of square increasing residuated lattices.     

Vagueness-Adaptive Logic: A Pragmatical Approach to Sorites Paradoxes

Kripke-completeness of every classical modal logic with Sahlqvist formulas is one of the basic general results on completeness of classical modal logics. This paper shows a Sahlqvist theorem for modal logic over the relevant logic Bin terms of Routley-Meyer semantics. It is shown that usual Sahlqvist theorem for classical modal logics can be obtained as a special case of our theorem.     

"[人]在[大场所]"材料范式下观察不到信息整合的原因初探

本研究采用扇效应技术来探求推翻G．A．Radvansky针对其1993年研究结果所作解释的证据。共分为两个分实验。实验1重复Radvansky1993年研究中的实验三,以取得中文材料的基线值,为实验2做准备;实验2通过在材料中使用同样具有可“移动性”的物体的概念(例如快餐车)来探讨“可移动性”是否是“[人]在[大场所]”材料范式下观察不到信息整合的根本原因。结果表明“人的可移动性”不是“[人]在[大场所]”．材料范式下观察不到信息整合的原因。     

Age and probabilistic reasoning: Biases in conjunctive,disjunctive and Bayesian judgements in early and late adulthood

Probabilistic reasoning plays an essential part in many aspects of our daily routine and it has been argued that as we grow older, the need to make judgements under uncertainty becomes increasingly important. Two studies were conducted to establish whether the propensity to commit probabilistic reasoning errors increased with age. Young (aged 16–24), middle aged (25–54), and older persons (55 years and above) were included. Study 1 revealed systematic biases and errors across a range of judgement tasks. However, no evidence of any age effect in Bayesian inference, the incidence of the conjunction fallacy, or in the number of disjunction errors was found. The results obtained in Study 1 were replicated in Study 2, where the potential mediating role of working memory processes and intellectual capacity were explicitly assessed. While some aspects of probabilistic reasoning performance were correlated with measures of intelligence and working memory functioning among young adults, this was much less evident in older persons. The present findings are discussed in relation to the evolution of the dualistic heuristic–analytical system over the adult lifespan. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

情境模型建构过程中空间信息的作用探讨

本研究采用扇效应技术来进一步探讨空间信息在情境模型建构过程当中的作用。共分为两个分实验。实验1通过在材料中使用同样具有可“移动性”的物体概念（例如快餐车）来探讨“可移动性”是否是“[人]在[大场所]”材料范式下观察不到信息整合的根本原因。实验2将材料中的“大场所”地点替换为“中场所”地点,来进一步探讨空间信息在情境模型建构过程中的作用特点。结果表明“人的可移动性”不是“[人]在[大场所]”材料范式下观察不到信息整合的原因并且在不受个体背景知识衰减的情况下．空间信息对情境模型建构的影响作用强于主人公信息的影响作用。     

Gleason's Theorem Has a Constructive Proof

Gleason's theorem for R ³ says that if f is a nonnegative function on the unit sphere with the property that f(x) + f(y) + f(z) is a fixed constant for each triple x,y,z of mutually orthogonal unit vectors, then f is a quadratic form. We examine the issues raised by discussions in this journal regarding the possibility of a constructive proof of Gleason"s theorem in light of the recent publication of such a proof.     

对选择注意中负启动效应的研究

以数字命名作业为任务对选择注意中的负启动效应作了探讨,发现在强调反应正确性时,有负启动效应产生;若强调反应速度,则表现出正启动效应。干扰项的活动状态是启动效应性质的决定因素。研究结果还验证了扩散抑制及其扇形效应的构想,并支持注意后期选择理论。     

RELIGION AND THE THEORIES OF SCIENCE: A RESPONSE TO BARBOUR

Abstract. This paper offers a detailed response to “Religion and the Theories of Science” in Barbour's Gifford Lectures I. Topics include: complementarity, indeterminacy, parts and wholes, and Bell's theorem in quantum theory; metaphysical issues raised by relativity theory and thermodynamics, principally the problem of temporality and “top-down” versus “bottom—up” causality; design arguments and the origins of the universe in astronomy and creation; and God's action in the context of evolution and continuing creation. Areas of agreement and disagreement between Barbour and myself over philosophical and theological implications are presented, and endnotes indicate further areas of conversation.