MENTAL FREEDOM AND FREEDOM OF THE LOVING HEART: FREE WILL AND BUDDHIST MEDITATION

In Buddhism, Meditation and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom, Rick Repetti explains how the dynamics of Buddhist meditation can result in a kind of metacognition and metavolitional control that exceeds what is required for free will and defeats the most powerful forms of free will skepticism. This article argues that although the Buddhist path requires and enhances the kind of mental and volitional control Repetti describes, the central dynamic of the path and meditation is better understood as a process of habituation. This not only involves the dis-identification from mental and emotional content that Repetti discusses—and is commonly emphasized in modern presentations of mindfulness or insight (vipassanā) meditation—but also a transformation of the heart that is effected through the complementary psychological and somatic qualities associated with calm abiding (samatha) and concentration (samādhi) and emphasized in the Pali Nikāyas and commentaries.     

Memory,Future Thinking,and the Self. In Honour of Martial Van Der Linden

Over the past 20 years, much progress has been made in understanding the relations between memory and future thinking, and their role in shaping our sense of self and identity. My own interest in these research questions owes much to Martial Van der Linden, with whom I had the chance to interact closely for several years. The purpose of this article is to pay tribute to him by reviewing the work we initiated together on autobiographical memory and future-oriented thinking. I first review our early work on the relationship between memory and future thinking and discuss their role in self-representation. Then, I provide an overview of the underlying neural bases and describe the alterations of autobiographical thinking that characterize certain psychological disorders. Finally, I outline an integrative framework that I recently proposed to account for the cognitive structure of past and future autobiographical thinking.     

Visual enhancement of touch and the bodily self

We experience our own body through both touch and vision. We further see that others’ bodies are similar to our own body, but we have no direct experience of touch on others’ bodies. Therefore, relations between vision and touch are important for the sense of self and for mental representation of one’s own body. For example, seeing the hand improves tactile acuity on the hand, compared to seeing a non-hand object. While several studies have demonstrated this visual enhancement of touch (VET) effect, its relation to the ‘bodily self’, or mental representation of one’s own body remains unclear. We examined whether VET is an effect of seeing a hand, or of seeing my hand, using the rubber hand illusion. In this illusion, a prosthetic hand which is brushed synchronously—but not asynchronously—with one’s own hand is felt to actually be one’s hand. Thus, we manipulated whether or not participants felt like they were looking directly at their hand, while holding the actual stimulus they viewed constant. Tactile acuity was measured by having participants judge the orientation of square-wave gratings. Two characteristic effects of VET were observed: (1) cross-modal enhancement from seeing the hand was inversely related to overall tactile acuity, and (2) participants near sensory threshold showed significant improvement following synchronous stroking, compared to asynchronous stroking or no stroking at all. These results demonstrate a clear functional relation between the bodily self and basic tactile perception.     

Merely Activating the Concept of Money Changes Personal and Interpersonal Behavior

ABSTRACT— Money plays a significant role in people's lives, and yet little experimental attention has been given to the psychological underpinnings of money. We systematically varied whether and to what extent the concept of money was activated in participants' minds using methods that minimized participants' conscious awareness of the money cues. On the one hand, participants reminded of money were less helpful than were participants not reminded of money, and they also preferred solitary activities and less physical intimacy. On the other hand, reminders of money prompted participants to work harder on challenging tasks and led to desires to take on more work as compared to participants not reminded of money. In short, even subtle reminders of money elicit big changes in human behavior.     

虚假医疗信息的道德缺失与伦理重建

伴随着经济和信息技术的发展,医疗信息环境的污染和失衡已严重影响到了医疗卫生事业的健康发展。从虚假医疗信息的表现入手,剖析了虚假医疗信息产生的根源,着重分析了虚假医疗信息的道德缺失,从实际出发提出了具有可操作性的伦理道德重建。     

特质标签对儿童错误信念理解的影响

该研究将错误信念任务中主人公加上"聪明"或"笨"的标签,以考察特质标签是否会影响儿童对错误信念的理解。360名5~8岁儿童参加实验,每个年龄组儿童随机分配到"聪明"标签组、无标签组和"笨"标签组。结果表明:(1)"聪明"标签会极大地阻碍67、岁儿童理解他人错误信念,对5、8岁儿童没有影响;(2)"笨"标签对所有年龄组儿童错误信念的理解都没有产生影响。     

7~9岁儿童二级错误信念和失言理解的发展

采用二级错误信念任务、失言理解任务分别考察了90名7-9岁学龄儿童心理理论的发展。结果表明,7岁组儿童在二级错误信念和失言理解任务上的成绩与8岁组、9岁组存在显著差异,但8岁组和9岁组儿童之间没有显著差异,提示8岁可能是个体心理理论发展的又一个转折点。三组被试在二级错误信念理解上的成绩显著高于失言理解任务上的成绩,在控制年龄后,他们在两种心理理论任务上的成绩显著相关。另外,失言任务中三种心理状态理解的得分两两相关。综合以上结果,在学龄期,心理理论仍有质的发展,且心理理论的信念、情绪和意图等核心概念仍然相互关联。     

Cultural variation in the motivational standards of self-enhancement and self-criticism among bicultural Asian American and Anglo American students

Recent work on biculturalism has made theoretical and methodological inroads into our understanding of the relation of cultural processes with psychological functioning. Through the use of cultural priming methodologies, investigators have demonstrated that biculturals, or individuals who have experienced and identify with more than one culture, can switch between various "cultural frames of reference" in response to corresponding social cues (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). Drawing on this work on the cognitive implications of biculturalism, the purpose of the present study was to examine the assumption that independent and interdependent self-construals are associated with the motivational standards of self-enhancement and self-criticism, respectively. More specifically, the effects of differential primes of self on ratings of self-enhancement were investigated in a sample of bicultural Asian American (N = 42) and Anglo American (N = 60) college students; overall, more similarities than differences were noted between the two groups. It was hypothesized that Anglo American students would display marked tendencies toward self-enhancement. However, this hypothesis was not supported. Nevertheless, consistent prime effects were observed for a selected number of ratings related to academic virtues, with those who received an independent-self prime often exhibiting greater self-enhancing tendencies than those who received an interdependent-self prime. For example, participants in the independent-self condition reported on average significantly higher ratings for self-discipline and initiative, as well as the degree to which they perceived themselves to be hard working. Implications for the work on self-representations, motivation, and acculturation are discussed.     

On being, knowing and having a self

This paper(1) takes the distinction between being conscious ('core consciousness') and knowing that one is conscious (self-reflexive consciousness) as a starting point for differentiating between three different aspects of the self: 1) the overall process of psychosomatic being which we share with all living creatures and which expresses itself through action (self as totality), 2) the conscious awareness of knowing the self that is a peculiarly human phenomenon consequent on the development of symbolic imagination (sense of self including numinous experiences of the self) and 3) having a self (or soul) as an essential attribute of being human that can only be achieved through being endowed with a self in the mind of others (self-identity leading to the self as the centre of the personality). Some clinical implications of these distinctions are considered including the role of interpretation as fostering integration through the provision of alternative self-images, the loss of self-reflexive consciousness in states of overwhelming affect and the attack on the spontaneous psychosomatic being of the self in states of self-hatred and self-division.     

Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility

In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.