Time trends in the adjustment of Swedish teenage girls: a 26-year comparison of 15-year-olds

The aim of this study was to investigate stability and change over 26 years in self-reported adjustment of Swedish teenage girls. Data were collected with the same questionnaire from two school-cohorts in a middle-sized Swedish community: 522 girls attending Grade 8 (approximately at age 15) in 1970, and 529 girls attending Grade 8 in 1996. The first cohort was part of the longitudinal research programme Individual Development and Adaptation (IDA). In most domains, adjustment problems were approximately as common in 1996 as in 1970, with two exceptions: more girls reported problems with self-esteem and antisocial problems in 1996. In the antisocial domain, a polarization process was indicated, with an increase also in the number of girls without adjustment problems. In the relational domains, especially peer relations, there was an increase in positive adjustment. The results are discussed in relation to earlier findings and to social changes during the period.     

Brief Exposure to Misinformation Can Lead to Long‐Term False Memories

Do false memories last? And do they last as long as true ones? This study investigated whether experimentally created false memories would persist for an extended period (one and a half years). A large number of subjects (N = 342) participated in a standard three‐stage misinformation procedure (saw the event slides, read the narrations with misinformation, and then took the memory tests). The initial tests showed that misinformation led to a significant amount of false memory. One and a half years later, the participants were tested again. About half of the misinformation false memory persisted, which was the same rate as for true memory. These results strongly suggest that brief exposure to misinformation can lead to long‐term false memory and that the strength of memory trace was similar for true and false memories. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Repetition and Spacing Effects on True and False Recognition in the DRM Paradigm

Dubuisson, J.-B., Fiori, N. & Nicolas, S. (2012) Repetition and spacing effects on true and false recognition in the DRM paradigm. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 382-389. With the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, the repetition effect on false memory had never been clarified. More importantly, the spacing effect on false memory was never directly investigated. So, we carried out two experiments to examine these effects on true and false recognition. In experiment 1, participants studied DRM lists which were presented one, three or five times. In experiment 2, we manipulated the repetition mode (massed vs. spaced with a short interval or a long interval) to explore the spacing effect. The results showed that true recognition increased monotonically with list repetition (experiment 1) and repetition spacing (experiment 2). The most striking finding was a similar spacing effect but no repetition effect on false recognition. Thus, these results were principally discussed in the light of the activation-monitoring framework.     

Knowledge despite falsehood

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.     

SOME REFLECTIONS ON IAN MCEWAN'S ATONEMENT: ENACTMENT,GUILT, AND REPARATION

Recognizing that enactments have been discussed in psychoanalysis primarily as occurrences in the treatment setting, the author proposes a new application of the term enactments: that it may pertain to the actions of some individuals in their efforts to cope with bad things that they have done to others. That is, enactment can be a substitute‐for‐atonement mechanism. The author illustrates this view of enactment through a discussion of Ian McEwan's novel Atonement (2001), and in particular by examining the behavior and motivations of one of its central characters, Briony Tallis. Included are explorations of the relationships between enactment and guilt and between enactment and reparation.     

Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief: …”

I applaud Ruffman for cautioning us against interpreting early sensitivity to others’ beliefs as evidence for an innate theory of mind and for making room for learning. In turn, however, I caution against his claim that all infants need is to understand that people act depending on what they perceive. Instead, infants may keep experiential records (Perner & Roessler, 2010) for other people or records of what they have registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), which makes it less obvious that all required knowledge can be acquired by statistical learning. As a general criticism I remonstrate with current theory of mind research on its lack of concern that we understand people as acting for reasons which goes beyond detecting lawful regularities in behaviour.     

Working with unrealistic or unshared hope in the counselling session

Hope has long been identified as an important therapeutic factor in counselling. Further, research evidence for the importance of hope to counselling practice and outcome is abundant. However, the field is only beginning to explicitly consider how hope can be effectively and intentionally practised. One of the most challenging dilemmas encountered by counsellors committed to working with this important therapeutic factor is that of so-called unrealistic hope. In this paper, we outline two real-life counselling vignettes illustrating unrealistic hope, and consider these scenarios alongside relevant scholarship and practice experience. Guiding principles and practices for conceptualising and working with unrealistic hope are offered as a means of beginning the conversation about this complex aspect of working with client hope.     

3～6岁儿童情绪伪装认知能力发展及其与错误信念理解的关系

个体的情绪伪装能力是其情绪社会化发展极为重要的方面,选取某幼儿园123名3～6岁儿童为被试,通过“区分外表-真实情绪”任务和“错误信念”任务考察3～6岁儿童情绪伪装认知能力的发展特点,进而探讨情绪伪装认知与错误信念理解的关系.结果表明：（1）儿童情绪伪装认知能力随年龄增长而提高,3～5岁为儿童情绪伪装认知能力的快速发展期;（2）儿童在消极情境下区分内外情绪的能力显著高于在积极情境中的表现;同时,对两种情绪伪装动机（社会适应、自我保护）的认知能力无显著差异;（3）儿童情绪伪装认知和错误信念理解能力显著相关,两种错误信念（意外内容、意外地点）理解都能很好地预测情绪伪装认知能力.     

Fifty years of American polarization and the changing roles of faith communities

The 2016 election of Donald Trump as president and the first year of his administration have been accompanied by intensified social and political divides in the United States. A comparison of today's polarization with that during the Vietnam War and civil rights movement of the 1960s suggests strategies for bridging the divides—and in particular for an expanding role by faith communities.