On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be ‘persuaded’ to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude‐change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events – compatible with a source monitoring approach – would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.     

The Effects of Dysphoria and Personality on Negative Self-Referent Attitudes and Perceptions of the Attitudes of Others

The cognitive model of depression posits that depressed individuals harbor more dysfunctional self-referent attitudes, but little is known about how depressed individuals perceive the attitudes and perceptions of others in their social arena. This study examined whether dysphoric individuals perceive others to hold equally negative attitudes about themselves, and whether such perceptions depend on sociotropic (i.e., highly invested in social approval and relationship success) and autonomous (i.e., highly invested in vocational or academic achievement and goal attainment) personality styles. A sample of undergraduate students (N = 197) was recruited, and after the assessment of their depression symptoms and personality style, participants read vignettes that described negative scenarios, and imagined that these scenarios occurred to themselves or the general university student. After reading each vignette, participants also rated their agreement with a number of statements that assessed dysfunctional attitudes. Results indicated that elevated dysphoria (i.e., showing signs of depression) scores were positively associated with dysfunctional self-referent attitudes. Further, moderational analyses examining the interaction of sociotropy and dysphoria did not support the hypothesis that individuals higher on dysphoria and sociotropy were less likely to perceive others as harboring negative attitudes about themselves in comparison to those with elevated dysphoria and lower levels of sociotropy. Last, individuals showing elevated dysphoria and higher scores on subdomains of autonomy were more likely to perceive others as exhibiting negative attitudes about themselves than those with low levels of the trait. These findings, their implications, and strengths and limitations of the current investigation are further discussed.     

Young children produce categorical false recall without activation of the lure items

Individuals who study a list of words that are all related to another word that is not presented (a lure word) sometimes produce a false memory of having studied the lure word. The false memories are observed in lists of words that are in the same category as (category list) or associated with (associative list) a word that was not presented in an attempt to elicit false recall. The present study investigated whether young children create these types of false recall. Following the study of a categorical list, false recall was elicited in young children to the same degree as in adults, but studying an associative list elicited false recall only in adults. Furthermore, categorically related lure words did not have a priming effect in young children. These results suggest that the categorical false recall is produced via a different mechanism from the associative false recall.     

Self-awareness,Perspective-taking,and Egocentrism

The present experiment examined the effect of self-awareness on adult perspective-taking and egocentrism. After having indicated their own opinion on an ecology-related topic, university students estimated a fellow student’s opinion on the same matter. Participants did so either in front of a mirror or not, and either after having received a cue for the fellow student’s most probable opinion—his perspective—or not, resulting in a 2 (self-awareness: Low vs. high) × 2 (cue: Yes vs. no) between persons design. As expected, self-aware participants were more likely to correctly estimate the fellow student’s most probable opinion, reflecting perspective-taking, if a cue for his/her perspective was provided. Moreover, self-awareness also reduced participants’ false consensus beliefs (i.e., egocentrism)—when they had a cue for the fellow student’s perspective. The results conceptually replicate and extend previous findings on self-awareness, perspective-taking, and egocentrism.     

Not lost in translation: writing auditorily presented words at study increases correct recognition “at no cost”

Previous studies have reported a translation effect in memory, whereby encoding tasks that involve translating between processing domains produce a memory advantage relative to tasks that involve a single domain. We investigated the effects of translation on true and false memories using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure [Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 17–22; Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 21, 803–814]. Translation between modalities enhanced correct recognition but had no effect on false recognition. Results are consistent with previous research showing that correct memory can be enhanced “at no cost” in terms of accuracy. Findings are discussed in terms of understanding the relationship between true and false memories produced by the DRM procedure.     

Drawing what lies ahead: False intentions are more abstractly depicted than true intentions

The aim of this study was to examine how people mentally represent and depict true and false statements about claimed future actions—so‐called true and false intentions. On the basis of construal level theory, which proposes that subjectively unlikely events are more abstractly represented than likely ones, we hypothesized that false intentions should be represented at a more abstract level than true intentions. Fifty‐six hand drawings, produced by participants to describe mental images accompanying either true or false intentions, were rated on level of abstractness by a second set of participants (N = 117) blind to the veracity of the intentions. As predicted, drawings of false intentions were rated as more abstract than drawings of true intentions. This result advances the use of drawing‐based deception detection techniques to the field of true and false intentions and highlights the potential for abstractness as a novel cue to deceit.     

真实记忆与虚假记忆中的生命性效应研究

本研究采用DRM范式,探讨了生命性对真实和虚假记忆的影响。实验1使用类别呈现词语强化类别加工,实验2伪随机呈现词语弱化类别加工并进行即时及延时探测。结果发现：（1）当强化类别加工时,生命性和类别对击中率有相类似的促进效应;（2）当弱化类别加工并进行即时探测时,生命性对击中率的促进作用最强;（3）类别效应促进真实记忆和虚假记忆,但生命性效应仅促进了真实记忆,而不影响虚假记忆的产生;（4）在即时与延时探测中均发现类别效应和生命性效应。本研究证明了：（1）生命性效应的作用机制不同于类别效应;（2）生命性效应对真实和虚假记忆的作用机制不同;（3）类别效应和生命性效应的存在时效长达24小时,但是生命性效应的衰退速度较快。     

启动情绪和呈现方式对错误记忆的影响

采用DRM范式(Deese-Roediger-Mc Dermott paradigm),考察了启动情绪状态下词表项目的呈现方式对错误记忆的影响。结果发现:(1)启动情绪主效应不显著。(2)词表项目的呈现方式主效应显著。(3)启动情绪与呈现方式间存在交互作用。在愉快启动情绪状态下分组呈现的错误再认率明显高于随机呈现条件;当词表项目分组呈现时,三种情绪状态下的错误再认率有显著差异,其中愉快启动情绪下的错误再认率最高,其次是悲伤情绪,最低的为对照组—非启动情绪状态。说明启动的愉快情绪增强了对关键诱饵的连续激活累积效应,从而导致对关键诱饵较高的错误再认率。     

Fantasy proneness as a confounder of verbal lie detection tools

This study investigated whether high fantasy‐prone individuals have superior storytelling abilities. It also explored whether this trait is related to specific linguistic features (i.e. self‐references, cognitive complexity, and emotional words). Participants high (n = 30) and low (n = 30) on a fantasy proneness scale were instructed to write down a true and a fabricated story about an aversive situation in which they had been the victim. Stories were then examined using two verbal lie detection approaches: criteria‐based content analysis (CBCA) and linguistic inquiry and word count (LIWC). Irrespective of the truth status of the stories, independent observers rated stories of high fantasy‐prone individuals as being richer in all nine CBCA elements than those of low fantasy‐prone individuals. Furthermore, overall, high fantasy‐prone people used more self‐references in their stories compared with low fantasy‐prone individuals. High fantasy prones' fabricated stories scored higher on various truth indices than authentic stories of low fantasy prones. Thus, high fantasy‐prone people are good in creating a sense of authenticity, even when they fabricate stories. Forensic experts should bear this in mind when they employ verbal lie detection tools. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.