Posterior probabilities for a consensus ordering

In the situation where subjects independently rank order a fixed set of items, the idea of a consensus ordering of the items is defined and employed as a parameter in a class of probability models for rankings. In the context of such models, which generalize those of Mallows, posterior probabilities may be easily formed about the population consensus ordering. An example of rankings obtained by the Graduate Record Examination Board is presented to demonstrate the adequacy of these generalized Mallows' models for describing actual data sets of rankings and to illustrate convenient summaries of the posterior probabilities for the consensus ordering.The authors thank Leann Birch for permission to refer to her experiment on cracker preferences, and the Graduate Record Examination Board for permission to use primary data from the Pike Report in our example. We also thank the referees for helpful comments.     

Rhetoric,reasonableness and ethics: An essay on Perelman

The article deals with an interpretation of the work of Ch. Perelman. The author tries to determine the meaning of reasonableness in a hermeneutical and anthropological perspective. He then places the work of Perelman in the light of the theory of symbolic interactionism of G.H. Mead.     

Effect of lie labelling on children's evaluation of selfish,polite, and altruistic lies

This study investigates how 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds' evaluations of selfish, polite, and altruistic lies change as a result of whether these false statements are explicitly labelled as lies. We are also interested in how interpretive theory of mind may correlate with such evaluations with and without a lie label. Our results showed that labelling lowered children's evaluations for the polite and altruistic lies, but not for the selfish lies. Interpretive theory of mind correlated positively with the evaluation difference between the polite and altruistic lies and that between the selfish and altruistic lies in the label, but not in the non‐label condition. Correlation between the selfish and altruistic lies and that between the polite and altruistic lies were stronger with than without labelling, after controlling for age, and verbal and non‐verbal intelligence. We conclude that lie labelling biases children towards more negative evaluations for non‐selfish lies and makes them see lies of different motives as more similar. If a lie label is applied, whether lies of different motives are still evaluated differently depends on interpretive theory of mind, which reflects the child's ability to represent and allow different interpretations of an ambiguous reality.     

The Influence of Social Consensus Information on Intergroup Attitudes: The Moderating Effects of Ingroup Identification

ABSTRACT

Two studies examined the role of ingroup identification in the influence of social consensus information (information about others' beliefs) on intergroup attitudes. Research demonstrates that consensus information influences individuals' intergroup attitudes. However, the extent to which individuals identify with the group providing consensus information seems important to understanding consensus effects. In Study 1, 100 high or low ingroup identifiers received information that other ingroup members held favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward African Americans and then provided their own attitudes. In Study 2, 250 participants completed an ingroup identification manipulation (high, low, or control) before receiving favorable or no consensus information. Results of both studies demonstrated that ingroup identification moderated consensus effects, such that high identifiers were more susceptible to others' beliefs than individuals in the low identification and control conditions. In determining critical factors involved in consensus effects, we hope to create a useful method to promote favorable intergroup attitudes and behaviors.     

Untangling the web of misinformation and false beliefs

Stanley et al. (2022) underscore four fundamental cognitive principles that underlie the human belief system. These include the truth bias (a predisposition to believe incoming information as true), bias to extract meaning from information (use of prior expectations to make sense of new information), bias to rely on the source of information to judge truth (using judgments of source credibility to rate veracity), and bias to rely on fluency to judge truth (perceptions of ease of processing information affect truth judgments). I suggest that understanding these principles can help us defer and deflect false beliefs from becoming entrenched in consumer minds and offer ways to leverage the four principles in the service of truth. I then propose that we broaden our focus in the study of false beliefs in three ways--by focusing on prevention of false beliefs rather than correction, by diversifying the dependent measures we study and by addressing the role of identity in false belief maintenance. I conclude with a discussion of some thorny issues and the need for regulation in this sphere. I seek to offer a research agenda to scholars interested in addressing the misinformation crisis that is ripping apart the fabric of our society.     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

三岁之前幼儿对错误信念的理解

关于幼儿开始理解错误信念的年龄,一直存在激烈的争论。目前颇具影响力的观点认为,幼儿只有在4岁左右才能理解错误信念,3岁幼儿至多只能隐性理解错误信念。支持这种观点的证据主要来自于对幼儿的错误信念的言语实验。由于这些实验结果被认为与言语测试范式相关,越来越多的实验采用非言语测试方法,结果发现3岁,甚至3岁之前幼儿就能够理解错误信念。同时,这一观点也获得了一些理论证据的支持。     

Posttraumatic growth and religion in Rwanda: individual well-being vs. collective false consciousness

Some scholars include changes in spirituality, such as a greater commitment to their religious beliefs or an enhanced understanding of spiritual matters, in the definition of posttraumatic growth; others conclude that questions of spirituality should be excluded from this definition. This article highlights the fundamental difference of religion to other domains of posttraumatic growth because religions are ideologies (and other domains of growth are not). As ideologies, it is argued that religions can affect different levels of identity in different ways. Based on testimonial evidence from Rwandan genocide survivors, the article demonstrates that although religious beliefs can bring existential comfort at the individual level, they can also lead to a state of false consciousness at the collective level. In Rwanda, the dominant religious ideology facilitated the spiritual and moral climate in which genocide became possible. Today, religious interpretations of the Rwandan Patriotic Front's (RPF) leadership provide spiritual backing to a government which has become increasingly authoritarian.     

Theory of mind and its relationship with behavioural inhibition in Chilean preschools / Teoría de la mente y su relación con inhibición conductual en pre-escolares chilenos

Abstract

This study’s main objective was to determine whether the five-step theory of mind scale is associated with responses to behavioural inhibition tasks. The data collected for this were the responses to the scale given by 65 Chilean children aged three to five from medium-low socioeconomic levels, and were derived from the changing locations, happy-sad Stroop, day-night and Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) tasks they carried out. Results showed that there was a significant association between the five-step theory of mind scale and behavioural inhibition (r = .28) and behavioural inhibition with the false belief task (r = .31), controlling for age, sex and language. These data support the emergence model as the best model to describe the relationship between theory of mind and behavioural inhibition. Finally, the results are discussed and future lines of study in this subject are put forward.     

THE LIMITS TO PARTICIPATION IN DIS‐EQUILIBRIUM ECOLOGY: Maori involvement in habitat restoration within Te Urewera National Park

In this paper, we explore conceptualizations of ‘ordinary’ citizens common in public engagement forums on emerging technologies and assumptions from deliberative theory that ordinary people are more likely to be appropriately ‘changed’ through deliberative processes facilitated by experts. Looking at a large US public forum event [the National Citizens Technology Forum (NCTF)], we asked: What were the goals for this exercise and how did they shape conceptualizations of ordinariness and representativeness? Whose goals and conceptualizations were they? Were the engaged citizens ordinary and representative—and were they changed by the exercise? Our exploration revealed that exercise organizers conceived of ordinary citizens as people lacking science and technology backgrounds, without advocacy or business connections to the technologies at hand, and demographically reflecting the US population. Exercise materials also implied that ideal ordinary participants would lack strong opinions and emotions about these technologies. Actual NCTF participants, however, tended to be more educated, have higher incomes, and to be more liberal than the US public, and participants from all backgrounds had a range of relevant knowledge, experiences and opinions about science and technology. They were changed by the exercise in complex and conflicting ways—based as much on their own knowledge and reflections on relational dynamics as on exercise processes, interactions with experts, and information provided in the exercise. We argue that inadequately explored ideas about ordinary citizens are highly problematic. Further, invisible assumptions about what is ‘normal’ among experts and status quo institutions serve to reify the lay–expert divide that engagement exercises are intended to counteract.