祖辈协同教养与幼儿错误信念理解能力的关系:亲子依恋与祖辈同住的作用

为考察祖辈协同教养与幼儿错误信念理解之间的关系以及幼儿亲子依恋的中介作用,采用方便抽样的方法,调查了某城市三所幼儿园345名小班至大班的祖辈协同教养幼儿及其家庭教养人。对幼儿使用操作任务考察错误信念理解能力,对其家庭教养人利用自陈式问卷收集家庭教养方式和亲子依恋等数据。结果显示：(1)祖辈协同教养类型显著影响幼儿的错误信念理解水平和亲子依恋,“有祖辈同住”协同教养幼儿的错误信念理解水平以及依恋的安全性均显著低于“无祖辈同住”协同教养幼儿;(2)亲子依恋在祖辈协同教养的民主信任和教养冲突两个维度与幼儿错误信念理解能力之间分别存在显著的中介作用;(3)祖辈协同教养类型在教养冲突、亲子依恋、错误信念理解能力的中介模型中起调节作用,在“有祖辈同住”条件下,协同教养冲突显著负向预测幼儿的亲子依恋安全感。     

基于开放医疗大数据的人工智能研究

医疗人工智能（artificial intelligence, AI）的发展离不开大数据的汇聚与标注,同时也引发了医疗大数据及其标注标准如何统一的问题。从AI发展对医疗大数据需求出发,指出建立医疗大数据统一标准的重要性与必要性,分析当前医疗AI技术的开发过程缺乏数据统一标准和临床共识,提出“以开放换取共识”的医疗大数据平台方案——素问系统,实现“算法工程师开发技术—临床医生编辑知识—伦理专家监控伦理”的一体化AI生产流程。最后,以素问系统中第一个开源项目——医学知识图谱,作为大数据抽取标准知识的案例,解析了如何以开放换取共识,让AI技术专家与临床专家共同打造可落地的医疗AI技术。

     

听障儿童错误信念理解与谎言理解的关系：情绪理解的调节作用

本研究主要探讨听障儿童自我/他人错误信念理解与谎言理解各层面的关系,以及情绪理解在其中的调节作用。实验1采用错误信念理解和谎言理解来探讨自我/他人错误信念理解与谎言理解各层面的关系。实验2增加了情绪理解任务,并探讨情绪理解在错误信念理解和谎言理解之间关系的机制。结果发现：（1）听障儿童他人错误信念理解、真假信息辨别、谎言意图理解的正确率显著不如典型发展儿童,且他人错误信念理解越好,越容易进行真假信息辨别和谎言意图理解;（2）典型发展儿童自我/他人错误信念理解越准确,谎言意图理解越好;（3）当听障儿童情绪理解得分较高时,自我/他人错误信念理解对谎言行为判断具有正向预测作用;（4）典型发展儿童情绪理解得分较高时,自我错误信念理解对真假信息辨别有正向预测作用,他人错误信念理解对谎言行为判断、真假信息辨别有正向预测作用。这些研究结果不仅表明听障儿童他人错误信念理解对谎言理解具有解释作用,而且表明高情绪理解在谎言理解中有促进作用以及表明高情绪理解在对错误信念理解与谎言理解中的调节作用更加显著。     

激活水平和呈现方式对错误记忆的影响

随机抽取80名大学生参与实验,采用DRM(Deese-Roediger-Mcdermott)范式,探讨了激活水平和呈现方式对错误记忆的影响。结果发现:(1)在随机呈现条件下,关键诱饵的错误再认率显著低于分组呈现条件,但学过项目的正确再认率在两种条件下无差异。(2)在高激活水平条件下,学过项目的正确再认率明显低于低激活水平条件,但关键诱饵的错误再认率在两种激活条件下的差异不够明显。这表明,呈现方式对关键诱饵的错误再认率有显著影响,而激活水平的影响则不显著。由此可知,人们的记忆可以在没有任何外界信息干扰的情况下因内在联想过程而自发地发生改变。     

Brief Exposure to Misinformation Can Lead to Long‐Term False Memories

Do false memories last? And do they last as long as true ones? This study investigated whether experimentally created false memories would persist for an extended period (one and a half years). A large number of subjects (N = 342) participated in a standard three‐stage misinformation procedure (saw the event slides, read the narrations with misinformation, and then took the memory tests). The initial tests showed that misinformation led to a significant amount of false memory. One and a half years later, the participants were tested again. About half of the misinformation false memory persisted, which was the same rate as for true memory. These results strongly suggest that brief exposure to misinformation can lead to long‐term false memory and that the strength of memory trace was similar for true and false memories. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Populism vs. elitism: social consensus and social status as bases of attitude certainty

This study examined the effects of social consensus and social status on attitude certainty that is conceptualized multi-dimensionally as perceived clarity and correctness of one's attitude. In a mock opinion exchange about a social issue, participants were either supported (high consensus) or opposed (low consensus) by most of the confederates. They were informed that their opinion (high status) or their opponents' opinion (low status) had the alleged psychological significance indicative of future success. Post-experimental attitude clarity was significantly greater when attitudinal position was associated with high rather than low status. Attitude correctness was interactively affected by social status and social consensus. Supporting the compensatory effect hypothesis, attitude correctness was comparable across the levels of social consensus as long as they were associated with high status, and across the levels of social status as long as they were associated with high social consensus.     

Repetition and Spacing Effects on True and False Recognition in the DRM Paradigm

Dubuisson, J.-B., Fiori, N. & Nicolas, S. (2012) Repetition and spacing effects on true and false recognition in the DRM paradigm. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 382-389. With the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, the repetition effect on false memory had never been clarified. More importantly, the spacing effect on false memory was never directly investigated. So, we carried out two experiments to examine these effects on true and false recognition. In experiment 1, participants studied DRM lists which were presented one, three or five times. In experiment 2, we manipulated the repetition mode (massed vs. spaced with a short interval or a long interval) to explore the spacing effect. The results showed that true recognition increased monotonically with list repetition (experiment 1) and repetition spacing (experiment 2). The most striking finding was a similar spacing effect but no repetition effect on false recognition. Thus, these results were principally discussed in the light of the activation-monitoring framework.     

Knowledge despite falsehood

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.     

Two Key Differences between Science and Philosophy

C. S. Peirce made the following claim: If science reveals truth, then consensus among scientists can be expected in the limit. This article does not dispute this claim; it simply assumes it. On the basis of this assumption, the following question is asked: Is it possible to extend Peirce's claim to philosophy in a natural way? It is argued that two important differences between science and philosophy strongly militate against such an extension. Does this mean that there is no truth to be found in philosophy? Are there, perhaps, different kinds of truth (scientific, philosophical, religious, and so on)? But such questions, though related to the present investigation, are nevertheless well beyond the scope of this article.