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31.
JAN SMEDSLUND 《Scandinavian journal of psychology》1990,31(2):110-120
Tversky and Kahneman explain cognitive errors in terms of either misunderstanding or fallacy , but have failed to define these concepts. Therefore, they are unable to derive strict diagnostic criteria for distinguishing between them. The lack of conceptual clarification also has prevented them from recognizing the circular relationship between understanding and logicality. Diagnosis of understanding presupposes logicality, and diagnosis of logicality presupposes understanding. This circularity follows when understanding is defined as grasping what is and is not logically implied by a given expression as intended, and when fallacy is defined as logical error. Alternative definitions are discussed and rejected. Tversky and Kahneman fail to realize that one cannot explain and understand what is genuinely illogical, and that, therefore, errors must always be regarded as failure to understand, that is, as logical inference from erroneous premises. 相似文献
32.
Michael J. Wreen 《Argumentation》1988,2(4):425-440
This paper is a critical assessment of argumentum ad baculum, or appeal to force. Its principal contention is that, contrary to common opinion, there is no general fallacy of ad baculum. Most real-life ad baculums are, in fact, fairly strong. A basic logical form for reconstructed ad baculums is proposed, and a number of heterodoxical conclusions are also advanced and argued for. They include that ad baculum is not necessarily a prudential argument, that ad baculum need not involve force, violence, or threats, and that one can argue ad baculum to oneself. The starting point of the paper, however, is a critical evaluation of three ad baculums from the exercise sets of Irving Copi's well-known Introduction to Logic. 相似文献
33.
Jaakko Hintikka 《Argumentation》1987,1(3):211-238
Several of the so-called fallacies in Aristotle are not in fact mistaken inference-types, but mistakes or breaches of rules in the questioning games which were practiced in the Academy and in the Lyceum. Hence the entire Aristotelian theory of fallacies ought to be studied by reference to the author's interrogative model of inquiry, based on his theory of questions and answers, rather than as a part of the theory of inference. Most of the fallacies mentioned by Aristotle can in fact be diagnosed by means of the interrogative model, including petitio principii, multiple questions, babbling, etc., and so can Aristotle's alleged anticipation of the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem. The entire Aristotelian conception of inquiry is an interrogative one. Deductive conclusions caught Aristotle's attention in the form of answers that every rational interlocutor must give, assuming only his own earlier answers. Several features of Aristotle's methodology can be understood by means of the interrogative model, including the role of endoxa in it. Theoretically, there is also considerable leeway as to whether fallacies are conceived of as mistakes in questioning or as breaches of the rules that govern questioning games. 相似文献
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36.
Schaal DW 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2005,84(3):683-692
Bennett and Hacker use conceptual analysis to appraise the theoretical language of modern cognitive neuroscientists, and conclude that neuroscientific theory is largely dualistic despite the fact that neuroscientists equate mind with the operations of the brain. The central error of cognitive neuroscientists is to commit the mereological fallacy, the tendency to ascribe to the brain psychological concepts that only make sense when ascribed to whole animals. The authors review how the mereological fallacy is committed in theories of memory, perception, thinking, imagery, belief, consciousness, and other psychological processes studied by neuroscientists, and the consequences that fallacious reasoning have for our understanding of how the brain participates in cognition and behavior. Several behavior-analytic concepts may themselves be nonsense based on thorough conceptual analyses in which the criteria for sense and nonsense are found in the ways the concepts are used in ordinary language. Nevertheless, the authors' nondualistic approach and their consistent focus on behavioral criteria for the application of psychological concepts make Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience an important contribution to cognitive neuroscience. 相似文献
37.
Paul Thompson 《Zygon》1999,34(3):473-484
The development of modern evolutionary ethics began shortly after the publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection . Early discussions were plagued by several problems. First, evolutionary ethical explanations were dependent on group-selection accounts of social behavior (especially the explanation of altruism). Second, they seem to violate the philosophical principle that "ought" statements cannot be derived from "is" statements alone (values cannot be derivedfrom facts alone). Third, evolutionary ethics appeared to be biologically deterministic, deemed incompatible with the free will required for ethics to be possible. Fourth, social policies based on evolutionary theory (for example, eugenics in the early part of this century) seemed patently unethical. Sociobiology (which coalesced as a field of study with Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis , 1975) addressed several of these problems and provided a rich framework and a new impetus for evolutionary ethics. The lingering problems were the philosophical is-ought barrier and biological determinism. After tracing the early and more recent development of evolutionary ethics, I argue that the remaining problems can be surmounted and an incipient evolutionary ethics can be defended. Thoroughgoing evolutionaryethics must await theoretical developments in neurobiology and cognitive science. 相似文献
38.
Mikey Biddlestone Jon Roozenbeek Sander van der Linden 《Applied cognitive psychology》2023,37(2):304-318
Psychological inoculation has proven effective at reducing susceptibility to misinformation. We present a novel storytelling approach to inoculation against susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy (dmeta-analysis = 0.82), a known cognitive predictor of conspiracy beliefs. In Study 1 (Pilot; N = 161), a narrative inoculation (vs. control) reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and in turn, conspiracy beliefs regarding government malfeasance. In Study 2 (main experiment; N = 141; pre-registered), two separate narrative inoculations (vs. control) directly reduced susceptibility to conjunction errors, and indirectly reduced conspiracy beliefs regarding extra-terrestrial cover-ups. In addition, the inoculation messages improved detection of both real and fake news (‘truth discernment’). We discuss theoretical and practical implications, including the use of inoculation to induce critical thinking styles, and tailoring inoculations that may suit storytelling mediums. 相似文献
39.
Gilbert Plumer 《Argumentation》2001,15(2):173-189
The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions – they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure – for legitimacy, and because these tests affect people's lives. This paper attempts to construct an adequate and appropriate representation of such structure, that is, the logical structure that an argument is perceived to have by mature reasoners, albeit ones who are untrained in logic. 相似文献
40.
Dale Jacquette 《Argumentation》2007,21(4):335-347
This essay proposes and defends a general thesis concerning the nature of fallacies of reasoning. These in distinctive ways
are all said to be deductively invalid. More importantly, the most accurate, complete and charitable reconstructions of these
species and specimens of the informal fallacies are instructive with respect to the individual character of each distinct
informal fallacy. Reconstructions of the fallacies as deductive invalidities are possible in every case, if deductivism is
true, which means that in every case they should be formalizable in an expressively comprehensive formal symbolic deductive
logic. The general thesis is illustrated by a detailed examination of Walter Burleigh's paradox in his c. 1323 work, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior (Longer Treatise on the Purity of Logic), as a challenge to the deductive validity of hypothetical syllogism. The paradox has the form, ‹If I call you a swine, then
I call you an animal; if I call you an animal, then I speak truly; therefore, if I call you a swine, then I speak truly'.
Several solutions to the problem are considered, and the inference is exposed as an instance of the common deductive fallacy
of equivocation. 相似文献