THE ORIGINS AND GOVERNANCE OF COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS

The new science of Complexity explains that limited knowledge prevents societies from predicting and controlling their developments. But Complexity further suggests that nature uses the limits of knowledge to evolve, which turns an apparent obstacle into an opportunity to reevaluate governmental institutions. As in nature, the limits of knowledge lead social systems to evolve by individuating, liberating, and empowering their members. Societies individuate and liberate their members to probe environments and exploit opportunities. Societies empower individuals to globalize their findings which requires constitutionally constraining governmental powers. Societies that respect human rights thus gain selective advantage. Showing that what nature is models what societies ought to be, Complexity may finesse the “naturalistic fallacy” of Hume and Moore.     

Rendering unto Science and God: Is NOMA Enough?

The proverbial “war between science and religion” has in many quarters reached the status of truism. Francisco J. Ayala seeks to negotiate a truce between the opposing sides through implementing the concept of the Non-overlapping Magisteria (NOMA) of science and theology. The NOMA understanding of the interaction between science and religion maintains that science and religion cannot contradict each other because each discipline has its own proper range of inquiry, namely questions of fact versus questions of value. This article explores the boundaries of these two different domains of knowledge and finds that in both theory and practice, the territorial claims overlap significantly. Furthermore, the author argues that such “territorial trespassing” is not owing to misunderstandings concerning the essence of science and of religion as such. Instead, the overlap of boundary lines—when viewed in light of the history and philosophy of science—is understood as integral to how progressive research normally advances in both science and theology.     

THE ANALYST'S APPROACH AND THE PATIENT'S PSYCHIC GROWTH

Psychoanalysis, which shares many functions with other therapies, is built upon its unique concern for the unconscious forces active behind a patient's symptoms and difficulties. What defines psychoanalysis is the analyst's approach as a disciplined engagement in the service of exploring those forces and their roots, an approach that is the product of curiosity working in the service of the other. As a result of the analyst's actualizing this approach, the patient comes to benefit not only from whatever specific declarative interpretations and insights have been explicitly opened, but also, importantly, from observing and taking in the unspoken underlying psychoanalytic mental processes. In this light, the patient's significant capacities for empathy, a subject often neglected, are also discussed. ¹      

Book Review: Ecological rationality and its heuristics

In this study both adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developing controls were presented with conditional reasoning problems using familiar content. In this task both valid and fallacious conditional inferences that would otherwise be drawn can be suppressed if counterexample cases are brought to mind. Such suppression occurs when additional premises are presented, whose effect is to suggest such counterexample cases. In this study we predicted and observed that this suppression effect was substantially and significantly weaker for autistic participants. We take this as evidence that autistics are less contextualised in their reasoning, a finding that can be linked to research on autism on a variety of other cognitive tasks.     

认知需要和警告类型对合取谬误的影响

合取谬误是一种常见的判断偏差,它指的是在不确定条件下,个体评估合取事件及其简单事件发生的概率时,对合取规则系统性偏离的一种现象.实验1 就认知需要类型对合取谬误的影响进行探讨,结果发现高认知需要的被试较不易表现出双重合取谬误和单合取谬误.实验2 探讨了警告类型对合取谬误的影响,结果发现无警告时个体最易表现出单合取谬误,其次是间接警告,最后是直接警告;此外,认知需要与警告类型的交互作用显著,高认知需要的被试在直接警告和间接警告时更少表现出双重合取谬误,在直接警告时更少表现出单合取谬误.     

How do supporters perceive positive and negative psychological momentum changes during a simulated cycling competition?

ObjectiveThe present study examined changes in sport supporters' psychological momentum (PM) during a simulated cycling competition through the lens of the dynamical systems approach.DesignParticipants were asked to support one of two competing cyclists involved in a race that was displayed on a screen in a lecture hall.MethodThe race scenario was manipulated so that the image of the supported cyclist underwent either positive or negative momentum. At regular intervals, participants indicated their PM perceptions during the race.ResultsPM perceptions rapidly changed at the onset of both the positive and negative momentum sequences and then remained stable, reflecting negative hysteresis. Supporters tended to anticipate the future performance of a given athlete on the basis of their current performance. Moreover, this anticipatory tendency was stronger during the positive momentum sequence than during the negative momentum sequence.ConclusionThese results provide initial insights into how PM perceptions of sport supporters change during a competition.     

Source reliability and the conjunction fallacy

Information generally comes from less than fully reliable sources. Rationality, it seems, requires that one take source reliability into account when reasoning on the basis of such information. Recently, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) proposed an account of the conjunction fallacy based on this idea. They show that, when statements in conjunction fallacy scenarios are perceived as coming from such sources, probability theory prescribes that the "fallacy" be committed in certain situations. Here, the empirical validity of their model was assessed. The model predicts that statements added to standard conjunction problems will change the incidence of the fallacy. It also predicts that statements from reliable sources should yield an increase in fallacy rates (relative to unreliable sources). Neither the former (Experiment 1) nor the latter prediction (Experiment 3) was confirmed, although Experiment 2 showed that people can derive source reliability estimates from the likelihood of statements in a manner consistent with the tested model. In line with the experimental results, model fits and sensitivity analyses also provided very little evidence in favor of the model. This suggests that Bovens and Hartmann's present model fails to explain fully people's judgements in standard conjunction fallacy tasks.     

TRANSCENDING IRONY

A more complete understanding of the biocultural evolutionary origins of the concept of ought as developed by David Hume and G. E. Moore may lower the philosophical barrier between is and ought and provide new insights about the separations between the domains of religion and science. If this conjecture is correct, the resulting wisdom will help transcend a major source of irony that Philip Hefner has so aptly identified in his essay.     

Erroneous gambling-related beliefs emerge from broader beliefs during problem-solving: a critical review and classification scheme

Abstract

Erroneous gambling-related beliefs (EGRBs) can be defined as beliefs that imply a failure to recognise how commercial gambling activities are designed to generate a guaranteed loss to players. In theorising about how EGRBs develop, previous reviews have proposed that EGRBs are extensions of decision-making heuristics and associated biases. We propose an alternative generative mechanism: one in which gambling games make substantial wins seem possible through problem-solving and eventual correct strategic action. EGRBs are then beliefs in the possibility of correct strategic action (illusions of control) that develop as players trial candidate strategies—strategies selected based on various broader beliefs. We further propose that EGRBs can be classified based on what is theorised in cognitive science about categories of general human beliefs about the world. For example, it has been theorised that human beliefs about supernatural forces and randomness have certain similarities across cultures, and so we propose that there exists a category of supernatural EGRBs, as well as a category of EGRBs based on broader beliefs about the nature of randomness. We review evidence for this classification scheme and discuss how it can be applied in researching and treating gambling disorder.     

The relationship between anomalistic belief,misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy

Abstract

A poor understanding of probability may lead people to misinterpret every day coincidences and form anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs. We investigated the relationship between anomalistic belief (including type of belief) and misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy across both anomalistic and control (i.e., neutral) contexts. Greater anomalistic belief was associated with poorer performance for both types of items; however there were no significant interactions between belief and context. For misperception of chance items, only experiential (vs. theoretical) anomalistic beliefs predicted more errors. In contrast, overall anomalistic belief was positively related to the base rate fallacy but no specific subtype of anomalistic belief was a significant predictor. The results indicate misperception of chance may lead people to interpret coincidental events as having an anomalistic cause, and a poor understanding of base rates may make people more prone to forming anomalistic beliefs.