Semantic and syntactic aspects of the mass/count distinction: a case study of semantic dementia

Semantic and syntactic contributions to processing of mass and count nouns were assessed by examining the performance of a patient suffering from a pure semantic deficit. Semantic and syntactic processing was evaluated on grammaticality judgement and sentence-picture matching tasks, respectively, where each task involved mass and count readings of metonymic nouns. While the patient did not show impaired performance on the grammaticality judgment task, he manifested difficulties in making mass/count distinctions in the sentence-picture matching task. It is thus argued that while distributionally the mass/count distinction may be established on a purely syntactic basis, cognitive processing of mass/count information requires both intact syntactic and semantic knowledge.     

外表真实区别、表征变化和错误信念的任务分析

自20世纪80年代以来,“心理理论”已成为发展心理学的研究热点和最活跃、最多产的领域。为了分析和比较“心理理论”的实验任务,该研究以济南市3所幼儿园中的233名3—6岁儿童为有效被试。进行了“意外转移。和“欺骗外表”两种心理理论实验任务。得出如下主要结论：(1)意外转移任务中内隐错误信念显著难于标准错误信念,易化错误信念与标准错误信念的难度不存在显著差异。(2)欺骗外表任务中外表真实区别难度显著低于表征变化和错误信念。(3)意外转移任务的错误信念显著难于欺骗外表任务的错误信念。     

A dialogue on Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise

The five participants in this dialogue critically discuss Zeno of Elea's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. They consider a number of solutions to and restatements of the paradox, together with their philosophical implications. Among the issues investigated include the appearance-reality distinction, Aristotle's distinction between actual and potential infinity, the concept of a continuum, Cantor's continuum hypothesis and theory of transfinite ordinals, and, as a solution to Zeno's puzzle, the distinction between infinite and indeterminate or inexhaustible divisibility.     

Sacrifices,Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

When a person gives up an end of crucial importance to her in order to promote a moral aim, we regard her as having made a moral sacrifice. The paper analyzes these sacrifices in light of some of Bernard Williams’ objections to Kantian and Utilitarian accounts of them. Williams argues that an implausible consequence of these theories is that that we are expected to sacrifice projects that make our lives worth living and contribute to our integrity. Williams’ arguments about integrity and meaning are shown to be unconvincing when the content of projects is left open. However, a look at his later arguments suggests a reason to be concerned about defensible ethical projects as understood through what he refers to as “the morality system”. The problem for theories of this type turns out to be not merely conflicts between ethical projects and moral demands but making sense of some of the ethically relevant features of these projects. Accommodations to moral theories that leave room for ethical projects may be insufficient to explain such features, for example in cases where agents demand more of themselves than the theories require. Making the theories more demanding is also problematic. Williams’ view about the role ethics plays in our conception of the life we want to lead provides a better account of these cases.

Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of spatial attention. While the sceptic is correct that some putative cases are accurately deflected in this way, the rejoinder oversimplifies the possible roles that attention might play in relevant contexts. This paper identifies alternative ways that selective attention might play a role in cognitive effects on perception. What emerges is a plausible and well-evidenced mental schema that describes attention-mediated cognitive penetration.     

Explorations on the Notion of Legal Tolerance

This article builds on the notion of legal tolerance and analyzes the scope of its definition. It situates the notion in the complex set of relations occurring between the major systems of society. Generally, legal tolerance, as a concept, is understood in light of the possibilities of the legal system of influencing other major systems’ responses. On the other hand, tolerance is also the response of the legal system in respect to other major systems’ communications. Although there is a common understanding of tolerance as “under punishing bias” in criminology or as political tolerance in political science, ¹ 1. There is also a distinct field in political science, where the issue is political tolerance. In this view, political tolerance is defined as “Political tolerance typically refers to individual-level attitudes that permit groups to express opinions or maintain practices that a majority finds objectionable.” See Allison Harrell, The limits of tolerance in diverse societies: Hate speech and political tolerance norms among youth. Canadian Journal of Political Science 43 (2010), 407–432. See also C. W. Collier, A legal theory of tolerance and perspective. ARSP. Archiv. für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 84(1) (1998), 59–86. Still within criminology, an antonym for legal tolerance would be the notion of “Rationalité Pénale Moderne”; see Pires, Alvaro Pires, “Beccaria, l’utilitarisme et la rationalité pénale moderne,” in Christian Debuyst, Françoise Digneffe, Jean-Michel Labadie, and Alvaro P. Pires, eds., Histoire des savoirs sur le crime et la peine. Tome II : La rationalité pénale et la naissance de la criminologie, Première partie: “La formation de la rationalité pénale moderne au XVIIIe siècle,” (Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, De Boeck Université, 1998), chapter 3, 83–143. Collection: Perspectives criminologiques. the focus of this article is different. The central points here are, first, the analysis of legal tolerance as part of systemic communications and, second, the historicity of the transformations of the nation-state in its ability to cope with the growth of separate, distinct and partial systems of society. Tolerance seems relational and raises questions such as: “How much can the legal system tolerate?” And also, “Which societal topics belong to the social system's domain-matter?” These questions are relevant given that the concept of legal tolerance depends on the possibilities of a given system to steer, to direct or to influence other major systems’ behavior, or to resist, respond or to address other systems, which are in its environment.

The concept of legal tolerance requires an analysis of a cluster of related definitions to assess the implications of the concept. These definitions are the following: (1) The concepts that result from the historical process of structuration and that explain the emergence of social systems. (2) The definition of reflexivity and its relation with the “second order cybernetics dilemma.” This is the place where heuristic and epistemological problems are found. Such problems result from both the problem of representation and from the ontological status of the real. This analysis will show why reflexivity is a key concept to explaining the transformations suffered by such systems. Then, legal tolerance is a newer development in respect to the idea of planning. As an alternative to hard planning, legal tolerance creates a fostering environment. Instead of a single system directing other systems, legal tolerance is relational and created collectively by the organizational national state using its (limited) power of legal creation. Legal tolerance also stems from the concerned subsystems of the society (economy, law, politics, science, along with others) by means of a variety of legislative products, public policies, alliances, and legal and other scientific communications that emerge as coordinating mechanisms among the alluded major subsystems.     

Using a Few Snapshots to Distinguish Mountains from Waves: Weak Factorial Invariance in the Context of Trait-State Research

In this article, we show that the underlying dimensions obtained when factor analyzing cross-sectional data actually form a mix of within-person state dimensions and between-person trait dimensions. We propose a factor analytical model that distinguishes between four independent sources of variance: common trait, unique trait, common state, and unique state. We show that by testing whether there is weak factorial invariance across the trait and state factor structures, we can tackle the fundamental question first raised by Cattell; that is, are within-person state dimensions qualitatively the same as between-person trait dimensions? Furthermore, we discuss how this model is related to other trait-state factor models, and we illustrate its use with two empirical data sets. We end by discussing the implications for cross-sectional factor analysis and suggest potential future developments.     

The Spatiality of Cognition in the Zhuangzi

In this paper I explore the conception of cognition and action found in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi. More specifically, I focus on the role of explicit and implicit spatial imagery in the context of this complex problem. Spatial imagery suggests that cognition is understood as fundamentally bimodal in the text: (1) the default modality, which is informed by an entrenched distinction pattern, is cast in terms of fullness and bulk; and (2) the auxiliary modality, which is free from this kind of constraint, is imagined in terms of emptiness and lack of bulk, as an axis or point. The latter is the preferred mode of engagement with the environment, according to the Zhuangzi. Spatial imagery brings out the crucial characteristics of this cognitive modality: its radical openness and infinite fecundity in the context of distinction–drawing and action. It also connects with other metaphorical schemata at work in the text, including organic imagery. Interestingly, the notion of emptiness and the figure of an axis do not mark an experience of undifferentiated oneness but the state of heightened sensitivity to the makeup of one’s environment. Such sensitivity allows the agent to entertain the situation at hand without bias and to move around (relatively) conflict–free.