JUST LIES: Finding Augustine's Ethics of Public Lying in His Treatments of Lying and Killing

Augustine famously defends the justice of killing in certain public contexts such as just wars. He also claims that private citizens who intentionally kill are guilty of murder, regardless of their reasons. Just as famously, Augustine seems to prohibit lying categorically. Analyzing these features of his thought and their connections, I argue that Augustine is best understood as endorsing the justice of lying in certain public contexts, even though he does not explicitly do so. Specifically, I show that parallels between his treatments of killing and lying along with his “agent (auctor)–instrument (minister)” distinction, in which God is the true agent or “author” of certain acts and humans are merely God's instruments, together imply that he would regard certain instances of public lying as permissible and even obligatory. I buttress my argument by examining several key but neglected passages and by responding to various objections and rival interpretations. Throughout, I challenge standard interpretations of Augustine's ethics of killing and lying and seek to deepen our overall understanding of these dimensions of his thought. In so doing, I contribute to ongoing discussions of public and private lying and to the task of relating Augustine's thought to contemporary debate and deliberation on war, killing, and lying.     

Faith and reason and physician-assisted suicide.

Aquinas's conception of the relationship of faith and reason calls into question the arguments and some of the conclusions advanced in contributions to the debate on physician-assisted suicide by David Thomasma and H. Tristram Engelhardt. An understanding of the nature of theology as based on revelation calls into question Thomasma's theological argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide based on the example of Christ and the martyrs. On the other hand, unaided reason calls into question his assumptions about the nature of death as in some cases a good for the human person. Finally, if Aquinas is right about the relationship of faith and reason, Engelhardt's sharp contrast between "Christian" and "secular" approaches to physician-assisted suicide needs reconsideration, although his conclusions about physician-assisted suicide would find support.     

Psychopathy and internalism

Do psychopaths make moral judgments but lack motivation? Or are psychopaths’ judgments are not genuinely moral? Both sides of this debate seem to assume either externalist or internalist criteria for the presence of moral judgment. However, if moral judgment is a natural kind, we can arrive at a theory-neutral criterion for moral judgment. A leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent. Psychopaths are therefore not counterexamples to internalism. Nonetheless, internalism is empirically problematic because it is unable to explain psychopaths’ moral deficits.     

When things are not the same: A review of research into relations of difference

Responding to stimuli as same and different can be considered a critical component of a variety of language and academic repertoires. Whereas responding to “sameness” and generalized identity matching (i.e., coordination) have been studied extensively, there appears to be a significant gap in behavior analytic research and educational programs with regard to nonmatching relations or relations of difference. We review research on difference relations from a variety of domains, including comparative psychology, as well as experimental, and translational behavior analysis. We examine a range of studies, including research on the perception of difference and oddity responding, as well as investigations on establishing relational frames of distinction. We present suggestions for future research and describe potential methods for teaching skills related to relations of difference.     

Terrorism and the Uses of Terror

“Terrorism”' is sometimes defined as a “form ofcoercion.” But there are important differences between ordinary coercion and terrorist intimidation. This paper explores some of those differences, particularly the relation between coercion, on the one hand, and terror and terrorization, on the other hand. The paper argues that while terrorism is not necessarily associated with terror in the literal sense, it does often seek to instill a mental state like terror in the populations that it targets. However, the point of instilling this mental state is not necessarily coercive or intimidatory: one can try to instill terror as an act of punishment, or as an expressive or therapeutic act, or because one values the political consequences that might follow, or because one thinks terror is preferable, from an ethical point of view, to the inauthentic complacency that characterizes the targeted population at present. Though this paper asks questions about the definition of “terrorism,” these questions are not asked for their own sake. The quest for a canonical definition of “terrorism” is probably a waste of time. But asking questions which sound like questions of definition is sometimes a fruitful way of focusing our reflections on terrorism and organizing our response. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

学前儿童朴素生物学理论及其获得机制

学前儿童朴素生物学理论发展的研究近20年来一直是儿童认知发展研究的热点。Carey等主张学前儿童的生物概念系统是从心理概念系统中分离出来的由一个系统到另一个系统的根本性概念转变,儿童还没有一个包含动植物的整合的生物系统。但另一些研究主张学前儿童能够对生物现象进行本体区分并形成内在一致的生物学因果解释,拥有朴素生物学理论,该理论是在一个概念系统（生物学概念系统）中逐渐的连续性变化过程。目前整合的观点认为儿童朴素生物学理论在童年早期就独立于心理学理论,但在分离一开始的一段时间里还要受心理学的影响。     

Break philosophy through internally

This paper contrasts and illustrates two types of breakthroughs in philosophy; i.e., external and internal ones. Both are made possible through its application to a newfield. In the external breakthrough, a new field is discovered by such factors without philosophy as encounters with different traditions of thought and advance in technology. In the internal one, a new field is brought into attention by critical examination of one or another assumption within philosophy that has once dismissed the field as too trivial or insignificant to be its proper subject. Based on this distinction, a research guideline for philosophy is proposed that one must always seek the possibility of its internal breakthrough. It is also suggested that the philosophy of science and epistemology can be innovated internally when they are applied to a new field, that is, statistics. Finally the distinction between pure and applied philosophy is reinterpreted in the light of the internal breakthrough.     

Against Anthropocentrism: A Jobian Appeal to Science on Theology's Behalf

Abstract : The author asks how science can affect the work of the theologian and uses the experience of Job in the “wild” as pointing toward a new seeing. From science's study of temporality the theologian may learn (1) that humans belong with the (other) creatures, against anthropocentrism, (2) that the traditional distinction between creation and preservation inadequately recognizes God's continuing creative work, and (3) that Christian soteriology needs to address the “groaning” (Romans 8) of the whole creation. While science may help the theologian see thus newly, theology needs to retain its own integrity, as represented by the distinction between creation and fall.     

Autoshaping and automaintenance: a neural-network approach

This article presents an interpretation of autoshaping, and positive and negative automaintenance, based on a neural-network model. The model makes no distinction between operant and respondent learning mechanisms, and takes into account knowledge of hippocampal and dopaminergic systems. Four simulations were run, each one using an A-B-A design and four instances of feedfoward architectures. In A, networks received a positive contingency between inputs that simulated a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an input that simulated an unconditioned stimulus (US). Responding was simulated as an output activation that was neither elicited by nor required for the US. B was an omission-training procedure. Response directedness was defined as sensory feedback from responding, simulated as a dependence of other inputs on responding. In Simulation 1, the phenomena were simulated with a fully connected architecture and maximally intense response feedback. The other simulations used a partially connected architecture without competition between CS and response feedback. In Simulation 2, a maximally intense feedback resulted in substantial autoshaping and automaintenance. In Simulation 3, eliminating response feedback interfered substantially with autoshaping and automaintenance. In Simulation 4, intermediate autoshaping and automaintenance resulted from an intermediate response feedback. Implications for the operant-respondent distinction and the behavior-neuroscience relation are discussed.     

How 7-month-olds interpret ambiguous motion events: Category-based reasoning in infancy

This paper investigates the role of static and dynamic attributes for the animate-inanimate distinction in category-based reasoning of 7-month-olds. Three experiments tested infants’ responses to movement events involving an unfamiliar animal and a ball. When either the animal or the ball showed self-initiated irregular movements (Experiment 1), infants expected the previously active object to start moving again. When both objects were moving together in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 2), infants expected only the animal to start moving again. Initial looking preferences for each object did not influence results. When either the facial features of the animal were removed, or its furry body was replaced by a plastic spiral in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 3), infants formed no clear expectation regarding future movements. Based on this set of findings we conclude that 7-month-olds flexibly combine information about the static and dynamic properties of objects in order to reason about motion events.