Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.     

Can we learn from the clinically significant face processing deficits,prosopagnosia and capgras delusion?

This review describes two clinically significant face processing deficits, prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion, and provides new knowledge about the face recognition process by a convergence of empirical findings. These empirical findings are structured around two questions that are viewed from the perspectives of the two deficits. First is the question of hemispheric specificity, which inquires into the degree of each hemisphere's contribution to the face recognition process. Second is the question of dual neural pathways, which addresses the possibility that the face recognition process proceeds along two parallel pathways in the brain. Findings from the hemispheric specificity studies reinforce the current view that right hemisphere involvement is necessary for face recognition while left hemisphere involvement is minimal. Findings from the dual neural pathways studies reinforce the plausible but yet unproven hypothesis that two neural pathways pass information from the visual association cortex in the occipital lobe toward the temporal lobes and limbic system when faces are seen and recognized. These findings, which also indicate that each of the dual neural pathways carries different, nonredundant information, could be instrumental in showing that the pathways play different roles in the manifestations of the clinically significant face processing deficits, prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion.     

The Role of Emotional Content and Perceptual Saliency During the Programming of Saccades Toward Faces

Previous studies have shown that the human visual system can detect a face and elicit a saccadic eye movement toward it very efficiently compared to other categories of visual stimuli. In the first experiment, we tested the influence of facial expressions on fast face detection using a saccadic choice task. Face-vehicle pairs were simultaneously presented and participants were asked to saccade toward the target (the face or the vehicle). We observed that saccades toward faces were initiated faster, and more often in the correct direction, than saccades toward vehicles, regardless of the facial expressions (happy, fearful, or neutral). We also observed that saccade endpoints on face images were lower when the face was happy and higher when it was neutral. In the second experiment, we explicitly tested the detection of facial expressions. We used a saccadic choice task with emotional-neutral pairs of faces and participants were asked to saccade toward the emotional (happy or fearful) or the neutral face. Participants were faster when they were asked to saccade toward the emotional face. They also made fewer errors, especially when the emotional face was happy. Using computational modeling, we showed that this happy face advantage can, at least partly, be explained by perceptual factors. Also, saccade endpoints were lower when the target was happy than when it was fearful. Overall, we suggest that there is no automatic prioritization of emotional faces, at least for saccades with short latencies, but that salient local face features can automatically attract attention.     

Checking ID‐cards for the sale of restricted goods: Age decisions bias face decisions

Matching unfamiliar faces is highly error‐prone, and most studies highlight the implications for real‐world ID‐checking. Here we study a particular instance of ID‐checking: proof of age for buying restricted goods such as alcohol. In this case, checkers must establish that an identity document is carried by its legitimate owner (i.e., that the ID photo matches the face of the bearer) and that the ID proves the bearer to be old enough to make the purchase. Across three experiments, using two common forms of photo‐ID (i.e., driving licenses, PASS+ cards) we show that observers produce very high error rates when age requirements are met, but faces mismatch. This bias away from detecting a face mismatch remained evident in experienced cashiers—though to a somewhat attenuated level. We discuss interactions between face matching and other tasks, and the practical consequences of a bias which favours those using photo‐ID with fraudulent intent.     

Automatic gaze to the nose region cannot be inhibited during observation of facial expression in Eastern observers

Humans can extract a great deal of information about others very quickly. This is partly because the face automatically captures observers’ attention. Specifically, the eyes can attract overt attention. Although it has been reported that not only the eyes but also the nose can capture initial oculomotor movement in Eastern observers, its generalizability remains unknown. In this study, we applied the “don’t look” paradigm wherein participants are asked not to fixate on a specific facial region (i.e., eyes, nose, and mouth) during an emotion recognition task with upright (Experiment 1) and inverted (Experiment 2) faces. In both experiments, we found that participants were less able to inhibit the initial part of their fixations to the nose, which can be interpreted as the nose automatically capturing attention. Along with previous studies, our overt attention tends to be attracted by a part of the face, which is the nose region in Easterner observers.     

An expanded model for perceptual visual single object recognition system using expectation priming following neuroscientific evidence

Under numerous circumstances, humans recognize visual objects in their environment with remarkable response times and accuracy. Existing artificial visual object recognition systems have not yet surpassed human vision, especially in its universality of application. We argue that modeling the recognition process in an exclusive feedforward manner hinders those systems’ performance. To bridge that performance gap between them and human vision, we present a brief review of neuroscientific data, which suggests that considering an agent’s internal influences (from cognitive systems that peripherally interact with visual-perceptual processes) recognition can be improved. Then, we propose a model for visual object recognition which uses these systems’ information, such as affection, for generating expectation to prime the object recognition system, thus reducing its execution times. Later, an implementation of the model is described. Finally, we present and discuss an experiment and its results.     

词汇共现频率视角下语义联想效应及其神经机制

词汇识别与记忆受到词汇之间语义联想关系的影响。鉴于自由联想方法建立词汇语义联想关系的局限性, 研究者们提出用共现联想法建立词汇之间的语义联想关系。本文对词汇共现频率视角下的语义联想效应及其神经机制的研究进行分析发现, 语义联想的丰富程度和关联程度影响词汇的加工; 与少语义联想词相比, 多语义联想词导致P200波幅增大和N400波幅减小; 语义联想加工涉及的脑区主要是额上回和左内侧颞叶区域。未来研究需要探讨自由联想法和共现联想法建立语义联想关系的差异, 基于共现联想法进一步地探究语义联想的行为规律和神经机制, 并从共现联想的角度开展汉语语义联想效应及神经机制的研究。