The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state.     

Reading qualitative research

In recent years, qualitative research has emerged as an increasingly significant source of evidence for counselling and psychotherapy policy and practice. As a result, it is important for readers of qualitative studies to develop an appreciation of what kind of knowledge is made available, and not available, through this form of inquiry. The present paper offers a critical reflection on a series of qualitative studies published in the current issue of this journal. From a reader perspective, it is possible to identify a set of key themes: the capacity of qualitative research to address major issues within the field; contrasts between professional knowledge and other sources of evidence; the positionality of the author; the challenges associated with the accomplishment of contextuality; and, the struggle to determine the credibility and reliability of findings. The paper concludes by suggesting a shift in publication practice that might enhance the value and readability of qualitative articles.     

Therapists’ experiences with internal representations of clients

Fourteen therapists were interviewed via telephone regarding their experience of “carrying around” their clients with them between sessions (i.e. internal representations, or IRs, of clients), a phenomenon about which little empirically based knowledge exists. Data were analyzed using consensual qualitative research. Findings indicated that overall, therapists have IRs infrequently, most often have IRs of clients struggling with severe or challenging presenting problems, and do receive some training about IRs. When describing a specific IR experience, therapists typically noted a strong therapy relationship, and stated that the IRs typically had specific triggers. The IRs generally consisted of feelings about the client, and typically consisted of thoughts about the client or the felt presence of the client. The IRs generally yielded positive effects, typically both personally and professionally, and were typically discussed with supervisors/consultants. Implications for research, training, and practice are presented.     

Familiarity matters: A review on prioritized processing of personally familiar faces

In this review, we synthesize the existing literature investigating personally familiar face processing and highlight the remarkable, enhanced processing efficiency resulting from real-life experience. Highly learned identity-specific visual and semantic information associated with personally familiar face representations facilitates detection, recognition of identity and social cues, and activation of person knowledge. These optimizations afford qualitatively different processing of personally familiar as compared to unfamiliar faces, which manifests on both the behavioural and neural level.