Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state.     

Reading qualitative research

In recent years, qualitative research has emerged as an increasingly significant source of evidence for counselling and psychotherapy policy and practice. As a result, it is important for readers of qualitative studies to develop an appreciation of what kind of knowledge is made available, and not available, through this form of inquiry. The present paper offers a critical reflection on a series of qualitative studies published in the current issue of this journal. From a reader perspective, it is possible to identify a set of key themes: the capacity of qualitative research to address major issues within the field; contrasts between professional knowledge and other sources of evidence; the positionality of the author; the challenges associated with the accomplishment of contextuality; and, the struggle to determine the credibility and reliability of findings. The paper concludes by suggesting a shift in publication practice that might enhance the value and readability of qualitative articles.     

The first interview: Anxieties and research on initiating psychoanalysis

A qualitative clinical study of preliminary interviews by the Working Party on Initiating Psychoanalysis (WPIP) of the European Psychoanalytic Federation suggests that the unconscious dynamics in first interviews are extraordinarily powerful and that they give rise to deep unconscious anxieties in both patient and analyst, with the corresponding defences against them. Furthermore, the group dynamics observed in the clinical workshops and in the research team doing the study suggest that both the anxieties and the defences are conveyed to these groups in the form of unelaborated ‘session residues’ provoking renewed anxieties and defences in them. These findings contribute to our understanding of what goes on in first interviews, but also raise interesting questions about the psychoanalytic research process in psychoanalysis and how confrontation with the unknown is dealt with in that context. Rather than as a means to avoid anxiety, method in clinical research can be seen as a way to help the research group to contain its reactions and to tolerate them until the group finds its way to further elaboration. These points are illustrated with a clinical case drawn from the study.     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Mixed matters: fluency impacts trust ratings when faces range on valence but not on motivational implications

Facial features that resemble emotional expressions influence key social evaluations, including trust. Here, we present four experiments testing how the impact of such expressive features is qualified by their processing difficulty. We show that faces with mixed expressive features are relatively devalued, and faces with pure expressive features are relatively valued. This is especially true when participants first engage in a categorisation task that makes processing of mixed expressions difficult and pure expressions easy. Critically, we also demonstrate that the impact of categorisation fluency depends on the specific nature of the expressive features. When faces vary on valence (i.e. sad to happy), trust judgments increase with their positivity, but also depend on fluency. When faces vary on social motivation (i.e. angry to sad), trust judgments increase with their approachability, but remain impervious to disfluency. This suggests that people intelligently use fluency to make judgments on valence-relevant judgment dimensions – but not when faces can be judged using other relevant criteria, such as motivation. Overall, the findings highlight that key social impressions (like trust) are flexibly constructed from inputs related to stimulus features and processing experience.     

Therapists’ experiences with internal representations of clients

Fourteen therapists were interviewed via telephone regarding their experience of “carrying around” their clients with them between sessions (i.e. internal representations, or IRs, of clients), a phenomenon about which little empirically based knowledge exists. Data were analyzed using consensual qualitative research. Findings indicated that overall, therapists have IRs infrequently, most often have IRs of clients struggling with severe or challenging presenting problems, and do receive some training about IRs. When describing a specific IR experience, therapists typically noted a strong therapy relationship, and stated that the IRs typically had specific triggers. The IRs generally consisted of feelings about the client, and typically consisted of thoughts about the client or the felt presence of the client. The IRs generally yielded positive effects, typically both personally and professionally, and were typically discussed with supervisors/consultants. Implications for research, training, and practice are presented.     

Amalia X: dialogical sequence analysis as a method in theory-based single case research in psychoanalysis

In this article, Dialogical sequence analysis (DSA) is introduced as a method in theory-based single case research. The structure of article is as follows: first, we will describe briefly the historical background of single case studies and their position as the foundation of psychoanalytic knowledge formation. Secondly, we will describe through Amalia X’s case how one psychoanalytic ‘specimen case’ has been used as a cornerstone for a comprehensive psychoanalytic process research model, the so called ‘Ulm model’. Amalia X is one of the most studied single cases internationally also outside psychoanalytic process study field. Thirdly, we will introduce the central theory and practice of DSA. Fourthly, in the last section of our article, we will show in practice how DSA can be used in the analysis of Amalia’s dream in the session 152.