目击证人研究

目击证人的证词对维持司法系统公正的重要性使得对目击证人的研究成为当今法律心理学和司法领域的热点之一。目击证人的错误证词是导致锗判案件的最常见原因。警方在询问、队列辨认与照片识别中的特定程序和行为,目击证人的记忆、年龄、性别、种族、自信程度等．都将影响证词的准确性。     

When negative evidence increases confidence: change in belief after hearing two sides of a dispute

Four experiments examined change in confidence after hearing two sides of a dispute. The results showed that a case independently judged to weakly support one side often increased confidence that the opposing side was correct. Furthermore, the stronger the first case, the more likely a subsequent weak case had a reverse impact. Traditional belief‐updating models, which tend to focus on change in belief after individual pieces of evidence rather than entire cases, cannot account for these results, and a model that can account for them is introduced. In the new model, case strength is evaluated with respect to a relatively demanding (and malleable) reference point. A weak case can fall below this demanding reference point, resulting in a reverse impact on confidence. Cases must exceed relatively high strength thresholds in order to have their intended impact because they are expected to be biased summaries of evidence. When it is clear that a weak case is unbiased, it affects confidence in the intended direction. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Confidence of Eyewitnesses in Their Identifications From Lineups

The confidence that eyewitnesses express in their lineup identifications of criminal suspects has a large impact on criminal proceedings. Many convictions of innocent people can be attributed in large part to confident but mistaken eyewitnesses. Although reasonable correlations between confidence and accuracy can be obtained under certain conditions, confidence is governed by some factors that are unrelated to accuracy. An understanding of these confidence factors helps establish the conditions under which confidence and accuracy are related and leads to important practical recommendations for criminal justice proceedings.     

THEOLOGY,EVOLUTION, AND THE HUMAN MIND: HOW MUCH CAN BIOLOGY EXPLAIN?

Evolutionary biology contributes much to our present understanding of life, and it promises also to deepen our understanding of human intelligence, ethics, and even religion. For some scientific thinkers, however, Darwin's science seems so impressive that it now supplants theology altogether by providing the ultimate explanation of all manifestations of life, not only biologically but also metaphysically. By focusing on human intelligence as an emergent aspect of nature this essay examines the question of whether theology can still have an explanatory role to play alongside biology in attempts to understand mind.     

On approximate confidence intervals for measures of concordance

The use ofU-statistics based on rank correlation coefficients in estimating the strength of concordance among a group of rankers is examined for cases where the null hypothesis of random rankings is not tenable. The studentizedU-statistics is asymptotically distribution-free, and the Student-t approximation is used for small and moderate sized samples. An approximate confidence interval is constructed for the strength of concordance. Monte Carlo results indicate that the Student-t approximation can be improved by estimating the degrees of freedom.Research partially supported on ONR Contract N00014-82-K-0207.     

Moment of Truth: Why Aha! Experiences are Correct

Having a sudden insight is often associated with inherent confidence, enough for Archimedes to run naked through the streets shouting “Eureka!”. Recent evidence demonstrates that public displays of enthusiasm, such as the ancient polymath's, are actually supported by a higher likelihood of being correct.     

The effect of viewing distance on empirical discriminability and the confidence–accuracy relationship for eyewitness identification

The distance from which an eyewitness views a perpetrator is a critical factor for eyewitness identification, but has received little research attention. We presented three mock-crime videos to participants, varying distance to three perpetrators (3, 10, or 20 m). Across two experiments, increased distance reduced empirical discriminability in the form of a mirror effect, such that correct identifications decreased while false identifications increased. Moreover, high confidence identifications were associated with high accuracy at 3 m (Experiment 1 and 2) and 10 m (Experiment 2), but not at 20 m. We conclude that eyewitnesses may be less likely to identify a perpetrator viewed at a distance, and also more likely to falsely identify an innocent suspect. Furthermore, there may be certain boundary conditions associated with distance and the impact it has on the confidence–accuracy relationship. More research is needed to elucidate the effect of estimator variable manipulations on the confidence–accuracy relationship.     

Centrality ratings,forensic relevance,and production frequency: Which one best identifies central and peripheral items?

Production frequency has often been used to identify central and peripheral information, under the assumption that high frequency implies that the item is central. However, no research to date has tested the relationship between centrality and frequency. Participants watched a video of a bank robbery and completed a free recall test, from which frequency for recalled items was computed. Two groups then watched the same video and rated centrality and forensic relevance for each item. Results showed that most, but not all, items with high frequency were rated as central and forensically relevant but that low frequency items were not diagnostic of either item centrality or forensic relevance. Forensic relevance was a better indicator of item centrality than frequency. We concluded that frequency measures should be avoided to determine centrality. Also, if centrality ratings cannot be collected, forensic relevance ratings may be more appropriate for this purpose.     

On the sampling interpretation of confidence intervals and hypothesis tests in the context of conditional maximum likelihood estimation

In the context ofconditional maximum likelihood (CML) estimation, confidence intervals can be interpreted in three different ways, depending on the sampling distribution under which these confidence intervals contain the true parameter value with a certain probability. These sampling distributions are (a) the distribution of the data given theincidental parameters, (b) the marginal distribution of the data (i.e., with the incidental parameters integrated out), and (c) the conditional distribution of the data given the sufficient statistics for the incidental parameters. Results on the asymptotic distribution of CML estimates under sampling scheme (c) can be used to construct asymptotic confidence intervals using only the CML estimates. This is not possible for the results on the asymptotic distribution under sampling schemes (a) and (b). However, it is shown that theconditional asymptotic confidence intervals are also valid under the other two sampling schemes. I am indebted to Theo Eggen, Norman Verhelst and one of Psychometrika's reviewers for their helpful comments.     

Effects of prior knowledge and response bias upon recognition memory for a story: Implications for children's eyewitness testimony

Abstract: The present study was designed to evaluate the integration hypothesis and the response bias hypothesis for explaining the fragility of children's eyewitness memory, by varying the plausibility of postevent information and the strength of response bias in recognition tests. Preschool children were told a story in which a boy named Ken saw a housebreaker stealing various objects and the postevent information was also incorporated into the story. The first recognition test was administered immediately following the presentation of an interpolated story, and the second recognition test was administered 10 weeks later. The results indicated that high-plausibility objects tended to be recognized as the stolen objects in the second recognition test, and that recognition accuracy was higher for a new-distractor condition than for a misleading-distractor condition. These findings were interpreted as suggesting that the memory representation of the story might be changed through the integration processes and/or rendered inaccessible in terms of the response bias.