婴儿如何认识他心：“似我”假说述评

Meltzoff的“似我”假说认为,婴儿借助“我他对等”认识解读他人行为和心理状态,通过他人间的互动信息推断和调整自身行为。“似我”认识以动作表征为基础,借助第一人称体验建立双向映射,对“似我”之人进行因果推理,由此构成发展路径引导婴儿认识他心。注视追随与模仿两种初级社会学习机制进一步丰富了婴儿对社交关系的理解,使人类学习的渠道突破了自我体验的局限而变得更加多元。     

Taking a Step Back,Moving Forward: Place and Space without Mental Representations

ABSTRACT

The publication of the revised edition of Place and Experience provides the occasion to discuss Malpas’ original account of place, and its role in a proper account of the central features of human minds. The first edition is a groundbreaking work on the embodiment and embeddedness of human minds, that prefigures more recent developments of a now established field of research on embodied minds: so-called E accounts. In this paper, I address three issues in Malpas’ book that I found problematic at times and unclear at others, and argue that E- accounts, or better, a particular rendering of them, can better dissolve. These interrelated issues are: 1. the use of the idea of mental representations to understand location and orientation; 2. the claim that non-human animals have ‘environments’ but lack ‘worlds’, 3. the use of two exclusive vocabularies, the physical and the mental, for describing cognition. I thus question such ideas, associated with traditional accounts of cognition, which not only are responsible for some of the gravest criticisms such accounts have received, but seem inadequate to Malpas’ characterization of minds as placed. My recommendation is to take a step back from the traditional framework, and allow ourselves to simply move forward.