Folk psychology’ is not folk psychology

This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology.     

Predicting preference for items during periods of extended access based on early response allocation

Top‐ranked items were identified during 30‐min free‐operant preference assessments for 9 individuals. Data from each session were analyzed to identify the item (a) that was engaged with first in each session and (b) to which the most responding was allocated after 5 min, 10 min, 15 min, 20 min, and 25 min had elapsed in each session. The results indicated that the first‐engaged item and the 5‐min high‐allocation item predicted the top‐ranked item in 55% and 62% of the sessions, respectively. The results also showed that engagement with the top‐ranked item from the first session decreased across subsequent sessions for 6 of the 9 participants. The implications of the results for brief versus extended stimulus preference assessments are discussed.     

Modeling self on others: An import theory of subjectivity and selfhood

This paper outlines an Import Theory of subjectivity and selfhood. Import theory claims that subjectivity is initially perceived as a key feature of other minds before it then becomes imported from other minds to own minds whereby it lays the ground for mental selfhood. Import theory builds on perception-production matching, which in turn draws on both representational mechanisms and social practices. Representational mechanisms rely on common coding of perception and production. Social practices rely on action mirroring in dyadic interactions. The interplay between mechanisms and practices gives rise to model self on others. Individuals become intentional agents in virtue of perceiving others mirroring themselves. The outline of the theory is preceded by an introductory section that locates import theory in the broader context of competing approaches, and it is followed by a concluding section that assesses import theory in terms of empirical evidence and explanatory power.     

Equipercentile equating via data-imputation techniques

In the design of common-item equating, two groups of examinees are administered separate test forms, and each test form contains a common subset of items. We consider test equating under this situation as an incomplete data problem—that is, examinees have observed scores on one test form and missing scores on the other. Through the use of statistical data-imputation techniques, the missing scores can be replaced by reasonable estimates, and consequently the forms may be directly equated as if both forms were administered to both groups. In this paper we discuss different data-imputation techniques that are useful for equipercentile equating; we also use empirical data to evaluate the accuracy of these techniques as compared with chained equipercentile equating.A paper presented at the European Meeting of the Psychometric Society, Barcelona, Spain, July, 1993.     

Thought translation, tennis and Turing tests in the vegetative state

Brain damage can cause massive changes in consciousness levels. From a clinical and ethical point of view it is desirable to assess the level of residual consciousness in unresponsive patients. However, no direct measure of consciousness exists, so we run into the philosophical problem of other minds. Neurologists often make implicit use of a Turing test-like procedure in an attempt to gain access to damaged minds, by monitoring and interpreting neurobehavioral responses. New brain imaging techniques are now being developed that permit communication with unresponsive patients, using their brain signals as carriers of messages relating to their mental states.     

婴儿如何认识他心：“似我”假说述评

Meltzoff的“似我”假说认为,婴儿借助“我他对等”认识解读他人行为和心理状态,通过他人间的互动信息推断和调整自身行为。“似我”认识以动作表征为基础,借助第一人称体验建立双向映射,对“似我”之人进行因果推理,由此构成发展路径引导婴儿认识他心。注视追随与模仿两种初级社会学习机制进一步丰富了婴儿对社交关系的理解,使人类学习的渠道突破了自我体验的局限而变得更加多元。     

Epistemic presentism

Commonsense functionalism is taken to entail a version of the extended mind thesis, according to which one’s dispositional beliefs may be partly constituted by artifacts. As several opponents of the extended mind thesis have objected, claiming so can generate a cognitive/knowledge bloat, according to which we may count as knowing the contents of trusted websites, even before looking them up (!). One way to retain commonsense functionalism, but avoid the ensuing “cognitive/knowledge bloat” worry is to introduce epistemic presentism—the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can only believe, and thereby know, things in the present. Independently of the above problem, epistemic presentism can be further motivated by shedding light on two central epistemological questions: (1) how to understand the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification and (2) how to interpret the closure principle. The view also aligns with strong intuitions about what we may take ourselves to know, what the relation between action and belief is, and what may count as part of our minds.     

Distributed learning: Educating and assessing extended cognitive systems

Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plus-artifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualizing how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalizing cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on how extended cognitive systems are assembled, we focus on the question: If our cognition extends, how should we educate and assess such extended cognitive systems? We suggest various ways to minimize possible negative effects of extending one’s cognition and to efficiently find and organize (online) information by adopting a virtue epistemology approach. Educational and assessment implications are foregrounded, particularly in the case of Danish students’ use of the internet during exams.     

Dynamic estimation in the extended marginal Rasch model with an application to mathematical computer-adaptive practice

We introduce a general response model that allows for several simple restrictions, resulting in other models such as the extended Rasch model. For the extended Rasch model, a dynamic Bayesian estimation procedure is provided, which is able to deal with data sets that change over time, and possibly include many missing values. To ensure comparability over time, a data augmentation method is used, which provides an augmented person-by-item data matrix and reproduces the sufficient statistics of the complete data matrix. Hence, longitudinal comparisons can be easily made based on simple summaries, such as proportion correct, sum score, etc. As an illustration of the method, an example is provided using data from a computer-adaptive practice mathematical environment.     

The Relationship Between Agentic and Communal Personality Traits and Psychosocial Adjustment to Breast Cancer

Agency, communion, unmitigated agency (UA), and unmitigated communion (UC) are related to psychosocial health outcomes in nonclinical and medical populations. This study examined the relationship between these personality traits and emotional and interpersonal well-being, as up to 50% of women experience difficulties in psychosocial adjustment after being diagnosed with breast cancer. Seventy-four women newly diagnosed with breast cancer completed baseline assessment measures within 2 weeks prior to their first chemotherapy treatment or at the beginning of their hormonal therapy. Findings indicate that (1) agency and UA are important correlates of emotional and interpersonal adjustment and should be considered when attempting to identify women at high risk for psychosocial distress, and (2) UC deserves increased attention in behavioral medicine research, given its strong relationship with emotional distress in a breast cancer population. Thus, evidence continues to accumulate regarding the important relationship of these personality traits to psychosocial outcomes in medical populations.