第三方惩罚的演化与认知机制

第三方惩罚一般是指当违反社会规范的行为与自身利益无关时,个体牺牲自我利益来惩罚违规者的行为。最近的研究发现,对于个体而言,第三方惩罚是一种具有适应性的信号,包括建立良好的声誉以及威慑违规者。不同情境下第三方惩罚的功能有所差异,它是一种特殊的利他行为。第三方惩罚依赖于多个系统,涉及情绪反应、共情等社会认知能力以及认知控制等中央执行能力。探讨该行为的演化和认知机制也能贡献于个体、群体和人际层面的社会心理服务工作。     

The Incarnation of Lived Time: Towards an Ecology of Memory

Most of us think of memory in terms of the brain's ability to store and retrieve events, facts, and skills. Philosophers and cognitive scientists seek to understand memory in terms of causation and justification. This article steps back from these considerations to reflect broadly on what memory is. Drawing on the paradigm shift underway in mind sciences, I explore the implications of the emerging understanding of cognition as embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted. This new paradigm undermines epistemological dualism and individualism and makes it possible to view memory as an ecological process.     

Is it possible to experimentally determine the extension of cognition?

Various analytical tools originally developed for theories of mechanistic explanation have recently been imported into the ongoing debate on the hypothesis of (extracerebrally) extended cognition (HEC). One such tool that appears particularly relevant to that debate is Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitution (MM), most of all because it promises to settle the debate on experimental grounds. This paper investigates whether it is possible to deliver on that promise. We first find that, far from grounding an experimental evaluation of HEC, MM is conceptually incompatible with both internalist and externalist accounts of cognition. Next, we propose a suitable modification of MM, MM*, but it turns out that MM* presupposes rather than produces clarity on the extension of cognition. Moreover, subject to MM* the inference to constitution is radically empirically underdetermined. Finally, we argue that our results can be generalized and conclude that, for principled reasons, it is impossible to experimentally determine whether cognitive processes have extracerebral constituents. Determining the extension of cognition is an inherently pragmatic matter.     

心理分离研究进展*

心理分离指的是个体在非工作时间里从工作中分离出来,个体不仅身体上远离工作场所,精神上也摆脱掉工作的事情,对员工工作压力的恢复过程非常关键。首先,文本概述了心理分离的概念及其进展;其次,论述了心理分离研究现状;最后,阐述了心理分离的已有研究存在的问题和未来研究的方向。     

QUINTUPLE EXTENSION: MIND, BODY, HUMANISM, RELIGION, SECULARISM

Extension of the system that includes the key substrates for sensation, perception, emotion, volition, and cognition, and all representational sources for cognition, supports the view that there is an extended mind and an extended body. These intellectual views can be made practical in a humanist system based on extensions and in religious systems based on extensions. Independently, there is also an institutional extension of secularism. Hence, I maintain, there are five principal forms of extension.     

MINDS, INTRINSIC PROPERTIES, AND MADHYAMAKA BUDDHISM

Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the traditional view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line between intrinsic and relational causal powers. The second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna deals with similar issues when he argues for a middle way between the two positions that were known in his time by the terms eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism, like MBI, asserts that the mind is a permanent enduring substance (although the two theories disagree as to how long mind endures). Nihilism argued that the mind had no intrinsic existence, and today some argue that HEC could lead us to a similar conclusion. Nagarjuna's argument for a middle way between these two extremes is similar to an argument that can be made for HEC. We can accept that neither the brain nor any other single physical item is identical to the mind without falling down the slippery slope that leads to "The mind does not really exist, and therefore we are one with everything." Nagarjuna was correct to say that the mind has conventional reality—that the mind exists even though there is no sharp border between the mind and the world.     

ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE AND SOCIALLY EXTENDED MENTATION

Abstract: The leading accounts of the ethics of proxy decision making implicitly draw on internalist conceptions of the philosophy of mind, or so this essay tries to demonstrate. Using the views of Ronald Dworkin as its jumping-off point, the essay argues that accepting the sort of externalism associated with writers such as Putnam and Burge would alter Dworkin's conclusions concerning how we should respond to the current or precedent decisions of people suffering from dementia. Building on the views of Agnieszka Jawarska, it argues that accepting "active" externalism à la Clark and Chambers would provide currently competent people with new resources for establishing the authority of their present values over inconsistent values they might come to entertain should they become demented.     

Congruence Coherent Symmetric Extended de Morgan Algebras

An algebra A is said to be congruence coherent if every subalgebra of A that contains a class of some congruence on A is a union of -classes. This property has been investigated in several varieties of lattice-based algebras. These include, for example, de Morgan algebras, p-algebras, double p-algebras, and double MS-algebras. Here we determine precisely when the property holds in the class of symmetric extended de Morgan algebras. Presented by M.E. Adams