Extending Compatibilism: Control,Responsibility, And Blame

In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced by admonishment. I would like to thank Dr. Cara Nine and Dr. David Hemp (University College Cork), and the two anonymous referees at Res Publica for their helpful comments on this paper.     

Empowering Academics the Viskerian Way

Abstract

Academics and/or scholars increasingly feel that their academic voice (combined or individual) has been squelched by the demands of performativity in its various guises, and resultantly, that they have been caught up in a process of steady disempowerment. Rather, it should be their right to be free to use their positions in the pursuit of scholarship as their conscience and their expert knowledge of their subject dictate. Academics should be free to question for themselves the boundaries of their limitations, and not have these imposed on them by the state or government bureaucracy. In order to help empower academics to regain their academic voice and identity, this article transposes six of the philosophical ideas of Belgian philosopher Rudi Visker to the world of academia. It explores the possibilities of using these ideas as instruments for the promotion and maintenance of academic freedom.     

Democracy & democratic education

A profound problem posed by education for any pluralistic society with democratic aspirations is how to reconcile individual freedom and civic virtue. Children cannot be educated to maximize both individual freedom and civic virtue. Yet reasonable people value and intermittently demand both. We value freedom of speech and press, for example, but want (other) people to refrain from false and socially harmful expression. The various tensions between individual freedom and civic virtue pose a challenge that is simultaneously philosophical and political. How can we resolve the tensions philosophically in light of reasonable political disagreements over the relative value of individual freedom and civic virtue? Instead of giving priority to one value or the other, this essay defends a democratic ideal ofconscious social reproduction, which consists of three principles:nonrepression, nondiscrimination, and democratic deliberation.     

Differential Factors in the Testing of Personality: II. Differences in Maturity

ABSTRACT

The evoking freedom or “but you are free” (BYAF) technique is a social influence tactic that offers recipients the freedom to accept or decline a request. This research tested the effectiveness of the evoking freedom technique in two field experiments. Participants were asked either to complete a survey (Experiment 1) or to allow a stranger to borrow their mobile phone to make a call (Experiment 2) on an urban university campus. Half of the requests involved language that evoked freedom, and half of the requests were direct. In both experiments, results showed significantly greater compliance in the evoking freedom condition. This research extends previous work by demonstrating the effectiveness of the technique using a high-stakes request and in a culture other than that of France, where the majority of evoking freedom studies have been conducted.     

A Richer or a Poorer Naturalism?

Willem Drees endorses not only minimal naturalism, understood as the rejection of supernatural interruptions of the world's normal causal processes, but also maximal naturalism, with its reductionistic materialism. Besides arguing that this reductionistic naturalism provides the best framework for interpreting science, he believes that it is compatible with religion (albeit of a minimalist sort). The "richer" naturalism advocated by Whiteheadians is, accordingly, unnecessary. Drees's position, however, cannot do justice to a number of "hard-core commonsense notions," which we inevitably presuppose in practice and thereby in science as well as religion. His naturalism is too poor, in particular, to account for subjectivity, freedom, and mathematical, religious, and moral experience.     

论体育的人道原则

本文分析了当今我国体育中所普遍存在的反人道现象。指出应该依据“使人自由”和“消除异化”两个正负原则,还体育以本来面貌,实现体育于人的自我完善与自由文化本质属性。     

Freedom is Not Free?: Posthumanist,Ecological Reflections on Christian Freedom and Responsibility

Philosophers aligned with a kind of posthumanism emphasize the modern, modern human's freedom and ethics are founded on a break from all ties to animality and materiality. Highlighting the posthumanist work of Jacques Derrida, Donna Haraway, and Karen Barad, this article aligns key insights of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's work, such as his pervasive concept of “sociality,” with the call for a more ecologically embedded humanity. The resulting reconstruction of Christian freedom is profoundly Christological and sacramental: freedom‐for the other comes in, with, and through—not apart from—both the divine and created other.     

Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed – a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement – provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's ‘decision to act’ involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true.     

DEVELOPMENT OF SPONTANEOUS MANDING IN LANGUAGE DEFICIENT CHILDREN

Six institutionalized children, aged 7–11, with little or no spontaneous vocal manding, were trained to request food items under appropriate natural conditions when snacks were presented. “I want a” was appropriate when an adult presented food in the playroom. “Out” was appropriate when the items were displayed in the hallway, across a half-door barrier from the child. A sequence of steps was trained, through increasingly naturalistic setting and cuing conditions. The two mands were trained in sequence, not concurrently. To encourage “spontaneous” productions, no vocal cuing was provided by the adult. After criterion performance in each step, several probe sessions were conducted for various cuing conditions, adults, and settings. Probes after imitation training showed no spontaneous manding. Thus, failure of manding was not due to production difficulties. In probes after training for “approximately” natural cues, most children showed little transfer to the natural cues. This implies that training for the specific appropriate cues may often be required. However, good transfer generally occurred across persons, and from training room to playroom. Probes also showed that most children did not use one of the trained mands in the stimulus conditions that were appropriate for the other mand. Thus, adding a second mand did not generally disrupt use of the first. However, significant disruption occurred for two children. Finally, at the end of training, extinction training was given for one mand in one setting. Performance of the other mand was litle affected. In sum, the appropriate form of a mand depends on specific stimulus and setting characteristics, and these characteristics must be considered in training.     

Compatibilism,Evil, and the Free-Will Defense

It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad possible worlds that are populated only by compatibilist free creatures. The primary thesis of this essay is that none of these propositions is true. This thesis is defended by appealing to a recently proposed novel, acausal, composite, unified theory of free action – the Theory of Middle Freedom – that evades the central problems plaguing traditional theories of metaphysical compatibilism.