The associations of cultural worldviews,political orientation,and trust with COVID-19 risk beliefs in the U.S.

Given that risk beliefs predict engagement in behaviors to prevent disease, it is important to understand the factors associated with risk beliefs. In the present paper, we conducted path analyses to investigate the associations of belief systems (political orientation and cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy) with COVID-19 risk beliefs (i.e., perceived likelihood, perceived severity, and worry about disease; Studies 1 and 2), and the indirect effect through trust in information sources in these relationships (Study 1). Two online panels of U.S. adults were surveyed at three timepoints during the COVID-19 pandemic (Study 1: baseline n = 1,667, 1-year follow-up n = 551; Study 2: n = 404). Results of path analyses indicated that, across studies and timepoints, when controlling for political orientation, trust, and demographic factors, greater individualism had consistent significant direct effects on lower perceived severity and worry about COVID-19, whereas greater hierarchy had consistent significant direct effects on lower perceived severity. However, after accounting for cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy (and trust and demographic factors), none of the associations among political orientation and any of the three COVID-19 risk beliefs were significant. The test of indirect effects indicated that individualism and hierarchy were indirectly associated with lower perceived severity of and worry about COVID-19 through less trust. The findings suggest that cultural worldviews of individualism and hierarchy play a role in shaping people's risk beliefs.     

The Janus of Diversity: May the Ideology of Individual Diversity Rationalize Social Inequalities?

Some popular ideas about diversity today emphasize the uniqueness and potential in each individual and posit that all differences across individuals count the same as long as they are “true to themselves.” These ideas saturate current antidiscrimination discourses, but their impact on what might be perceived as discrimination has hardly been tested empirically. This article argues that the direction of that impact may not be taken for granted and advances two hypotheses. First, individual diversity (ID) ideology may direct attention to the alleged psychological attributes of minority group members, rather than to social inequalities and discrimination. Secondly, ID ideology may direct attention towards discrimination only if the target is seen as “authentically unique” (the prototype of ID). Both hypotheses were tested and supported in two studies addressing Greek participants’ perceptions of immigrant children’s difficulties. Study 2 further controlled for possible mediation effects. The discussion suggests that ID ideology might paradoxically rationalize inequalities and discrimination, as well as implicitly raise elitist expectations from minority group members.     

Heidegger on the Struggle for Belongingness and Being at Home

In 1840, Alexis de Tocqueville coined the term “individualism” to refer to the tendency for Americans to withdraw into their own desires and interests, thus weakening and diminishing the “habits of the heart” that bind a generation to the customs of their forebears and contemporaries. A problem, though, is that modern individualism undermines the very ideals—i.e. autonomy, equality, and freedom—that motivated it in the first place. Understood as a way of life, liberal individualism is permeated by alienation, estrangement, and thoughtless patterns of conformism. In what follows, I hope to show that hermeneutic phenomenology as developed by Martin Heidegger marks an important break from the modern liberal individualistic outlook. The point is to undercut the contrived interpretations of our current historical tradition in order to demonstrate that belonging to and sharing in the struggles of a generation are conditions for being human at all. This critique does not provide a panoptic or definitive account of the basis of a genuine community, but does give us a richer sense of place and purpose, beyond even what the current polis/political community designates (though it certainly includes it).     

Closing the gap? Some questions for neurophenomenology

In his 1996 paper “Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem,” Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela's call hasn't gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To what extent is neurophenomenology a distinctive and unified research programme? In this paper I attempt to shed some light on these questions.     

班级辅导对改善初中生乐观心理品质的实验研究

以《生活取向测量修订版》、《儿童解释风格问卷》、《中国中学生心理健康量表》为评估工具,从积极心理学和积极心理健康教育的理念出发,对实验班进行8周的班级辅导。结果表明:班级心理辅导能改善和培养初中生乐观心理品质。     

The inclosure scheme and the solution to the paradoxes of self-reference

Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to a phenomenal one. We fully understand the identity between water and H₂O but the identity between pain and the firing of C-fibers is inconceivable. Mark Johnston [Journal of philosophy (1997), 564–583] suggests that if water is constituted by H₂O, not identical to it, then the explanatory gap becomes a pseudo-problem. This is because all “manifest kinds”—those identified in experience—are on a par in not being identical to their physical bases, so that the special problem of the inconceivability of ‘pain = the firing of C-fibers’ vanishes. Moreover, the substitute relation, constitution, raises no explanatory difficulties: pain can be constituted by its physical base, as can water. The thesis of this paper is that the EG does not disappear when we substitute constitution for identity. I examine four arguments for the EG, and show that none of them is undermined by the move from constitution to identity.     

Measuring individualism and collectivism: The importance of considering differential components,reference groups,and measurement invariance

A new instrument of individualism and collectivism (I/C) was developed and three key issues in I/C measurement were addressed: differentiating components of I/C, understanding the impact of reference groups, and testing of measurement invariance. Three components of I/C were assessed in China and the U.S.: independence, competitiveness, and uniqueness for individualism; considering of one’s decisions on others, sharing of positive outcomes, and sharing of negative outcomes for collectivism. Collectivism was measured with respect to parents, friends, and general others. Results indicate that Chinese participants are less unique but more independent and competitive than their counterparts in the U.S. The expected cultural difference is found for parent collectivism across all three components and for sharing negative outcome with respect to all three reference groups. These results suggest that individualism is a multidimensional construct, whereas the dimensionality of collectivism appears to be a function of social distance. Measurement invariance was tested at configural, factor loading, and intercept levels for all components of I/C.     

Social psychology and social networks: Individuals and social systems

Social psychology and social network research are both centrally concerned with human sociality. Despite some historically significant interactions between the two, these areas of investigation have not been usefully deployed together in recent research endeavours. The present paper attempts to bring out some points of both theoretical and methodological contentions, to characterize the gap between them, to traverse briefly the trajectories of their historical development, and to provide some concrete instances of these differences. Intellectual resources available to Asian social psychology are reviewed, which may help bridge the gap between the two areas of research. We conclude by calling for a greater integration of social psychology and social network perspectives in future research.     

Bochenski on Property Identity and the Refutation of Universals

An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I.M. Bochenski. Bochenski further applies Lesniewski’s refutation of universals by maintaining that identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity principles. Lesniewski’s argument is formalized for purposes of exact criticism, and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences. Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of identicals are recommended to forestall Lesniewski’s paradox.     

Dimensionality of individualism–collectivism and measurement equivalence of Triandis and Gelfand’s scale

Despite researchers’ strong interest in individualism and collectivism (I–C), the conceptualization and measurement of I–C constructs remain controversial. Through a cross-cultural study, the present research examines the dimensionality of I–C and tests equivalence of a measurement scale recently developed by Triandis and Gelfand. Through confirmatory factor analyses, the authors find that conceiving I–C as separate constructs with multiple dimensions is superior and better fits the data. The measurement scale developed based on such a conceptualization is found warrantable although refinements can be made. The results suggest a need for future research on further testing the dimensionality and measurement of the individualism and collectivism scale.