Ontological individualism reconsidered

The thesis of methodological individualism in social science is commonly divided into two different claims—explanatory individualism and ontological individualism. Ontological individualism is the thesis that facts about individuals exhaustively determine social facts. Initially taken to be a claim about the identity of groups with sets of individuals or their properties, ontological individualism has more recently been understood as a global supervenience claim. While explanatory individualism has remained controversial, ontological individualism thus understood is almost universally accepted. In this paper I argue that ontological individualism is false. Only if the thesis is weakened to the point that it is equivalent to physicalism can it be true, but then it fails to be a thesis about the determination of social facts by facts about individual persons. Even when individualistic facts are expanded to include people’s local environments and practices, I shall argue, those still underdetermine the social facts that obtain. If true, this has implications for explanation as well as ontology. I first consider arguments against the local supervenience of social facts on facts about individuals, correcting some flaws in existing arguments and affirming that local supervenience fails for a broad set of social properties. I subsequently apply a similar approach to defeat a particularly weak form of global supervenience, and consider potential responses. Finally, I explore why it is that people have taken ontological individualism to be true.     

心理与文化关系刍议

心理的发展影响了文化的生成,文化反过来也影响了心理加工过程,该综述旨在将该领域的相关理论研究进行简单的介绍和评价,且就其未来的发展提供一些新的研究视角。     

Examination of the content of individualism/collectivism scales in cultural comparisons of the USA and Japan

The definitions of individualism/collectivism and the content of scale items used to assess them could explain the lack of cross-cultural differences reported in some research. Specifically, existing scales may not adequately assess expected cultural differences. In study 1 , a new scale was given in Japan and the USA. Three factors were identified in both cultures. Japanese scored higher on the others focus factor but scored lower on the helping others factor than the US Americans. In study 2 , a forced choice version replicated results in study 1 . In studies 3 and 4 , the factor structure and cultural differences were replicated and the convergent and the divergent validities of the scale were examined. Results indicate that Japanese may be more others oriented depending on the item content.     

在当今中国为合理个人主义正名并无可能——与黄显中同志《个人主义与市民社会》一文商榷

合理个人主义既不合理,也不现实,它存在着逻辑矛盾。合理个人主义不是商品经济的反映,而是资本主义私有制商品经济的必然。传统意义的市民社会在本质上是资本主义性质的世俗社会,它是政治社会的经济基础。我国当今不存在合理个人主义的经济基础。     

刻板解释偏差测量

刻板解释偏差(Stereotypic Explanatory Bias,SEB)是测量内隐态度的一种指标,它反映了个体对某社会群体的刻板印象在信息加工过程中发生的作用。比较SEB与其他内隐态度测量方法后,发现SEB具有结合情境、自然反映内隐态度、预测性良好等特点。     

个人主义与集体主义结构的验证性研究

本文用实证方法通过对中国大陆303名被试的调查,对个人主义、集体主义的维度及其测量问卷的构想效度进行初步验证,结果支持Triandis提出的个人主义、集体主义可以分成水平、垂直两个维度,在个人水平上,个人主义与集体主义有四种类型的构想。验证性因素分析表明,Singelis的问卷有较好的构想效度,但在中国被试的测试结果上表现出一些题目的不适合,有待于进一步修正。     

个人主义方法的重新审视

个人主义及其方法,是近代尤其是当代具有影响的伦理思想及其方法。对于其产生与发展颇具争议：一方面,个人主义的方法原则把人从社会中剥离出来,使他成为周围事物和他自己的惟一评判,赋予他不断膨胀的权利;另一方面,它也为遭到长期压迫的人类思想提供了呼吸的空间和活动的范围,使一个人可以满怀尊严,能够亲自解决自己的幸福与命运问题。     

儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习

儿童的选择性学习是目前认知发展领域的热点问题。儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习(即选择性因果学习)对于回答儿童如何获取知识这个经典问题具有重要意义。儿童的选择性因果学习表现在对他人解释的辨别、评估与采纳上。他们会主动向可靠的信息提供者寻求解释, 并在接收回答后表现出选择性跟进反应。对于他人的回答, 年幼儿童不仅能根据言语线索辨别出解释性陈述, 还能依据解释的结构特征选择更好的陈述加以采纳, 年长儿童甚至可以从不同模式的解释中灵活地学习更适宜的因果知识。未来研究应深入关注解释的其它特征在儿童选择性因果学习中的作用, 进一步探讨选择性因果学习的认知机制。     

内隐学习意识性研究的两种理论取向:二分与渐进

传统的内隐学习研究范式大多致力于意识与无意识加工的操作性分离。随着学习任务和测量手段的改进,越来越多的研究发现量化渐变比二元分离能更好地兼容实验数据。本文对认知领域中与二分和渐进两种取向相关的理论框架和实证研究进行介绍和评价,指出意识的二分与渐进假设是源自不同的概念定义层次的理论框架,即功能性概念和解释性概念,因而对现象学数据具有不同的解释效力。它们的共存提供了不同的研究视角,丰富了我们对内隐学习活动的认识。     

The Truth-Conduciveness Problem of Coherentism and a Sellarsian Explanatory Coherence Theory

According to the truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism, the coherence theory of justification can hardly show that coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This problem is generally conceived as the most recalcitrant problem with the coherence theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that it does not pose a serious problem for a certain version of coherentism, namely a Sellarsian explanatory coherence theory of justification combined with the deflationary theory of truth. On this version of coherentism, our epistemic goal is to gradually improve our conceptual framework so as to maximize its explanatory coherence, and there is no substantial norm of truth independent of the norms of justification, so that we cannot evaluate the truth-conduciveness of a belief independently of the norms of justification. I argue that this version of coherentism can cope with the truth-conduciveness problem.