样例类型与解释方式对初中生数学概率问题解决的效果

为考察样例类型与解释方式对初中生数学概率问题解决的促进作用,实验1随机选取初中生90名,比较正确样例组、正误样例组、对照组的学习效果,实验2随机选取另外90名初中生,比较有教学解释、有自我解释与无解释的正误样例组的即时与延时测试学习效果,研究发现:(1)正误样例学习效果显著好于正确样例;(2)有解释的正误样例学习效果显著好于无解释的正误样例;(3)与有教学解释的正误样例学习效果相比,有自我解释的正误样例学习效果显著且更持久。     

Ambiguity and explanation

This paper presents evidence that ‘because’ is importantly ambiguous between two closely related senses covering what are usually called causal explanations, on the one hand, and grounding or metaphysical explanations, on the other hand. To this end, it introduces the lexical categories of monosemy, polysemy and homonymy; describes a test for polysemy; and discusses the results of the test when applied to ‘because’. It also shows how to understand so-called hybrid explanations in light of the semantic facts established by the analysis.     

A mechanistic perspective on canonical neural computation

Although it has been argued that mechanistic explanation is compatible with abstraction (i.e., that there are abstract mechanistic models), there are still doubts about whether mechanism can account for the explanatory power of significant abstract models in computational neuroscience. Chirimuuta has recently claimed that models describing canonical neural computations (CNCs) must be evaluated using a non-mechanistic framework. I defend two claims regarding these models. First, I argue that their prevailing neurocognitive interpretation is mechanistic. Additionally, a criterion recently proposed by Levy and Bechtel to legitimize mechanistic abstract models, and also a criterion proposed by Chirimuuta herself aimed to distinguish between causal and non-causal explanation, can be employed to show why these models are explanatory only under this interpretation (as opposed to a purely mathematical or non-causal interpretation). Second, I argue that mechanism is able to account for the special epistemic achievement implied by CNC models. Canonical neural components contribute to an integrated understanding of different cognitive functions. They make it possible for us to explain these functions by describing different mechanisms constituted by common basic components arranged in different ways.     

Is it possible to experimentally determine the extension of cognition?

Various analytical tools originally developed for theories of mechanistic explanation have recently been imported into the ongoing debate on the hypothesis of (extracerebrally) extended cognition (HEC). One such tool that appears particularly relevant to that debate is Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitution (MM), most of all because it promises to settle the debate on experimental grounds. This paper investigates whether it is possible to deliver on that promise. We first find that, far from grounding an experimental evaluation of HEC, MM is conceptually incompatible with both internalist and externalist accounts of cognition. Next, we propose a suitable modification of MM, MM*, but it turns out that MM* presupposes rather than produces clarity on the extension of cognition. Moreover, subject to MM* the inference to constitution is radically empirically underdetermined. Finally, we argue that our results can be generalized and conclude that, for principled reasons, it is impossible to experimentally determine whether cognitive processes have extracerebral constituents. Determining the extension of cognition is an inherently pragmatic matter.     

Pollard on Habits of Action

Bill Pollard has recently developed an account of habits of action, endeavoring to rehabilitate the traditional notion of habit in a way that can be used to address current philosophical concerns. I argue that Pollard’s account has important shortcomings. The account is intended to apply indiscriminately to both habitual and skilled acts, but this overlooks crucial distinctions. Moreover, Pollard’s account fails to do justice to the various ways in which the idea of habit figures in the explanation and assessment of action. These shortcomings are a consequence of certain assumptions Pollard shares with the accounts of mind and action he sets to criticize. As long as these assumptions are left intact, the potential of dispositional notions such as habit and skill to contribute to contemporary debates will not be realized.     

"The End of all our Exploring" in Science and Theology

Abstract. The present malaise of religion—and of theology, its intellectual formulation—in Western society is analyzed, with some personal references, especially with respect to its history in the United Kingdom and the United States. The need for a more open theology that takes account of scientific perspectives is urged. An indication of the understandings of God and of God's relation to the world which result from an exploration starting from scientific perspectives is expounded together with their fruitful relation to some traditional themes. The implications of this for the future of theology are suggested, not least in relation to the new phase, beginning in 2003, of the development of the Zygon Center for Religion and Science. In a concluding reflection the hope is expressed that the shared global experience and perspectives generated by the sciences might form a more common and acceptable starting point than hitherto for the exploration towards God of the seekers of many religious traditions and of none.     

Spontaneous Explanations for Work Events Among Individuals in an Occupational Crisis

The way employees in an occupational crisis and other employees explain work events was analyzed. Two hundred and seventeen female participants gave spontaneous attributions for 7 positive and 7 negative hypothetical work events. The results showed that other-blame and a general negative emotional tone of the attributions most powerfully differentiated crisis individuals' attributions from noncrisis individuals' attributions. Future studies are required to determine whether negative attributions lead to occupational crises or whether occupational crises activate employees' tendencies to negative attributions.     

Objective Explanations of Individual Well-being

Empirical research on questions pertaining to individual well-being is informed by the researchers' philosophical conception of the nature of well-being and, consequently, the adequacy of such research is partly determined by the plausibility of this conception. Philosophical theories of human well-being divide into subjective and objective. Subjective theories make our well-being dependent on our attitudes of favour and disfavour. Objective theories deny this dependency. This article discusses objective theories of individual well-being from the point of view of their explanatory power and argues that these theories are unable to provide an acceptable account of the prudential goodness of what they consider to be good for human beings. The article concludes by discussing some implications of its main argument to empirical research on questions pertaining to individual well-being. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.