人格差异性的进化心理学解释

进化心理学一直热衷于人格共同性的探讨,但一些研究者也认为应该关注人格差异性,因为共同性和差异性是人格必不可分的两面。对人格差异性的进化解释比较成熟的有三种：生活历史理论、基因多样性理论和代价信号理论。生活历史理论认为是不同的环境(稳定和不稳定),造成了不同的生活历史策略(K策略和R策略),人格特质差异是这些策略的进化产物。基因多样性理论主要从基因突变和平衡选择的角度来解释人格差异性。前者强调突变基因的不可避免性引发了个性差异的存在和发展;后者强调概率的调节作用,解释了不同人格特质之所以能够并行存在的原因。代价信号理论则认为是个体拥有的先天禀赋或者资源差距导致其传递信号的能力差异,从而选择了不同的行为策略。未来研究需要加大遗传学、神经科学等方面的力度,以及研究范式的创新。     

Reasons for Actions and Desires

It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that allpractical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall callany approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a `Humean approach'.In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aimingto explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. I focus on just one argument in favour of the Humean approach, which I believe can be constructed as the background idea of many Humean accounts: the argument from motivation.I first present the argument from motivation and explain why it seems so compelling. However, I then develop an equally compellingobjection to desire-based approaches to reason, showing that they cannot accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. I show that this objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must be false. And, finally, I argue thatwe should reject the premise that claims that only desires can explain actions. This result is fatal for desire-based views of practical reason. My conclusion is that practical reasons should be based not on desires, but on values.     

Evidence coverage and argument skills: cognitive factors in a juror's verdict choice

Juror reasoning and verdict choice have been explored variously as functions of argument skill and the overall story representation of the evidence on which verdict choices are based. This study investigates the proportion of testimony covered in the justification of a verdict choice and its relationship with argument skill, narrative explanation or evidence‐based argument, and certainty about verdict choice. Each of these variables was also compared with the verdict choice. People serving jury duty justified verdict choices in two abridged jury trials. Individuals were consistent in the relative amount of evidence used in both trials. Argument skills, evidence evaluation type, and evidence synthesis type all accounted for variance in the amount of evidence covered. Evidence coverage, along with argument skills, predicted verdict choice. As expected, those most certain about verdict choice did not use the most evidence. Implications regarding mediating factors in story construction and juror decision making are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

儿童对生物目的指向性的认知发展

目的指向性是生物的基本特征,是区分生物和非生物的重要指标。学前儿童能否根据目的指向性来区分生物与非生物,主要有3种观点：能区分、不能区分、认为学前儿童只能理解动物具有目的指向性,但不能理解植物的目的指向性。该文分层综述了学前儿童对生物包括人、动物和植物目的指向性的认知及学前儿童对不熟悉物体目的指向性的归因研究,并提出了需要进一步探讨的问题。     

论《管子》的经解体及其特征

《管子》的文体是十分丰富的,其文体可以分为论说文、记叙文、经解体等八类。而经解体又可分为两类：一类是一篇文章之中前经后解,经文和解文同在一篇文章之中;另一类是对《经言》部分经文的逐句解释,经文和解文皆单独成篇。     

Mathematical Spandrels

The aim of this paper is to open a new front in the debate between platonism and nominalism by arguing that the degree of explanatory entanglement of mathematics in science is much more extensive than has been hitherto acknowledged. Even standard examples, such as the prime life cycles of periodical cicadas, involve a penumbra of mathematical features whose presence can only be explained using relatively sophisticated mathematics. I introduce the term ‘mathematical spandrel’ to describe these penumbral properties, and focus on the property that cicada period lengths are expressible as the sum of two perfect squares. I argue that mathematical spandrels pose a particular problem for nominalism because of the way in which they are entangled with scientific explanations.     

An agentive non-intentionalist theory of self-deception

The self-deception debate often appears polarized between those who think that self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves (‘intentionalists’), and those who think that intentional actions are not significantly involved in the production of self-deceptive beliefs at all. In this paper I develop a middle position between these views, according to which self-deceivers do end up self-deceived as a result of their own intentional actions, but where the intention these actions are done with is not an intention to deceive oneself. This account thus keeps agency at the heart of self-deception, while also avoiding the paradox associated with other agency-centered views.     

Can the skepticism debate be resolved?

External world skeptics are typically opposed to admitting as evidence anything that goes beyond the purely phenomenal, and equally typically, they disown the use of rules of inference that might enable one to move from premises about the phenomenal alone to a conclusion about the external world. This seems to bar any a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate. This paper argues that the situation is not quite so hopeless, and that an a posteriori resolution of the debate becomes possible once it is recognized that the skeptic holds overly defensive and ill-motivated positions vis-à-vis both evidence and inference, and that more reasonable ones are available. In stating these more reasonable positions, as well as in showing how they make possible an a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate, the paper draws on the machinery of Bayesian epistemology.     

When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?

Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the standard examples given of supposedly fallacious genetic reasoning.