Explications causales normatives dans la distribution de sanctions professionnelles injustes

This research explores the degree of acceptability of the reasons given by a team leader to explain the unfair sanctions he/she distributes to his/her subordinates. Fifteen male high level managers leading team leaders, and 61 employees (30 women and 31 men) responded to a questionnaire in which they had to assess the desirability of the reasons given by a team leader for which he/she unfairly punished his subordinates: it might be either getting angry with them despite their good work (negative sanction) or, on the contrary, refraining intervention when they made mistakes (positive sanction). The results indicate a disaccountability of both the receiver and the distributor of the sanction, with, instead, the highlighting of contextual determinants, especially in case of negative sanction. There is also an influence of the direction of the sanction (positive vs. negative) on the stable/unstable component of the instance chosen as explanatory. These results are discussed on a theoretical level and perspectives of applications are proposed.     

Mathematics and Program Explanations

Aidan Lyon has recently argued that some mathematical explanations of empirical facts can be understood as program explanations. I present three objections to his argument.     

Reasons why in normative explanation

Normative explanations, which specify why things have the normative features they do, are ubiquitous in normative theory and ordinary thought. But there is much less work on normative explanation than on scientific or metaphysical explanation. Skow [2016. Reasons Why. Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that a complete answer to the question why some fact Q occurs consists in all of the reasons why Q occurs. This paper explores this theory as a case study of a general theory that promises to offer us a grip on normative explanation which is independent of particular normative theories. I first argue that the theory doesn't give an adequate account of certain enablers of reasons which are important in normative explanation. I then formulate and reject three responses on behalf of the theory. But I suggest that since theories of this general sort have the right kind of resources to illuminate how normative explanation might be similar to and different from explanations in other domains, they nonetheless merit further exploration by normative theorists.     

Can Explanatory Reasons Be Good Reasons for Action?

What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that matters to the agent. On this proposal, subjective states of the agent are indeed indispensable in characterizing reasons for action. Precisely which set of situational features matter to an agent—precisely what shape the agent experiences the situation as having—depends on the agent's psychological makeup. Those features themselves are not psychological states, however, and it is precisely those features that constitute the agent's reasons for action.     

The Limits of Experience and Explanation: F. A. Lange and Ernst Mach on Things in Themselves

In the middle of the nineteenth century, advances in experimental psychology and the physiology of the sense organs inspired so-called ‘Back to Kant’ Neo-Kantians to articulate robustly psychologistic visions of Kantian epistemology. But their accounts of the thing in itself were fraught with deep tension: they wanted to conceive of things in themselves as the causes of our sensations, while their own accounts of causal inference ruled that claim out. This paper diagnoses the source of that problem in views of one Neo-Kantan, F. A. Lange, and argues that it is solved only by Ernst Mach. No less than Lange and other Neo-Kantians, Mach was inspired to develop a psychologistic account of the foundations of knowledge, but his account also includes a coherent denial of things in themselves’ existence. Finally, this paper uses this account of Lange and Mach on things in themselves to illuminate Mach's relation to a certain strain of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of his own time: his views constitute a more fully coherent version of the psychologistic theory of knowledge Back to Kant figures tried to articulate.     

Mental illness has multiple causes: beliefs on causes of mental illness by congregants of selected neo-prophetic churches in Ghana

ABSTRACT

The present study explored perceived causes of, and preferred treatment approach for, mental illness among congregants of six Neo-prophetic churches in Accra and Kumasi through in-depth interviews. Using thematic analysis, five themes emerged from participants’ causal attributions of mental illness. These included lifestyles and environmental stressors, spiritual causes, interaction of multiple factors, trauma and biological causes. Additionally, participants discussed four main mechanisms through which stress leads to mental illness. These included persistent worrying over stressors, use of inappropriate coping strategies to cope with stress, refusal to talk about one's problems and individuals’ appraisal of stress and available coping resources. These beliefs directly determined congregants’ preferred treatment approach. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

The points of concepts: their types,tensions, and connections

ABSTRACT

In the literature seeking to explain concepts in terms of their point, talk of ‘the point’ of concepts remains under-theorised. I propose a typology of points which distinguishes practical, evaluative, animating, and inferential points. This allows us to resolve tensions such as that between the ambition of explanations in terms of the points of concepts to be informative and the claim that mastering concepts requires grasping their point; and it allows us to exploit connections between types of points to understand why they come apart, and whether they do so for problematic ideological reasons or for benignly functional reasons.     

The dual role of ‘emergence’ in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science

The concept of emergence is widely used in both the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. In the philosophy of mind it serves to refer to seemingly irreducible phenomena, in cognitive science it is often used to refer to phenomena not explicitly programmed. There is no unique concept of emergence available that serves both purposes.     

A REPLY TO ANNE KULL,EDUARDO CRUZ,AND MICHAEL DeLASHMUTT

In my reply to the essays by Anne Kull, Eduardo Cruz, and Michael DeLashmutt, I turn first to Cruz's charge that my use of “the sacred” is at odds with a growing religious studies mainstream that understands religion in secular terms. I suggest that this latter approach has its own problems, deriving partly from its neglect of the political, constructed nature of the category of “religion.” Second, in relation to Cruz's suggestion that my lack of attention to explanation compromises my claim to be social scientific, I defend a broader understanding of the human sciences and explore the relationships between understanding, critique, and history, and between sociology and theology. Third, reflecting on DeLashmutt's suggestion that I neglect the way that technical invention provides a glimpse of divine creativity, and the myth making that goes on around technology in vehicles such as science fiction, I argue that such issues have to be approached in a radically historical way. I conclude by identifying three challenges: to explore more deeply how technological objects form part of human being‐in‐the‐world, to show how my approach might offer practical resources for assessing technological and environmental developments, and to expand my analysis to include non‐Western religious traditions.     

Inference to the Best Explanation

The common role of research programs in science and religion is now widely accepted. The next step in the methodology debate is to specify more concretely the shared standards for adequate explanations. The article presents a detailed account of the method of inference to the best explanation and gives examples of how the method can structure the philosophical and theological interaction with science. The resulting approach dispenses with deductive and inductive proofs of religious propositions and limits itself to initially plausible hypotheses that are to be assessed according to their explanatory power. Only when a domain of data and a particular explanatory task have been specified can any serious claim be made that religious theories are equal or superior to their naturalistic alternatives.