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排序方式: 共有211条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
151.
Jonathan DANCY 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(3):345-357
This paper considers and rejects the arguments that have been given in favour of the view that one can only act for the reason
that p if one knows that p. The paper contrasts it with the view I hold, which is that one can act for the reason that p even if it is not the case that p. 相似文献
152.
G. R. Mayes 《Argumentation》2000,14(4):361-380
Although explanation is widely regarded as an important concept in the study of rational inquiry, it remains largely unexplored outside the philosophy of science. This, I believe, is not due to oversight as much as to institutional resistance. In analytic philosophy it is basic that epistemic rationality is a function of justification and that justification is a function of argument. Explanation, however, is not argument nor is belief justification its function. I argue here that the task of incorporating explanation into the theory of rational inquiry poses a serious challenge to our basic concept of epistemic rationality as well as the a priori method of inquiry that still lies at the heart of analytic philosophy. Specifically, it pushes us toward a much stronger form of naturalism than is generally thought necessary, one in which argument and explanation are recognized as distinct and equally fundamental cognitive processes whose dynamic relationship is one of the central issues in the theory of rationality. 相似文献
153.
Steve Clarke 《Sophia》2009,48(2):127-142
There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural
entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural
entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific
methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment.
It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural
entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow
for the possibility of supernatural entities.
相似文献
Steve ClarkeEmail: |
154.
The current experiments examine mental health clinicians' beliefs about biological, psychological, and environmental bases of the DSM-IV-TR mental disorders and the consequences of those causal beliefs for judging treatment effectiveness. Study 1 found a large negative correlation between clinicians' beliefs about biological bases and environmental/psychological bases, suggesting that clinicians conceptualize mental disorders along a single continuum spanning from highly biological disorders (e.g., autistic disorder) to highly nonbiological disorders (e.g., adjustment disorders). Study 2 replicated this finding by having clinicians list what they thought were the specific causes of nine familiar mental disorders and rate their bio–psycho–environmental bases. Study 3 further found that clinicians believe medication to be more effective for biologically based mental disorders and psychotherapy to be more effective for psychosocially based mental disorders. These results demonstrate that even expert mental health clinicians make strong distinctions between psychological and biological phenomena. 相似文献
155.
James R. Beebe 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):181-196
The abductivist reply to skepticism is the view that commonsense explanations of the patterns and regularities that appear
in our sensory experiences should be rationally preferred to skeptical explanations of those same patterns and regularities
on the basis of explanatory considerations. In this article I critically examine Laurence BonJour’s rationalist version of
the abductivist position. After explaining why BonJour’s account is more defensible than other versions of the view, I argue
that the notion of probability he relies upon is deeply problematic, that he incorporates an implausible double-standard concerning
a priori and a posteriori justification, and that his view is vulnerable to skepticism about the a priori. I suggest that
some of these problems are due to idiosyncratic commitments BonJour makes and that abductivists would be better off without
them. I conclude with some suggestions about how to improve BonJour’s abductivist response to skepticism.
相似文献
James R. BeebeEmail: |
156.
Lombrozo T 《Cognitive psychology》2007,55(3):232-257
What makes some explanations better than others? This paper explores the roles of simplicity and probability in evaluating competing causal explanations. Four experiments investigate the hypothesis that simpler explanations are judged both better and more likely to be true. In all experiments, simplicity is quantified as the number of causes invoked in an explanation, with fewer causes corresponding to a simpler explanation. Experiment 1 confirms that all else being equal, both simpler and more probable explanations are preferred. Experiments 2 and 3 examine how explanations are evaluated when simplicity and probability compete. The data suggest that simpler explanations are assigned a higher prior probability, with the consequence that disproportionate probabilistic evidence is required before a complex explanation will be favored over a simpler alternative. Moreover, committing to a simple but unlikely explanation can lead to systematic overestimation of the prevalence of the cause invoked in the simple explanation. Finally, Experiment 4 finds that the preference for simpler explanations can be overcome when probability information unambiguously supports a complex explanation over a simpler alternative. Collectively, these findings suggest that simplicity is used as a basis for evaluating explanations and for assigning prior probabilities when unambiguous probability information is absent. More broadly, evaluating explanations may operate as a mechanism for generating estimates of subjective probability. 相似文献
157.
归类不确定情景下特征推理的综合条件概率模型 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
用大学生被试,通过三个实验探讨在集中呈现类别成员样本信息的归类不确定情景下的特征推理。实验结果表明,单纯的归类确定性程度和靶类别靶特征的代表性并不直接影响被试的特征推理,而是预测特征相对于目标特征的综合条件概率直接影响被试的特征推理;特征推理不是基于类别中介的间接推理,而是基于特征关联综合条件概率的直接推理。实验结果支持作者提出的预测特征综合条件概率模型。 相似文献
158.
159.
Arthur Peacocke 《Zygon》2000,35(1):119-140
The ambivalent reputation of theology as an academic discipline is attributed to the often circular character of its procedures based on presumed authoritative sources. Recently, science too has come under the shadow of "postmodernist" critiques but, it is argued, has been able to withstand them successfully and make epistemologically warrantedclaims to be depicting reality—thereby vindicating human rationality. Evolutionary epistemological considerations also reinforce confidence in the more general deliverances of the human exploration of reasonableness through inference to the best explanation (IBE). The consequences of applying IBE, with its associated criteria, in theological investigation are considered in relation to theology as it is and as it might be. A number of issues critical for thedevelopment of a credible theology are identified. In spite of the challenging and somewhat negative view of contemporary theology to which this leads, hope is expressed that a genuinely credible "evangelical,""catholic," and liberal theology may yet emerge for the new millennium. 相似文献
160.
理解心理学是一种坚持心理学的人文科学取向,倡导人特有研究方式的建构与运用,以达成对人及其心理生活本质或生命意义与价值的理解、描述为目标的心理学流派、思想主张或形态。其发展先后呈现出知识论取向的理解心理学、价值论(或生存论)取向的理解心理学、整合论取向的理解心理学。在方法论上具有鲜明的人文主义特征,致力于探究人的社会本性,构筑了人文科学心理学的历史样态。未来,理解心理学还需摒弃非此即彼的思维方式,携手说明心理学共同推动心理学走向成熟 相似文献