Methodological functionalism and the description of natural systems

The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs (i.e., stimuli from the environment) are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations of chemical and biological systems that were developed using methodological functionalism are examined: Willis’s (1684) explanation of fermentation, Farr’s (mid-1800s) explanation of cholera, and Mendel’s (mid-1800s) explanation of inheritance. The discovery of HIV in the early 1980s, an investigation that rejected methodological functionalism early on, is also discussed. The assessment of methodological functionalism is not positive. This technique has limitations. The implications for cognitive psychology are considered, and one conclusion is that cognitive psychology will eventually cease relying on methodological functionalism.     

There are Non‐Causal Explanations of Particular Events

A defence of non‐causal explanations of events is presented in cases where explanation is understood as modal explanation. In such cases the source of modal information is crucial. All explanations implicitly use contrast classes, and relative to a particular contrast we can privilege some difference makers over others. Thinking about changes in these privileged “actual” difference makers is then the source of modal information for any given explanandum. If an actual difference maker is non‐causal, then we have a principled definition of a non‐causal explanation of an event regardless of how much causal information is also contained in the explanans. A demarcation of explanation into causal and non‐causal in this way recovers ordinary language about explanation as well as reflecting genuine differences in practice, such as the in‐principle evidential base for any modal claim.     

Justification, Discovery, Reason & Argument

In distinguishing justification from discovery, the logical empiricists hoped to avoid confusing causal matters with normative ones. Exaggerating the virtue of this distinction, however, has disguised from us important features of the concept of a reason as it functions in human practice. Surfacing those features gives some insight into reasoning and argument.     

A selectionist explanation for the success and failures of science

I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation. Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world, the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing theories are both equally successful.

Relations among functional systems in behavior analysis

This paper proposes that an organism's integrated repertoire of operant behavior has the status of a biological system, similar to other biological systems, like the nervous, cardiovascular, or immune systems. Evidence from a number of sources indicates that the distinctions between biological and behavioral events is often misleading, engendering counterproductive explanatory controversy. A good deal of what is viewed as biological (often thought to be inaccessible or hypothetical) can become publicly measurable variables using currently available and developing technologies. Moreover, such endogenous variables can serve as establishing operations, discriminative stimuli, conjoint mediating events, and maintaining consequences within a functional analysis of behavior and need not lead to reductionistic explanation. I suggest that explanatory misunderstandings often arise from conflating different levels of analysis and that behavior analysis can extend its reach by identifying variables operating within a functional analysis that also serve functions in other biological systems.     

Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality

Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson’s arguments and use Twin-Earth style cases to argue for the causal inertness of broad mental states.     

学习不良儿童的策略信念与理解水平

使用结构访谈法对120名儿童(其中学习不良儿童60名)的策略信念与策略理解水平进行了研究。结果显示:学习不良儿童组与一般儿童组的差异更多体现在对具体策略的元认知因果解释水平上,他们更多持有较低水平的“信息获得”解释,而对照组儿童则更多持有较高水平的“信息加工”解释,提示对策略理解水平的差异可能是导致学习不良儿童难以将新学到的策略主动应用到其它情景中去的一个重要原因。     

Representation of principled connections: a window onto the formal aspect of common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. Recent research suggests that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g., DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g., having four legs for dogs) but not other properties (t-properties; e.g., being brown for dogs). Principled connections differ from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections license (i) the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess their k-properties, (ii) formal explanations (i.e., explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is), and (iii) normative expectations concerning the presence of k-properties in tokens of the type. The present paper investigates the hypothesis that representing principled connections requires representing properties as aspects of being the relevant kind of thing (Aspect Hypothesis). Experiment 1 provides a direct test of the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 provide indirect tests of the Aspect Hypothesis. All three experiments provide support for the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiment 4 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the manner in which formal explanations are licensed by principled connections. Finally, Experiment 5 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the nature of the normative expectations licensed by principled connections. Together these results provide strong evidence for the idea that representing principled connections involves representing a property as being an aspect of being a given kind of thing. The results also help clarify the manner in which formal explanation differs from other modes of explanation. Finally, the results of the experiments are used to motivate a proposal concerning the formal structure of the conceptual representations implicated by principled connections. This structure provides a domain-general way of structuring our concepts and embodies the perspective we take when we think and talk of things as being instances of a kind.     

《论语》文体形式的文化阐释

《论语》是以“语”体和“子曰”等形式记录孔子的言论,建构孔子的话语权威和思想价值体系的。“子曰”形式最宜于孔子独自式地直接阐发自己的思想,“问——子曰”形式由于受到孔子“礼”和“仁”的规范,导致与孔子对话的真正主体缺席,而成为孔子建构自己话语权威的有效言说方式。孔子重视“言”的作用,但反对“巧言”。孔子不期望论辩,面对论辩他往往先预设道德判断,然后否定欲辩者,从而最终否定论辩本身。对孔子来说,“巧言”和“沦辩”会使自己的话语权威和思想价值体系面临被解构的威胁。     

对定量归因判断的能力差异解释

该文提出对由两个原因一起作用而产生的结果的定量归因判断的能力差异解释,认为对两个原因定量归因判断之间的差异主要取决于对两个原因能力评估之间的相对差异。两个实验发现,大学生被试一般能根据对两个原因能力评估的相对差异程度,对产生给定结果的贡献在两个竞争原因之间进行相应的比例分配;对两个原因贡献评估的差异随着对两个原因能力评估的相对差异程度的增大而增大。这支持对这种定量归因判断的能力差异解释。