High-level Enactive and Embodied Cognition in Expert Sport Performance

Abstract

Mental representation has long been central to standard accounts of action and cognition generally, and in the context of sport. We argue for an enactive and embodied account that rejects the idea that representation is necessary for cognition, and posit instead that cognition arises, or is enacted, in certain types of interactions between organisms and their environment. More specifically, we argue that enactive theories explain some kinds of high-level cognition, those that underlie some of the best performances in sport and similar practices (dance, martial arts), better than representational accounts. Flow and mushin (mindfully fluid awareness) are explained enactively to this end. This results in a mutually beneficial analysis where enactivism offers theoretical and practical advantages as an explanation of high performance in sports, while the latter validates enactivism.     

The impact of hedged testimony on judgments of credibility

We tested whether people are attuned to critical memory factors, such as age at the timing of encoding and hedge words when judging the credibility of testimony. In two experiments, participants read a 19‐year‐old's testimony regarding a sexual assault. We manipulated whether participants learned that the assault occurred 4 years ago (when the claimant was 15 years old) or 15 years ago (when the claimant was 4 years old) and whether the claimant used hedge words in her testimony. In Experiment 2, we included a cross‐examination. Without the cross‐examination, participants rated the testimony as more credible when the assault had occurred 15 years ago. However, with the inclusion of a cross‐examination, participants rated the testimony more reliable when the event occurred 4 years ago and the claimant did not use hedge words. We discuss the implications our results have, particularly for historical cases, where memory is a key factor.     

Reading,feeling, believing: online testimonies and the making of Evangelical emotion

A personal relationship with God is central to Evangelical belief. It unfolds as believers interpret internal sensations as coming from outside—from God. How does the formulaic design of testimonies present the audience with a personal relationship with God as a pursuit that is both feasible and deeply desirable? Analyzing the discursive rules structuring the appearance of emotion in the most popular testimonies on the online platform of Christianity Today reveals that such texts expertly present a microcosm in which the experience of reading mirrors the trajectory toward belief writers describe. To read a testimony from start to finish, readers must choose to tolerate the unfamiliar: that is, feel emotions that specifically belong in an Evangelical frame. Online written testimony relies on compelling storytelling to move readers, making them practise what it feels like to hand over part of one’s own story to God.     

Rumor mongering and remembering: how rumors originating in children's inferences can affect memory

This study examined how rumors originating in 3- to 6-year-olds' causal inferences can affect their own and their peers' memories for a personally experienced event. This was accomplished by exposing some members of classrooms to contextual clues that were designed to induce inferences about the causes of two unresolved components of the event. After a 1-week delay, a substantial number of children who were exposed to the clues misremembered their inferences as actual experiences. Causal inferential memory errors were most pronounced among 5- and 6-year-olds. Also, many of the children whose classmates were exposed to the clues mistakenly incorporated their classmates' causal inferences into their own accounts, with 3- and 4-year-olds being most likely to make this error.     

‘The witness who saw, /he left little doubt’: a comparative consideration of expert testimony in mental disability law cases in common and civil law systems

The question of how courts assess expert evidence—especially when mental disability is an issue—raises the corollary question of whether courts adequately evaluate the content of the expert testimony or whether judicial decision making may be influenced by teleology (‘cherry picking’ evidence), pretextuality (accepting experts who distort evidence to achieve socially desirable aims), and/or sanism (allowing prejudicial and stereotyped evidence). Such threats occur despite professional standards in forensic psychology and other mental health disciplines that require ethical expert testimony. The result is expert testimony that, in many instances, is at best incompetent and at worst biased. The paper details threats to competent expert testimony in a comparative law context—in both the common law (involuntary civil commitment laws and risk assessment criminal laws) and, more briefly, civil law. We conclude that teleology, pretextuality, and sanism have an impact upon judicial decision making in both the common law and civil law. Finally, we speculate as to whether the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is likely to have any impact on practices in this area. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion

Abstract

I can, given the right conditions, transmit my knowledge to you by telling you some information. If I know the time, and if all goes well, I can bring it about that you know it too. If conditions are right, all I have to do is assert to you what time it is. Paradigmatically, speakers use assertions to transmit what they know to their hearers. Clearly, assertion and testimony are tightly connected. The nature of this connection, however, is not so clear. According to many accounts, assertion has an epistemic constitutive norm. This norm appears to be able to account for some important features of testimony: first, testimonial knowledge transmission, second, the reliability of testimony, and third, the epistemic rights exchanged in cases of testimony. In this paper, however, I argue against this apparent ability. The constitutive norm of assertion, I argue, plays no role in accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission, or of the epistemic rights that testimony confers. This is especially clear when we consider the general norms to which we’re held. Epistemological accounts of testimony can and should, therefore, avoid the difficult debate over the constitutive norm of assertion.     

Psychological evidence in the courtroom: critical reflections on the general acceptance standard

The increasing ties between psychology and law have familiarized psychologists with the standards by which law admits scientific evidence into the courtroom. In the USA, these include the general acceptance standard and the Daubert guidelines and, in the UK, the Turner Rule. However, the psychological literature has largely failed to make clear the degree of legal debate that exists concerning the clarity and effectiveness of such standards. This paper will focus on the general acceptance standard, examining key problems of this standard and placing them in a specifically psychological context. Such consideration is important precisely because the standard has become so well known within the psychological literature and because insufficient attention has been given to the way in which it operates implicitly within jurisdictions outside the USA. The authors argue that it is the responsibility of psychologists to become more involved in the debate concerning admissibility standards, given the credibility and authority that law accords to psychology when admitting it into the courtroom. In particular, psychologists need to become more self-reflective about their role in creating and maintaining such standards. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forensic neuropsychiatric evaluation of a personal injury case

Civil litigation involving the forensic neuropsychiatric evaluation of a personal injury case requires an assessment of damages and causation. The expert witness is obliged to integrate data from three critical sources of information: the review of records; the results of neuropsychological testing; and the findings from the clinical examination. In civil litigation involving a personal injury claim, the expert witness can be expected to address causation and prognosis of any neuropsychiatric damages. We discuss the undertaking of a forensic neuropsychiatric evaluation, psychiatric disorders often encountered in personal injury litigation, provide case vignettes and describe a number of special types of forensic neuropsychiatric evaluations, for example, Workers' Compensation, VA Disability and Social Security Disability.     

Can rapport building strategies,age, and question type influence preschoolers’ disclosures of adult wrongdoing?

In the present experiment, we examined preschoolers’ disclosures of a secret as a function of rapport building strategies used in Scandinavian field settings (verbal rapport building vs. prop rapport building), age in months (33–75 months) and question type (open-ended free recall invitation vs. suggestive questions). Fifty-three preschoolers (M = 60.5 months old, SD = 11.4) witnessed a researcher break a toy and were asked to keep the toy breakage a secret. The children were thereafter interviewed about the incident. Overall, 18.9% of the children disclosed the secret after an open-ended free recall invitation. The disclosure rate rose to 83% after the final phase of the interviews when questions containing suggestive details were asked of the children. Notably, we did not observe any significant effects as a function of manipulating rapport building strategy. A linear regression model showed that child age (in months) significantly predicted the amount of reported details, with younger preschoolers reporting fewer details compared to older preschoolers. Age also predicted the amount of correct details, but not the amount of incorrect details. No age differences were found with regard to children’s disclosure tendencies or proportion of central details about the secret. Methodological limitations and practical implications will be addressed.     

Measurement scales and scale independence in the analytic hierarchy process

One approach to evaluate the relative performance of decision alternatives with respect to multiple criteria is provided by the analytic hierarchy process. The method is based on pairwise comparisons between attributes, and several numerical measurement scales for the ratio statements have been proposed. The choice of measurement scale is re‐examined, and new arguments supporting the measurement scale of geometric progression are derived. Separately from the measurement scale considerations, the effects of the scale parameter in geometric measurement scale are also studied. By using a regression model for pairwise comparisons data, it is shown that the statistical inference does not depend on the value of the scale parameter in the case of a single pairwise comparison matrix. It is also shown when the scale independence of statistical inference can be achieved in a decision hierarchy. This requires the use of the geometric‐mean aggregation rule instead of the traditional arithmetic‐mean aggregation. The results of the case study demonstrate that the measurement scale and the aggregation rule have potentially large impacts on decision support. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.