Reasoned use of expertise in argumentation

This article evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of arguments based on appeals to expertise. The intersection of two areas is explored: (i) the traditional argumentum ad verecundiam (literally, appeal to modesty, but characteristically the appeal to the authority of expert judgment) in informal logic, and (ii) the uses of expert systems in artificial intelligence. The article identifies a model of practical reasoning that underlies the logic of expert systems and the model of argument appropriate for the informal logic of the argumentum ad verecundiam.     

Exploring the Theory and Paradigm Base for Wraparound

Until recently, family-centered policy and practice used expert models which defined families of children with serious emotional disturbance as dysfunctional A collaborative model, called wraparound, is emerging which engages these families as decision making participants, using naturally occurring strengths to wrap individualized supports around the child and family. However, because wraparound has been defined only through value-based principles, the fidelity of the model is threatened by a developmental paradox. Those who have received training and whose careers have been shaped in more traditional expert models of deficit remediation can interpret these value-based principles as an emergent form of case management methodology. Critical and constructivist paradigms, and ecological systems theory, form a basis for negotiating this paradox to maintain fidelity of wraparound process. Anchored in this base, and derived from wraparound's value-based principles, a single construct with an operative focus is suggested to ensure the integrity of this collaborative model.     

And so indeed are perfect cheat

Ethical discourse and fallacy theory come together in a natural way over concepts such as bias, prejudice, preconceived opinion, prototypical and stereotypical thinking, dogmatism and loyalty. By and large, these are concepts that have not been sufficiently worked up to bear the theoretical weight either of ethics or of logic. The present paper seeks to ameliorate this situation. It proposes that situations describable by any such concepts partition into (a) the rationally and morally regrettable and (b) the rationally and morally impeccable, and in any event, unavoidable. Finding (b) will come as a surprise to some theorists.[A]ll the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented are for nothing else but to insinuate wrongIdeas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat; And therefore, however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided. ...John Locke,Essay on Human Understanding, Book III.     

证据顺序和证词自信度对学前末期儿童因果推理的影响

开展两个实验探究证据顺序和证词自信水平对5岁儿童因果推理的影响机制。132名和127名5岁儿童分别参与实验1和实验2。实验1发现证据顺序对儿童因果推理的影响表现为近因效应,但证词的自信水平差异不影响儿童的因果推理;实验2发现如果儿童注意到证词的自信水平信息,他们更倾向于在自信证词条件依据证词推断因果关系,证据顺序的影响力被削弱。研究结果说明证据顺序变化导致易受影响的近因效应。     

Narrative skill and testimonial accuracy in typically developing children and those with intellectual disabilities

Children must describe maltreatment coherently for their testimony to be influential in court. We know little about how well children with intellectual disabilities (CWID) describe their experiences relative to typically developing (TD) children, despite CWID's vulnerability to maltreatment. We investigated children's reports of an experienced event and compared coherence in CWID (mild to moderate impairment: 7–11 years) with TD children matched for mental (4–10 years) or chronological age (7–11 years). All children included important markers of narrative coherence in their reports. Children with lower mental ages, particularly those with an intellectual disability, included fewer markers of narrative coherence in their reports than children with higher mental ages. Individual markers of narrative coherence, particularly recall of content, predicted accuracy of testimony and resistance to suggestion even when disability and mental age were taken into account. These findings highlight the importance of helping children to describe their experiences coherently.     

When Eyewitnesses Talk

ABSTRACT— When two people witness an event, they often discuss it. Because memory is not perfect, sometimes this discussion includes errors. One person's errors can become part of another person's account, and this proliferation of error can lead to miscarriages of justice. In this article, we describe the social and cognitive processes involved. Research shows how people combine information about their own memory with other people's memories based on factors such as confidence, perceived expertise, and the social cost of disagreeing with other people. We describe the implications of this research for eyewitness testimony.     

Forbidding Science: Some Beginning Reflections

Growing powers to manipulate human bodies and minds, not merely to heal disease but to satisfy desires, control deviant behavior, and to change human nature, make urgent questions of whether and how to regulate their use, not merely to assure safety and efficacy but also to safeguard our humanity. Oversight in democratic societies rightly belongs to the polity, not merely to self-appointed experts, scientific or ethical. Yet the task of governing the uses of dangerous knowledge is daunting, and there is little evidence that we have the will or the wisdom to do it well.

High-level Enactive and Embodied Cognition in Expert Sport Performance

Abstract

Mental representation has long been central to standard accounts of action and cognition generally, and in the context of sport. We argue for an enactive and embodied account that rejects the idea that representation is necessary for cognition, and posit instead that cognition arises, or is enacted, in certain types of interactions between organisms and their environment. More specifically, we argue that enactive theories explain some kinds of high-level cognition, those that underlie some of the best performances in sport and similar practices (dance, martial arts), better than representational accounts. Flow and mushin (mindfully fluid awareness) are explained enactively to this end. This results in a mutually beneficial analysis where enactivism offers theoretical and practical advantages as an explanation of high performance in sports, while the latter validates enactivism.     

The impact of evidence lineups on fingerprint expert decisions

Forensic examiners routinely compare a crime-relevant mark of unknown origin against a single suspect's sample, which may create an expectation that the two will match. We tested how embedding the suspect's sample among known-innocent fillers (i.e., an evidence lineup) affects expert decision-making. Experienced fingerprint examiners (N = 43) compared crime-relevant marks against either individual suspect fingerprints (i.e., the standard procedure) or arrays of fingerprints (i.e., evidence lineups), with a matching fingerprint either present or absent. Evidence lineups promoted conservative decision-making, as evidenced by fewer correct IDs and a higher rate of inconclusive judgments. Though errors were rare, evidence lineups also occasionally revealed errors that would have otherwise gone undetected. Our findings thus support arguments that evidence lineups can expose fraud, identify flawed methodologies, and curb overconfidence. The potential benefits and challenges of implementing evidence lineups in forensic laboratories are discussed.     

Rumor mongering and remembering: how rumors originating in children's inferences can affect memory

This study examined how rumors originating in 3- to 6-year-olds' causal inferences can affect their own and their peers' memories for a personally experienced event. This was accomplished by exposing some members of classrooms to contextual clues that were designed to induce inferences about the causes of two unresolved components of the event. After a 1-week delay, a substantial number of children who were exposed to the clues misremembered their inferences as actual experiences. Causal inferential memory errors were most pronounced among 5- and 6-year-olds. Also, many of the children whose classmates were exposed to the clues mistakenly incorporated their classmates' causal inferences into their own accounts, with 3- and 4-year-olds being most likely to make this error.