Is compatibilism intuitive?

Eddy Nahmias, with various collaborators, has used experimental data to argue for the claim that folk intuition is generally compatibilist. We try to undermine this claim in two ways. First, we argue that the various formulations of determinism he uses are not conceptually equivalent, jeopardizing the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from the resulting data. Second, prompted by these conceptual worries we supplement the typical quantitative surveys that dominate the extant literature with short qualitative interviews. This, in turn, guides us to make a minor modification to the quantitative survey that provides better access to the relevant folk intuitions.     

Changing views: the effect of explicit perception-focus instructions on perspective-taking

In two experiments, we examined whether explicit attention to another’s perspective fosters perspective-taking. In the first experiment, we attempted to replicate previous findings showing that a mind-set focusing on self-other differences incites speakers to adopt another’s viewpoint in a subsequent task. However, our results showed that speakers focusing on self-other differences were just as likely to describe an object’s location from their egocentric perspective as speakers focusing on self-other similarities. In the second experiment, we intensified speakers’ awareness of perspectives by explicitly instructing them to regard their own (self-focus) or another’s (other-focus) viewpoint during the perspective-taking task. Participants allocated to the baseline did not receive explicit focus instructions. Findings revealed that other-focused speakers were more likely to adopt another’s perspective than self-focused speakers. However, compared to the baseline, an explicit other-focus did not foster perspective-taking. We conclude that an explicit awareness of perspective differences does not attenuate speakers’ egocentricity bias.     

States of identity: a perspective drawing upon Fordham's model and infant studies

This paper examines the Jungian concept of identity and distinguishes it from projective identification and participation mystique which also refer to non-differentiation between self and object but involve projective mechanisms. Clinical work by Fordham and a psychoanalytic infant observation are used to illustrate early perceptual operations defined by experimental researches. These operations are understood to be expressions of the primary self which manifest themselves before the structuring necessary for normal projective identification. This paper attempts to describe an intersubjective experience between mother and baby that allows for their separate ways of relating, but does not depend on projective mechanisms that can exist only after there has been adequate development.