Introduction

Cognitive behavioral therapy evolved from systematic studies testing learning theories. This research led to the development of effective treatment approaches for a variety of disorders. In more recent years we have moved away from relying on experimental psychopathology studies to directly inform our treatment approaches. This paper describes why the alienation from experimental psychopathology studies is detrimental to the advancement of treatment approaches. Examples of how systematic research can be conducted to address questions regarding treatment mechanisms and moderators are provided. Drawing on experimental psychopathology research can also lead to a better understanding of core processes of psychopathology, which in turn can lead to transdiagnostic treatment approaches.     

The Others Will Help: The Presence of Multiple Video Game Characters Reduces Helping After the Game Is Over

The bystander effect refers to the phenomenon that individuals are less likely to help if there are potential other helpers present. For instance, past research revealed that participants were less likely to help computer-controlled characters if there were other computer-controlled characters present. Research has also shown that the bystander effect occurs if the presence of others is merely imagined. The present research examined the idea that the presence of multiple characters within a video game reduces the player's helping behavior even after the video game is over. In fact, participants who played a video game with multiple characters present were less likely to devote time to assisting in a future study than participants who had played the same video game with only a single character present.     

Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias

Philosophers have developed three theories of luck: the probability theory, the modal theory, and the control theory. To help assess these theories, we conducted an empirical investigation of luck attributions. We created eight putative luck scenarios and framed each in either a positive or a negative light. Furthermore, we placed the critical luck event at the beginning, middle, or end of the scenario to see if the location of the event influenced luck attributions. We found that attributions of luckiness were significantly influenced by the framing of the scenario and by the location of the critical event. Positively framing an event led to significantly higher lucky ratings than negatively framing the same exact event. And the closer a negative event was placed toward the end of a scenario, the more unlucky the event was rated. Overall, our results raise the possibility that there is no such thing as luck and thereby pose serious challenges to the three prominent theories of luck. We instead propose that luck may be a cognitive illusion, a mere narrative device used to frame stories of success or failure.     

Everyday sadism predicts violent video game preferences

Playing violent video games has become an integral part of the lives of many people, although some people more than others may be predisposed to enjoy violent video games. Two cross-sectional studies examined the extent to which everyday sadism predicts the amount of violent video game play. Past research has shown that everyday sadists obtain pleasure from cruel behaviors. Hence, I reasoned that everyday sadists are drawn to violent video games because killing game characters might be an opportunity to satisfy their need for cruelty. In fact, results revealed a positive link between everyday sadism and the amount of violent video game exposure. Moreover, this relation statistically held when controlling for the impact of trait aggression, the Big 5, narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy.     

An Optimized Design of Choice Experiments: A New Approach for Studying Decision Behavior in Choice Task Experiments

In this paper, we present a new approach for the optimal experimental design problem of generating diagnostic choice tasks, where the respondent's decision strategy can be unambiguously deduced from the observed choice. In this new approach, we applied a genetic algorithm that creates a one‐to‐one correspondence between a set of predefined decision strategies and the alternatives of the choice task; it also manipulates the characteristics of the choice tasks. In addition, this new approach takes into account the measurement errors that can occur when the preferences of the decision makers are being measured. The proposed genetic algorithm is capable of generating diagnostic choice tasks even when the search space of possible choice tasks is very large. As proof‐of‐concept, we used this novel approach to generate respondent‐specific choice tasks with either low or high context‐based complexity that we operationalize by the similarity of alternatives and the conflict between alternatives. We find in an experiment that an increase in the similarity of the alternatives and an increase in the number of conflicts within the choice task lead to an increased use of non‐compensatory strategies and a decreased use of compensatory decision strategies. In contrast, the size of the choice tasks, measured by the number of attributes and alternatives, only weakly influences the strategy selection. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From

Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise.     

Caricatures,Myths, and White Lies

Pedagogical situations require white lies: in teaching philosophy we make decisions about what to omit, what to emphasise, and what to distort. This article considers when it is permissible to distort the historical record, arguing for a tempered respect for the historical facts. It focuses on the rationalist/empiricist distinction, which still frames most undergraduate early modern courses despite failing to capture the intellectual history of that period. It draws an analogy with Michael Strevens's view on idealisation in causal explanation to distinguish between myths and caricatures. Myths are distortions of the historical record that undermine students' understanding of the past, despite having other pedagogical benefits (being illuminative of some other period, or helping uptake of philosophical skills and methods). Caricatures are distortions that either increase or are indifferent to understanding of the past. Mythmaking, the article argues, is unjustified.     

THE MODERN INVENTION OF “SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION”: WHAT FOLLOWS?

I am grateful to the four reviewers of The Territories of Science and Religion for their careful and insightful readings of the book, and their kind words about it. They all got the central arguments pretty much right, and thus any critical comments are not the result of fundamental misunderstandings. While there are some common themes in the assessments, each reviewer, happily, has offered a distinct perspective on the book. For this reason I will deal with their comments in turn, but with a focus throughout on a generally expressed concern about the broader implications of the book's historical analysis, and what positive or concrete proposals might follow from it.