Cognitive-behavioral treatment and antidepressants combined with virtual reality exposure for patients with chronic agoraphobia

In this study we compared the efficacy of virtual reality exposure combined with cognitive-behavioral therapy (VRET) to that of traditional cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) alone in reducing phobic symptoms in a sample of patients with long-term agoraphobia. The study was a between-subject design with three experimental conditions (VRET group, N = 30; CBT group, N = 30; and medication only group, N = 20) and repeated measures (pre-treatment, post-treatment, and six-month follow-up). All patients were receiving antidepressant medication. Results showed that all therapies were statistically effective both at post-treatment and six-month follow-up. The VRET group showed clinical improvement in most variables measured at follow-up. The CBT group showed the highest dropout rates. These results are discussed pointing out that VRET probably serves as an intermediate procedure for an efficient exposure to phobic stimuli. Besides describing the advantages of VRET for the treatment of agoraphobia symptoms in cost-benefit terms, the study also considered issues related to higher treatment adherence and motivation.     

Validation of the Visual Analogue Scale for Anxiety-Revised and school refusal across anxiety profiles

Background/Objectives

This paper aimed to validate the Spanish version of scores of the Visual Analogue Scale for Anxiety-Revised (VAA-R) in child population, and to verify the existence of anxiety profiles and to relate them to school refusal.

Childhood memories of threatening experiences and submissiveness and its relationship to hallucination proneness and ideas of reference: The mediating role of dissociation

Recent studies have emphasized the importance of childhood memories of threatening experiences and submissiveness in a diversity of psychological disorders. The purpose of this work was to study their specific relationship with hallucination proneness and ideas of reference in healthy subjects. The ELES scale for measuring memory of adverse childhood experiences, the DES ‐II scale for measuring dissociation, the LSHS ‐R scale for measuring hallucination proneness, and the REF for ideas of reference were applied to a sample of 472 subjects. A positive association was found between childhood memories of adverse experiences and hallucination proneness and ideas of reference, on one hand, and dissociation on the other. A mediation analysis showed that dissociation was a mediator between the memory of adverse childhood experiences and hallucination proneness on one hand, and ideas of reference on the other. When the role of mediator of the types of dissociative experiences was studied, it was found that absorption and depersonalization mediated between adverse experiences and hallucination proneness. However, this mediating effect was not found between adverse experiences and ideas of reference. The relationship between these last two variables was direct. The results suggest that childhood memories of adverse experiences are a relevant factor in understanding hallucination proneness and ideas of reference. Similarly, dissociation is a specific mediator between adverse childhood experiences and hallucination proneness.     

Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (a) and (b) are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned.     

Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in Its Defense

In psychology, deception is commonly used to increase experimental control. Yet, its use has provoked concerns that it raises participants' suspicions, prompts second-guessing of experimenters' true intentions, and ultimately distorts behavior and endangers the control it is meant to achieve. Over time, these concerns regarding the methodological costs of the use of deception have been subjected to empirical analysis. We review the evidence stemming from these studies.     

Religious Context and Prosociality: An Experimental Study from Valparaíso,Chile

Are people more prosocial in a religious context? We addressed this question through an experiment. We randomly placed participants in the control group in a neutral location (a lecture hall), and we placed participants in the experimental group in a religious location (a chapel). The participants then took part in a one‐shot three‐person public goods game, which measured participants’ degree of cooperativeness. The results showed that participants in the experimental group cooperated significantly more than did participants in the control group. Furthermore, participants’ beliefs about other participants’ cooperativeness were more positive in the experimental group than they were in the control group. Improved expectations of others partially explained the enhanced cooperation in the religious context. We found no main or interaction effect of self‐reported religiosity in the experiment.     

In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy

Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distinguishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philosophers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philosophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental philosophy, both pro and con. The article argues, first, that the broader view is the only plausible one; discussions of experimental philosophy should recognize that the narrow view is a caricature of experimental philosophy as it is currently done. It then shows both how objections to experimental philosophy are transformed and how positive recommendations can be provided by adopting a broad conception of experimental philosophy.     

Con D. A. Norman

RESUMEN

J. J. Aparicio presenta a D. A. Norman como uno de los representantes más cualificados de lo que se ha dado en llamar “psicología cognitiva”, siendo uno de los primeros que rompieron con la tradición de Ebbinhaus al incorporar la investigación sobre la memoria. En esta entrevista el autor responde a cuestiones tales como la relación entre sus trabajos y los del resto de psicólogos cognitivos, las limitaciones de la psicología cognitiva en sus comienzos y el papel que ha desempeñado Chomsky y la lingüística en general en el desarrollo de ésta. Seguidamente nos explica qué entiende por esquema -cuestión en la que se ha centrado últimamente- y las diferencias entre la concepción piagetiana y la suya. También comenta el concepto de profundidad de procesamiento, la distinción entre memoria episódica y semántica y el estudio del control consciente e inconsciente. La última parte de la entrevista se centra en las relaciones entre el trabajo teórico y el experimental, finalizando con algunas alusiones al camino que deben seguir los psicólogos españoles para contribuir al desarrollo de su disciplina.     

Diferencias individuales en cognición: una nueva aproximación a la inteligencia

RESUMEN

El hecho de las diferencias individuales en el funcionamiento mental es una realidad. Su amplitud y naturaleza tiene unas consecuencias tan importantes en nuestra cultura que hace que la sociedad demande una forma de medir la inteligencia. No obstante algunos psicólogos opinan que los tests de inteligencia son un instrumento de medida que no representa adecuadamente un modelo formal de la dinámica de los procesos de pensamiento. Este artículo consiste en una serie de argumentos teóricos y empíricos contra la separación de los tests y las teorías cognitivas. Se piensa, en este artículo, que se pueden producir substanciales beneficios del acercamiento entre el psicólogo experimental y el psicómetra; los datos disponibles indican cómo se puede producir este acercamiento.