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刘腾飞 徐富明 张军伟 蒋多 陈雪玲 LIU Teng-Fei XU Fu-Ming ZHANG Jun-Wei JIANG Duo CHEN Xue-Ling 《心理科学进展》2010,18(10):1636-1643
安于现状偏差是指个体在决策时,倾向于不作为、维持当前或者以前的决策的一种现象。安于现状偏差包括内源的安于现状偏差与外源的安于现状偏差。目前研究者对这一现象的解释主要有两种:损失规避与后悔理论。安于现状偏差的影响因素主要包括备择项的数目、决策者的情绪以及认知与动机特征等。安于现状偏差有利于认识日常决策行为,而且在销售、管理与公共政策等实践领域有着重要的研究价值。未来的研究则需要从安于现状偏差与其他决策现象之间的关系,安于现状偏差的产生根源及其应用研究的拓展等方面来进一步探讨。 相似文献
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以往不作为惯性领域的研究发现, 当个体没有获得先前更优机会是源于他人或外界等不可控因素时, 个体仍会倾向于继续放弃当前次优机会, 且后悔情绪未能对此进行解释。本研究认为失望情绪适用于解释此种情况下的不作为惯性, 或可成为后悔情绪解释的有效补充。本研究通过两个实验首次探讨了失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用。结果发现, 各自变量对失望情绪(体验失望和预期失望)和作为可能性均具有一致的影响力, 且预期失望在不作为惯性的产生中具有中介作用。本研究表明, 失望情绪可能也是导致不作为惯性的一个重要因素。 相似文献
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Late‐life Depression,Suicidal Ideation,and Attempted Suicide: The Role of Individual Differences in Maximizing,Regret, and Negative Decision Outcomes 下载免费PDF全文
Wändi Bruine de Bruin Alexandre Y. Dombrovski Andrew M. Parker Katalin Szanto 《决策行为杂志》2016,29(4):363-371
Suicide rates are highest in adults of middle and older age. Research with psychiatric patients has shown that proneness to feel regret about past decisions can grow so intense that suicide becomes a tempting escape. Here, we examine the additional role of individual differences in maximizing, or the tendency to strive for the best decision, rather than one that is good enough. We provided individual‐difference measures of maximizing, regret proneness, and negative life decision outcomes (as reported on the Decision Outcome Inventory) to a nonpsychiatric control group, as well as three groups of psychiatric patients in treatment for suicide attempts, suicidal ideation, or non‐suicidal depression. We found that scores on the three individual‐difference measures were worse for psychiatric patients than for nonpsychiatric controls and were correlated to clinical assessments of depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation. More importantly, maximizing was associated with these clinical assessments, even after taking into account maximizers' worse life decision outcomes. Regret proneness significantly mediated those relationships, suggesting that maximizers could be at risk for clinical depression because of their proneness to regret. We discuss the theoretical relevance of our findings and their promise for clinical practice. Ultimately, late‐life depression and suicidal ideation may be treated with interventions that promote better decision making and regret regulation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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The unfavorable comparison between the obtained and expected outcomes of our choices may elicit disappointment. When the comparison is made with the outcome of alternative actions, emotions like regret can serve as a learning signal. Previous work showed that both anticipated disappointment and regret influence decisions. In addition, experienced regret is associated with higher emotional responses than disappointment. Yet it is not clear whether this amplification is due to additive effects of disappointment and regret when the outcomes of alternative actions are available, or whether it reflects the learning feature of regret signals. In this perspective, we used eye‐tracking to measure the visual pattern of information acquisition in a probabilistic lottery task. In the partial feedback condition, only the outcome of the chosen lottery was revealed, while in the complete feedback condition, participants could compare their outcome with that of the non‐chosen lottery, giving them the opportunity to experience regret. During the decision phase, visual patterns of information acquisition were consistent with the assessment of anticipated regret, in addition to a clear assessment of lotteries' expected values. During the feedback phase, subjective ratings and eye‐tracking results confirmed that participants compared their outcome with the outcome of the non‐chosen lottery in the complete feedback condition, particularly after a loss, and ignored the non‐realized outcome of the chosen option. Moreover, participants who made more visual saccades consistent with counterfactual comparisons during the feedback period anticipated regret more in their decisions. These results are consistent with the proposed adaptive function of regret. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 相似文献
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后悔的一致性模型:理论和证据 总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11
重新检验Gilovich和Medvec的后悔时间性模型。该模型认为,与假设思维有关的短期后悔的研究结果相反,人们日常生活中最大的后悔(长期后悔)多是“不做”而不是“做”的后悔。该文认为这一理论上的矛盾来自于双方对“做/不做”概念以及“做-不做”规律适用范围的不同理解。该研究使用这一新的分类方法,发现和短期后悔一样,至少一半的长期后悔来自于“状态改变”的后悔。这此基础上提出后悔的一致性模型,认为长期 相似文献
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Geoffrey Scarre 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2017,25(5):569-585
In this paper I defend and develop Bernard Williams’ claim that the ‘constitutive thought’ of regret is ‘something like “how much better if it had been otherwise”’. An introductory section on cognitivist theories of emotion is followed by a detailed investigation of the concept of ‘agent-regret’ and of the ways in which the ‘constitutive thought’ might be articulated in different situations in which agents acknowledge casual responsibility for bringing about undesirable outcomes. Among problematic cases discussed are those in which agents have caused harm through no fault of their own, or have been constrained to choose the lesser of two evils or to act against their moral values. R. Jay Wallace’s ‘bourgeois predicament’ and related cases, in which we recognize that our present advantages have flowed from regrettable antecedents, further show that regret is often not a simple emotion, and it is argued that conflicted regrets are sometimes unavoidable. Finally, the paper looks at Descartes’ account of regret as a form of sadness engendered by the recollection of irrecoverable happy experiences, to which the ‘constitutive thought’ does not readily apply. It is suggested that what Descartes is discussing is a different genre of emotion for which ‘nostalgia’ might be a better name. 相似文献
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Decision‐makers are sometimes depicted as impulsive and overly influenced by ‘hot’, affective factors. The present research suggests that decision‐makers may be too ‘cold’ and overly focus on rationalistic attributes, such as economic values, quantitative specifications, and functions. In support of this proposition, we find a systematic inconsistency between predicted experience and decision. That is, people are more likely to favor a rationalistically‐superior option when they make a decision than when they predict experience. We discuss how this work contributes to research on predicted and decision utilities; we also discuss when decision‐makers overweight hot factors and when they overweight cold factors. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献