A Note on Recurring Misconceptions When Fitting Nonlinear Mixed Models

Nonlinear mixed-effects (NLME) models are used when analyzing continuous repeated measures data taken on each of a number of individuals where the focus is on characteristics of complex, nonlinear individual change. Challenges with fitting NLME models and interpreting analytic results have been well documented in the statistical literature. However, parameter estimates as well as fitted functions from NLME analyses in recent articles have been misinterpreted, suggesting the need for clarification of these issues before these misconceptions become fact. These misconceptions arise from the choice of popular estimation algorithms, namely, the first-order linearization method (FO) and Gaussian-Hermite quadrature (GHQ) methods, and how these choices necessarily lead to population-average (PA) or subject-specific (SS) interpretations of model parameters, respectively. These estimation approaches also affect the fitted function for the typical individual, the lack-of-fit of individuals’ predicted trajectories, and vice versa.     

Expertise in soccer teams: A thematic inquiry into the role of Shared Mental Models within team chemistry

AimsThe purpose of the current study was to establish a conceptual framework of team chemistry components in sport with an emphasis on Shared Mental Models (SMM).MethodElite soccer coaches (n = 6) and players (n = 3) were interviewed using a semi-structured interview guide. An inductive thematic analysis was employed to analyze the data.ResultsFour themes related to team chemistry components were identified: (1) members' characteristics (i.e., demographic data, on-field characteristics, and member's ego), (2) coach–players interactions (i.e., professional interaction and emotional intelligence of coaches), (3) interactions among the players (i.e., professional understanding, efficacy beliefs, team cohesion, players' emotional intelligence, team roles, and goals), and (4) interactions with environmental factors (i.e., owners, management, fans, and media).ConclusionsThe cognitive components of the team chemistry model were clustered to establish a conceptual framework of SMM. Furthermore, the cognitive-affective-social-behavioral linkage of team chemistry and athletic performance is examined in light of the emerged model and conceptual framework. Implications and future directions are also discussed.     

Children's and Mothers' Contribution to Joint Reminiscing in Different Sociocultural Contexts: Who Speaks and What is Said

The study compares mothers' conversation with their 4‐year‐old children about two past events in two autonomy‐oriented (35 German and 42 Swedish families), one relatedness‐oriented (22 Cameroonian Nso families) and one autonomy‐relatedness oriented (38 Estonian families) contexts. German mothers were rather similar to Swedish mothers in talking a lot, providing a lot of information and engaging children into conversation, but they differed from Swedish mothers by talking more about social content. Swedish children were more independent conversational partners to their mothers than other children, including German children. Estonian mothers' contribution to conversation was similar to Cameroonian Nso mothers, except that they asked a lot of open‐ended questions to engage children in conversations. Estonian children did not differ from Swedish and German children in their contribution to conversations. Compared to Swedish mothers, past event talk of Estonian mothers was characterized by a bigger proportion of talk devoted to social content, but also to the child, mental states and non‐social content. It was characteristic of Cameroonian Nso mothers that they focused more on other people and actions, and their conversational dominance was larger. Differences in reminiscing were consistent with different cultural models of self and the type of autonomy – psychological or action – promoted. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Still Doing Fine? The Interplay of Negative Life Events and Self‐Esteem During Young Adulthood

This longitudinal study investigated the bidirectional relationship between negative life events and self‐esteem during the transition from adolescence to young adulthood (N = 2272). Drawing on theories of human development over the lifespan and just‐world theory, we analyzed age‐graded changes in self‐esteem and their interplay with negative life events at three measurement points over a 12‐year period. We addressed both the short‐term and the longer term effects of single as well as multiple negative life events on changes in self‐esteem (socialization effects). We further investigated whether the pre‐event level of self‐esteem affected the likelihood of negative life events occurring (selection effects) and, finally, whether it had protective effects in terms of helping people adjust to negative events. Latent change models yielded four main findings: (i) self‐esteem increased during young adulthood; (ii) socialization effects were observed over shorter and longer timespans, but (iii) selection effects were only found for multiple negative life events, with low self‐esteem predicting a high number of negative life events; (iv) high pre‐event self‐esteem acted as a protective factor, attenuating declines in self‐esteem after experience of multiple negative life events. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

组织中的人际冲突:类型、模型与表达

组织中的人际冲突是组织成员在分歧、负面情绪与干扰的相互作用下,通过意义建构导致互动双方在认知、情感与行为方面产生的一系列反应过程。现有研究将组织中的人际冲突分为单特征型和多特征型,集中探讨作用模型,并基于表达层面解析冲突的维度和作用模式。本文尝试将冲突类型、表达方式以及作用模型进行嵌入式整合,提出组织中人际冲突的具体应对策略。未来研究可将认知差异嵌入过程框架,探求冲突显现的临界点,验证应对方式的有效性,探究组织权力的影响,开展基于多元亚文化下组织中人际冲突的本土化研究。     

Walking through doorways causes forgetting: Event structure or updating disruption?

According to event cognition theory, people segment experience into separate event models. One consequence of this segmentation is that when people transport objects from one location to another, memory is worse than if people move across a large location. In two experiments participants navigated through a virtual environment, and recognition memory was tested in either the presence or the absence of a location shift for objects that were recently interacted with (i.e., just picked up or set down). Of particular concern here is whether this location updating effect is due to (a) differences in retention intervals as a result of the navigation process, (b) a temporary disruption in cognitive processing that may occur as a result of the updating processes, or (c) a need to manage multiple event models, as has been suggested in prior research. Experiment 1 explored whether retention interval is driving this effect by recording travel times from the acquisition of an object and the probe time. The results revealed that travel times were similar, thereby rejecting a retention interval explanation. Experiment 2 explored whether a temporary disruption in processing is producing the effect by introducing a 3-second delay prior to the presentation of a memory probe. The pattern of results was not affected by adding a delay, thereby rejecting a temporary disruption account. These results are interpreted in the context of the event horizon model, which suggests that when there are multiple event models that contain common elements there is interference at retrieval, which compromises performance.     

Latent semantic analysis cosines as a cognitive similarity measure: Evidence from priming studies

In distributional semantics models (DSMs) such as latent semantic analysis (LSA), words are represented as vectors in a high-dimensional vector space. This allows for computing word similarities as the cosine of the angle between two such vectors. In two experiments, we investigated whether LSA cosine similarities predict priming effects, in that higher cosine similarities are associated with shorter reaction times (RTs). Critically, we applied a pseudo-random procedure in generating the item material to ensure that we directly manipulated LSA cosines as an independent variable. We employed two lexical priming experiments with lexical decision tasks (LDTs). In Experiment 1 we presented participants with 200 different prime words, each paired with one unique target. We found a significant effect of cosine similarities on RTs. The same was true for Experiment 2, where we reversed the prime-target order (primes of Experiment 1 were targets in Experiment 2, and vice versa). The results of these experiments confirm that LSA cosine similarities can predict priming effects, supporting the view that they are psychologically relevant. The present study thereby provides evidence for qualifying LSA cosine similarities not only as a linguistic measure, but also as a cognitive similarity measure. However, it is also shown that other DSMs can outperform LSA as a predictor of priming effects.     

Considering too few alternatives: The mental model theory of extensional reasoning

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]–88 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. doi:10 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1037 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]/0033 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]-295X Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].106 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].1 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar].62 Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., &; Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62–88. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.62[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.     

Walking through doorways causes forgetting: environmental effects

Previous work has shown a decline in memory for objects carried through a doorway versus across a room. The aim of the current study is to extend this work to understand how variations in perceptual experience during these event shifts influence this finding. First a change in procedure to reduce memory load to a single item was assessed. Next we explored whether performance is influenced by spatial distance versus spatial categories, the ability to perceptually preview the next location, and changes in the colour and texture of the walls. The location updating effect was consistently observed for all manipulations, suggesting that such event transformations have a robust influence on human memory. This suggests that event cognition is driven more by the use of perceptual information to infer or impose a categorical shift from one event to another rather than by the nature of perceptual information available at the time.