Language Acquisition is Language Change

According to the theory of Universal Grammar, the primary linguistic data guides children through an innately specified space of hypotheses. On this view, similarities between child-English and adult-German are as unsurprising as similarities between cousins who have never met. By contrast, experience-based approaches to language acquisition contend that child language matches the input, with nonadult forms being simply less articulated versions of the forms produced by adults. This paper reports several studies that provide support for the theory of Universal grammar, and resist explanation on experience-based accounts. Two studies investigate English-speaking children’s productions, and a third examines the interpretation of sentences by Japanese speaking children. When considered against the input children are exposed to, the findings of these and other studies are consistent with the continuity hypothesis, which supposes that child language can differ from the language spoken by adults only in ways that adult languages can differ from each other.     

Thinking in Picture

Abstract :  We live today in a highly visual culture. Therefore, the author asserts that the use of visual images in preaching is an appropriate response of the church to the challenge of communicating the gospel in our pervasively visualized world. In making this argument, the author reviews the uses of art in the church's historical life, sets forth three theological assumptions that can ground such practice and urges a complementarity of words and images in homiletical practice. Words alone can be used to exclude people (e.g. doubters and heretics) from the embrace of the gospel. Images alone can be so all-inclusive in their meaning that they lead to superstition and idolatry. Words and images used together can communicate a holistic gospel to holistic hearers.     

Logical, Semantic and Cultural Paradoxes

The property common to three kinds of paradoxes (logical, semantic, and cultural) is the underlying presence of an exclusive disjunction: even when it is put to a check by the paradox, it is still invoked at the level of implicit discourse. Hence the argumentative strength of paradoxical propositions is derived. Logical paradoxes (insolubilia) always involve two contradictory, mutually exclusive, truths. One truth is always perceived to the detriment of the other, in accordance with a succession which is endlessly repetitive. A check is put on the principle of the excluded middle by the logical paradoxes, because self-reference leads to an endlessly repeating circle, out of which no resolution is conceivable. Logical paradoxes are to be compared with the `objective ambiguity' prevalent in oracles (Gallet, 1990). Semantic paradoxes are contextually-determined occurrences, whose resolution at the metalinguistic level is made possible by the discovery of a middle term. They express a wilful ambiguity, in which the interlocutor is invited to take an active part in the construction of sense, since what must be found is the unexpected sense thanks to which A and not-A can be asserted simultaneously. Cultural paradoxes play about doxa (`common sense') and openly challenge common opinion because of their character as inopinata (`unexpected'). My aim is to show that even cultural paradoxes hide sometimes a flaw of argumentation similar to logical or semantic paradox; they too imply an exclusive disjunction leading to the disappearance of the middle terms. Finally, basing myself on the theory of topoi (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1983), a tentative resolution of the cultural paradoxes will be suggested.     

An account of subjective probability judgment for joint events: Conjunctive and disjunctive

Probability judgment is a vital part of many aspects of everyday life. In the present paper, we present a new theory of the way in which individuals produce probability estimates for joint events: conjunctive and disjunctive. We propose that a majority of individuals produce conjunctive (disjunctive) estimates by making a quasi‐random adjustment, positive or negative, from the less (more) likely component probability with the other component playing no obvious role. In two studies, we produce evidence supporting propositions that follow from our theory. First, the component probabilities do appear to play the distinct roles we propose in determining the joint event probabilities. Second, contrary to probability theory and other accounts of probability judgment, we show that the conjunctive‐less likely probability difference is unrelated to the more likely disjunctive probability difference (in normative theory these quantities are identical). In conclusion, while violating the norms of probability judgment, we argue that estimates produced in the manner we propose will be close enough to the normative values especially given the changing nature of the external environment and the incomplete nature of available information.     

Médicaments princeps vs. marché concurrentiel. De la motivation obligatoire,au contrôle des motifs médicaux ?

Physicians are free to prescribe the drugs they consider the best for their patients, and simultaneously required to seek healthcare’ cost-effectiveness — especially after patents expiry. While the physician choice of a given molecule is indisputable, French pharmacists gradually gained a large power to choose the brands on chemicals’ and biologics’ competitive markets. In May 2018, the highest judicial Court decided the physician must expressly motivate his exclusive choice of a given brand, and can not simply refuse the brand’ substitution by pharmacists. This unprecedented requirement is extrapolable to all substitutable drugs in France (registered generics and biosimilars). It raises the possible examination of medical choice motives — but in our opinion, it finishes, rather than it opens the arms race between prescribers and mandatory health insurers in France.     

More than,less than,or minimum,maximum: how upper and lower bounds determine subjective interval estimates

Uncertain quantities can be described by single‐point estimates of lower interval bounds (X₁), upper interval bounds (X₂), two‐bound estimates (separate estimates of X₁ and X₂), and by ranges (X₁?X₂). A price estimation task showed that single‐bound estimates phrased as “T costs more than X₁” and “T costs less than X₂,” yielded much larger intervals than “minimum X₁” and “maximum X₂.” This difference can be attributed to exclusive interpretations of X₁ and X₂ in the first case (X₁ and X₂ are unlikely values), and inclusive interpretations in the second (X₁ and X₂ are likely values). This pattern of results was replicated in other domains where participants estimated single targets. When they estimated a distribution of targets, the pattern was reversed. “Minimum” and “maximum” values of variable quantities (e.g., flight prices) were found to delimit larger intervals than “more than” and “less than” estimates. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

一种齐当别思想下的量子决策模型：对囚徒困境中的分离效应的解释

量子决策模型是近10年来提出的一种新型决策模型, 用以解释那些违背经典决策模型的现象。虽然当前的量子决策模型能够解释囚徒困境中的分离效应, 但其中却存在一些困难, 即会产生反常的概率关系以及无法精确拟合分离效应量较大的实验结果。本研究在分析当前量子决策模型困难的基础上, 结合齐当别思想对模型进行改进和优化。结果表明, 研究所构建的量子决策模型克服了当前模型中的困难, 并且能够预测囚徒困境博弈中由他人收益差距改变而引起的分离效应变化趋势。本研究还是一次启发式决策模型与计算式决策模型相结合的探索。     

Synchrnoic consciousness from a neurological point of view: the philosophical foundations for neuroethics

Daniel Kolak’s theory of synchronic consciousness according to which the entire range of dissociative phenomena, from pathologies such as MPD and schizophrenia to normal dream states, are best explained in terms of consciousness becoming simultaneously identified as many selves, has revolutionary therapeutic implications for neurology and psychiatry. All these selves, according to Kolak—even the purely imaginary ones that exist as such only in our dreams—are not just conscious but also self-conscious, with beliefs, intentions, living lives informed by memories (confabulatory, in the case of the fictional ones) and personal histories. Kolak’s derivation of psychiatrically relevant aspects of his theory—a neurological rendition of a Kantian transcendental argument—can be given a straightforward neurological, and therefore open to scientific scrutiny, interpretation that would then more easily lend itself to the clinical setting in which these perplexing phenomena, along with their purveyors, must live and cope. This will be the main focus of this paper.