Counselor Education Students’ Perceptions of Wellness and Mental Health in African American Men: The Effects of Colorism

Colorism is discrimination based on skin tone. Skin color influences clinicians’ diagnostic impressions. The degree to which colorism influences counseling students’ clinical decision making is unknown. This study examined colorism's effect on counselor education master's students’ (N = 154) clinical decisions. Analysis of covariance failed to produce statistically significant results when comparing students’ evaluations of a male African American's mental health and wellness, when controlling for presentation management, across 4 skin tones. Counselors should include colorism in diversity training. El colorismo es la discriminación basada en el tono de la piel. El tono de la piel influye en las impresiones diagnósticas de los profesionales clínicos. Se desconoce hasta qué punto el colorismo influye en las decisiones clínicas de los estudiantes de consejería. Este estudio examinó el efecto del colorismo en las decisiones clínicas de estudiantes de maestría en educación de consejeros (N = 154). El análisis de la covarianza no produjo resultados estadísticamente significativos al comparar las evaluaciones de los estudiantes sobre la salud mental y el bienestar de un cliente afroamericano varón, controlando la gestión de la presentación de 4 tonos de piel diferentes. Los consejeros deberían incluir el colorismo en la capacitación de diversidad.     

进化心理学对心理素质结构研究的整合与重构——以学生心理素质结构研究为例

传统的心理素质结构研究模式不经济,研究结果出现纵向断裂横向分裂的趋势.从进化心理学的视角来看,心理素质结构的最终功能均指向个体的适应性,其形成是与周围环境不断排斥和融合的过程.建构的心理素质结构融合模型能在一定程度上解决传统研究模式的弊端,并建议今后的研究应以分析人为主导转而分析人及其所处的文化环境并重,进而引导人的心理素质结构的不断发展.     

A model of communicative perspective-taking for typical and atypical populations of children

Successful communication requires that individuals attend to the perspective of their conversational partners and use this information to modify their behavior accordingly. This paper presents a framework by which to understand children’s communicative perspective-taking skills and, within this framework, outlines three routes by which children’s communicative perspective-taking performance can be disrupted. First, children may have difficulty in communicative contexts due to deficits in mentalizing ability whereby they are unable to appreciate another’s perspective. Second, children may have intact mentalizing abilities but do not have the cognitive skills to support the use of this information when generating communicative behaviors. Third, decreased social exposure may lead to exacerbated deficits in either mentalizing ability or the use of mentalistic information within communicative contexts. Patterns within both typical and atypical populations (i.e., autism, ADHD, and mood disorders) are reviewed.     

行为免疫系统对个体就医行为倾向的影响

研究首次考察了行为免疫系统与个体就医行为倾向的关系。3个研究一致显示：行为免疫系统特质性激活水平较高的个体更容易对就医持消极态度和延迟就医; 情境性激活行为免疫系统会使得个体更不愿意就医和更倾向于延迟就医; 且行为免疫系统激活对就医态度和就医延迟倾向的影响以对就医感染风险的感知为中介。这支持了进化失配假说, 提示行为免疫系统对现代医学可能缺乏进化的适应性, 并为理解现代人类就医行为提供了新的理论视角。     

Is Disgust Prepared? A Preliminary Examination in Young Children

Children may be prepared to associate adult disgust reactions with adult disgust elicitors. To test this, three-year olds (and adults) were presented with two images and an emotive vocalization. The images and vocalizations included stimuli adults found disgusting, fear-provoking, and sad. On one set of trials, the main dependent variable (DV) was time spent looking at each image and on a second set of repeat trials the DV was knowledge of image-sound matches. Fear and disgust vocalizations were both more effective at orienting a child's attention to adult fear and disgust images, than sad vocalizations. Parental disgust sensitivity was associated with this effect, moderated by explicit matching knowledge. Matching knowledge was poor in children and good in adults. These data suggest that in children, fear and disgust vocalizations may both promote attention to stimuli that adults find disgusting and/or fear-provoking, suggesting that “preparedness” may not be wholly emotion-specific.     

ERNEST BECKER'S PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION FORTY YEARS ON: A VIEW FROM SOCIAL COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

This article distinguishes between three projects in Ernest Becker's (1924–1974) later work: his psychology of “religion,” his psychology of religion, and his psychology of Religion (with a capital R). The first is an analysis of culture and civilization as immortality projects, means by which to deny death. The second, which overlaps with the first, is a characterization of religion‐as‐practiced (e.g., by adherents of the world religions) as a particularly effective immortality project vis‐à‐vis death anxiety. The third is less social scientific and more theological; Becker argues for a view of God that is in the tradition of Søren Kierkegaard and Paul Tillich (and, arguably, Pseudo‐Dionysius, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas). Focusing on the second of these projects—as much has already been written on the first, and little can be said about the third—this article evaluates Becker's claims about religion‐as‐practiced in light of recent developments in social cognitive psychology.     

MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots?     

IMAGO DEI,DUALISM, AND EVOLUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE OF THE STRUCTURAL IMAGE OF GOD

Most contemporary theologians have distanced themselves from views that identify the image of God with a capacity or a set of capacities that humans have. This article examines three arguments against the structural view and finds them wanting. The first argument is that the structural view entails mind/body dualism and dualism is no longer viable given neuroscience and contemporary philosophy. Against this, I argue that contemporary forms of dualism are able to circumvent such worries and are at least prima facie plausible. The second claim is that structural views end up disvaluing the human body and our relatedness. Here, I argue that neither the structural view nor dualism has such consequences. The third issue consists of various evolutionary worries that have to do with the lack of a clear‐cut boundary between human capacities and the capacities of nonhuman animals. As a response, the article argues that although there might not be a clear‐cut set of capacities that all humans share, we could still have a notion of human distinctiveness that is sufficient for the structural image of God.     

The animacy advantage for free-recall performance is not attributable to greater mental arousal

People often demonstrate better memory for animate concepts (e.g., lion and sailor) than for inanimate concepts (e.g., hammer and mountain). Researchers have attributed this effect to an adaptive memory mechanism that favours information relevant for survival, including information about living things. In the present experiment, we examined the hypothesis that people demonstrate better free-recall performance for animate than inanimate words because animate words tend to be associated with greater mental arousal than inanimate words, a factor that was not controlled for in previous experiments on this topic. To this end, we matched animate and inanimate word lists on mental arousal (and several other factors), and compared participants’ free-recall performance for the two word types. We were able to replicate past findings that participants’ free-recall of animate words exceeds their free-recall of inanimate words, but we found no support for the possibility that the effect stems from differences in mental arousal between animate and inanimate concepts, as this effect maintained even when the word lists were matched on mental arousal. The present results therefore indicate that mental arousal cannot explain the effects of animacy on free-recall performance.