EMPATHY AND THE EVOLUTION OF COMPASSION: FROM DEEP HISTORY TO INFUSED VIRTUE

This article poses a challenge to contemporary theories in psychology that portray empathy as a negative force in the moral life. Instead, drawing on alternative psychological and philosophical literature, especially Martha Nussbaum, I argue that empathy is related to the virtue of compassion and therefore crucial for moral action. Evidence for evolutionary anthropological accounts of compassion in early hominins provides additional arguments for its positive value in deep human history. I discuss this work alongside Thomistic notions of practical wisdom, compassion, misericordia, and the importance of reason in the moral life. The tension between “bottom up” accounts of empathy and that according to a theological interpretation of “infused” virtues also needs to be addressed. From a secular perspective, infused virtue is a projection of the ideal moral life, but from a theological perspective, it is a way of understanding how human capacities through the action of grace can reach beyond what seem to be the limits of psychological moral identity.     

RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS EVOLUTIONARY ADAPTATIONS

Scholars employing an evolutionary approach to the study of religion and religious beliefs search for ultimate explanations of the origin, propagation, and persistence of religious beliefs. This quest often pairs in debate two opposing perspectives: the adaptationist and “by‐product” explanations of religion and religious beliefs. The majority of scholars prefer the by‐product approach, which is agnostic and even doubtful of the usefulness of religious beliefs. Despite this pervasive negativity, it seems unwarranted to deny the great usefulness of religious beliefs—particularly concerning their past utility. Instead, adaptationist explanations of religion and religious beliefs must be re‐established as interesting and useful approaches to the study of religious beliefs.     

Methodology to select solutions for multiobjective optimization problems: Weighted stress function method

The weighted stress function method is proposed here as a new way of identifying the best solution from a set of nondominated solutions according to the decision maker's preferences, expressed in terms of weights. The method was tested using several benchmark problems from the literature, and the results obtained were compared with those of other methods, namely, the reference point evolutionary multiobjective optimization (EMO), the weighted Tchebycheff metric, and a goal programming method. The weighted stress function method can be seen to exhibit a more direct correspondence between the weights set by the decision maker and the final solutions obtained than the other methods tested.     

The primal scene in cross-species and cross-cultural perspectives

A review of cross-species and cross-cultural research suggests that, throughout most of human behavioral evolution, children may have been enlightened as to the facts of life by observing parental intercourse and then imitating it in sexual rehearsal play in the context of a continuously rising curve of sexual desire and sexual knowledge throughout childhood. Concealment of the primal scene and prohibition of cross-generational, bisexual, and 'polymorphously perverse' childhood sex play may be of relatively recent origin in human cultural evolution, buttressed by the instillation of culturally acquired sexual disgust in sexually conservative cultures. Looking at the primal scene in cross-species and cross-cultural perspectives utilizing the adaptationist framework of contemporary evolutionary biology can challenge normative assumptions that may still be embedded in psychoanalytic theories of species-wide psychosexual development.     

Cognitive Science of Religion: Looking Back,Looking Forward

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) arose out of attempts to “science up” religious studies and the anthropology of religion without eliminating interpretive approaches. While maintaining this historical orientation, CSR holds promise to help bridge to other areas within the scientific study of religion. Particularly fruitful areas of future collaboration and complementary study are evolutionary studies of religion, psychology of religion, sociology of religion, and archeology of religion. In response to an invitation to explore the potential of CSR for the 50th anniversary of this journal, I briefly summarize CSR's history and current state and then offer exemplary future directions that might bring CSR into fruitful connection with other areas in the greater scientific study of religion.     

INTRINSIC AESTHETIC VALUE REVISTED

Abstract: Every sentient organism needs constantly to re‐assess its environment in order to adjust to any changes in it and to ascertain which aspects are, or become, salient for its current purposes. Such adaptation is of basic evolutionary importance, but for human beings it can be difficult to achieve in the face of radical novelty or when different frames of reference are in conflict. Art by virtue of its integrated structure presents examples of how a partial unification of experience may be envisaged. Art thus helps to meet our constant need for orientation and re‐orientation, though its operation in this respect is invariably outside consciousness. So art can be said to have intrinsic value only within a strictly subjective, phenomenological perspective; more broadly considered from a third‐person viewpoint, the value of art is instrumental. Questions then arise concerning our motivation for seeking or producing art, about the relation of art to other cultural activities, and about the role of pleasure in connection with aesthetic experience; these are briefly discussed.     

Replacing the Moral Foundations: An Evolutionary‐Coalitional Theory of Liberal‐Conservative Differences

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains liberal‐conservative differences as arising from different moral intuitions, with liberals endorsing “individualizing” foundations (Harm and Fairness) and conservatives also endorsing “binding” foundations (Authority, Respect, and Purity). We argue these labels misconstrue ideological differences and propose Evolutionary‐Coalitional Theory (ECT) as an alternative, explaining how competitive dynamics in the ancestral social environment could produce the observed ideological differences. We test ECT against MFT across three studies. Study 1 shows the so‐called “binding” orientation entails the threat‐sensitivity and outgroup antagonism predicted by ECT; that is, an authoritarian motive. Similarly, Study 2 shows the so‐called “individualizing” orientation is better described as a universalizing motive, one reflecting a broader set of moral commitments (e.g., to nature) and a broader sociality than the egocentrism implied by MFT. Study 3 provides a factor analysis reducing “binding” to authoritarianism and “individualizing” to universalism, with the latter loading against social dominance orientation (SDO). A hierarchical regression then provides additional evidence for ECT, showing this dominating motive (SDO) accounts for variance in conservatism that MFT leaves unexplained. Collectively, these three studies suggest that ECT offers a more accurate and precise explanation of the key psychological differences between liberals and conservatives.     

威胁信息的记忆优势

采用威胁信息（蛇类）和非威胁信息（龟类）为实验材料,以词汇和图片两种方式呈现,来探讨是否存在对威胁信息的记忆优势,然后添加威胁和非威胁场景以探究不同的场景启动对威胁信息记忆的影响。结果发现：（1）对威胁信息存在记忆优势,对图片信息的记忆优于词汇信息;（2）在威胁场景下,对威胁词汇和图片信息存在记忆优势,在非威胁场景下,对威胁图片信息存在记忆优势,而对威胁和非威胁词汇的记忆无差异。     

厌恶的起源及其泛化:进化的观点

厌恶是人类的基本情绪之一,也是情绪心理学的研究重点。以进化论为指导的进化心理学对厌恶研究提供了一个崭新的理论视角,认为人类厌恶情绪源于抵御寄生物和保持种群规模的需要。现代人类的多种复杂的道德厌恶感与生理厌恶感有着同样的进化根源,人类的道德心理系统有部分是建立在更为古老的进化适应基础之上。     

Ethics and Intuitions

For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should regard them as having any normative force. Research in the neurosciences should therefore lead us to reconsider the role of intuitions in normative ethics.